外資持股及董事持股質押比率與金控公司經營績效關聯性探討

The Relationship between the Foreign Shareholdings, Pledged Shares Ratio of Directors and the Operating Performance of the Financial Holding Companies

楊美娥(Mei-O Yang)

指導教授 ： 謝德宗

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2012.00704

摘要

本文研究對象為12家本國民營金控公司自2005年第1季至2011年第3季董事持股質押比率、外資持股比率對每股盈餘(EPS)、資產報酬率(ROA)及股東權益報酬率(ROE)發揮的影響，採用panel data模型進行實證，歸納出下列結論：
1.股東權益變化與EPS有顯著正向關係，尤其於2009年之後12家金控公司的外資比重均顯著提升，促使經營績效提昇。
2. 董事持股質押比率與ROA具有明顯負向關係，代表董事如果過度使用財務槓桿來提高持股，虛增持股比率僅為鞏固經營權，將會影響本業經營績效。在考慮債本比的情況下，同樣顯示質押比率越高，資產報酬率必定表現較差。債本比與ROA呈現明顯負向關係，此係金控是高債本產業，如不適當控制債本比，將對資產報酬率產生負面影響。
3. 董事實際持股比率係由董事持股比率乘上未質押比率，其與經營績效(ROE)呈現明顯正向關係，實際持股比率越高，股東權益報酬率表現更加優異。
4.單純僅考慮外資持股比率與ROA具有明顯正向關係。但再考慮其他因素後，外資持股比率卻對ROA的影響則不顯著，此即意味著外資很在意董事是否將其持股質押轉投資，若該金控董事持股質押比率很低，則外資對該金控具有信心，不需特別提高持股比率，來介入經營權，以提升資產報酬率。
由此實證結果顯示，因為台灣特有的法令，開放金控公司董事持股質押，導致外資因此法令鬆綁，也加入持股質押的財務槓桿遊戲，而非專心在本業經營上，造成劣幣驅逐良幣的逆選擇。公司法新修正法令中限制公開發行以上公司董事質押比超過50%以上的股票，不列入表決權之限制太過寬鬆，為加強推動建全金融監理環境，建議進一步加強限制並降低金控公司董事持股質押比率，杜絕少數股東藉持股質押的財務槓桿膨脹持股後當選董事，進而干預公司經營。外資投資的經營績效也會愈好。行政院金管會身為金控公司之主管機關，責無旁貸應在金融控股公司法裡修訂或增訂較公司法更嚴苛之董事持股質押比率之門檻限制，以防止投機董事操控金控公司，促使達成金融國際化的目標。

關鍵字

外資持股 ； 董事持股 ； 持股質押 ； 質押比率 ； 金控公司 ； 公司治理

並列摘要

By investigating 12 local private financial holding companies to probe the influence of the pledged shares ratio of directors, foreign shareholding ratios on the EPS, ROA and ROE for the period from the 1st quarter of 2005 to the 3rd quarter of 2011, this paper used the panel data model to process an empirical analysis, and induced the following conclusions:
1. The change in shareholders’ equity shows a significant positive correlation with the EPS. In particular, the ratios of the 12 financial holding companies’ foreign investors’ investments had increased significantly after 2009, which had propelled those companies’ operating performance.
2. The pledged shares ratio of directors show a significant negative correlation with the ROA, representing that excess use of financial leverage to uplift the shareholding ratio would only solidify the operating power through nominal increase of shareholding ratios, but, on the other hand, it would affect the core business operating performance. By taking the debt to equity ratio into account, it also shows that the higher a pledging ratio is, the poorer the ROA must be. The debt to equity ratio shows signification negative correlation with the ROA. Given the fact that financial holdings are an industry having high debt to equity ratios, their ROA will be negatively affected if the debt to equity ratio is not adequately controlled.
3. The actual shareholding ratio of a director was calculated by multiplying the director’s shareholding ratio by the unpledged ratio. The result shows a significant positive correlation with the operating performance (ROE). Thus, the higher the actual shareholding ratio is, the better the performance of the ROE will be.
4. By simply considering foreign shareholding ratios, the ratio shows a significant positive correlation with the ROA. Nevertheless, when further taking other factors into account, the influence of foreign shareholding ratios on the ROA becomes not significant. It indicates that foreign investors do mind whether directors pledge their shares for trans-investment. When a financial holding company has a very low ratio of pledged shares ratio of directors, foreign investors will have more confidence in the financial holding company, because they are not required to especially raise their shareholding ratio to have a hand in the operating power, so as to enhance the ROA.
The empirical results show that, with Taiwan’s particular laws and regulations, financial holding companies’ directors are allowed to pledge their shares. Due to the law and regulation lifting, foreign investors have also got in on the financial leverage game by pledging shares. As a result, instead of focusing on core business operating, it turns out to be an adverse selection making the bad pushes out the good. According to the newly revised Company Law, the directors of publicly listed companies pledging more than 50% of their shares do not have the voting rights. However, the restriction is too lax. To build a healthy financial supervision environment, it is recommended to reinforce the restriction and further lower the ratio of the shares pledged by financial holding companies’ directors. In so doing, some shareholders trying to be elected the director by pledging their shares to inflate their shareholding ratios and further manipulate the company’s operating will be held at bay, while on the other hand, foreign investor’s investment performance will also get better and better. As the competent authorities for financial holding companies, the Financial Supervisory Commission of Executive Yuan shall take full responsibility to modify the Financial Holding Company Act or additionally formulate a stricter restriction on the ratio of the shares pledged by financial holding companies’ directors, so as to prevent directors from speculatively manipulating financial holding companies and make headway towards financial internationalization.

並列關鍵字

Foreign Shareholdings ； Shares Ratio of Director ； Pledged Shares Ratio ； Pledged Ratio ； Financial Holding Companies ； Corporate Governance

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