本論文的研究目的主要是企圖找出影響臺灣上市公司董監事股票質押比率之因子。一般認為公司董監事持股質押會加深代理問題,並透過參與管理,藉執行業務之便剝削外在小股東,降低公司價值及經營績效,使公司發生財務危機的可能性變大。檢視過去發生財務危機的公司,即發現這些公司都有著董監事質押比例過大的現象存在。而董監事質押比例的大小,過去僅有實證以董監事的財富限制一由來解釋。因此本篇欲進一步探究是否有其他因素影響著董監事的股票質押行為。 本文首先將樣本分為董監事完全沒有股票質押與董監事有進行股票質押兩大類,以驗證董監事的質押行為是否與公司的特性有關。其次,本論文對不同公司間,董監事質押比率大小的不同提出探討,欲從市場外在環境、公司內部特徵、和公司治理三個角度來解釋之。 研究結果發現,董監事完全沒有股票質押的公司與董監事有進行股票質押的公司相比,在公司特性上的確存在顯著的不同,例如公司規模較小與經營績效較佳等。 此外本研究也發現外在市場景氣的好壞對於不同公司間董監事質押比率的大小並沒有顯著的影響。 最後本論文的實證結果支持公司的內部特徵影響了董監事持股的質押行為。負債比率愈大、每股盈餘愈小、營收成長率愈低的公司董監事傾向有較大的股票質押比率。在加入了公司治理變數後,多少提升了解釋董監事質押比率大小的能力。
The purpose of this study is to find out the factors that influence the equity pledge behaviors of board of directors and supervisors in Taiwan listed companies. It is generally thought that the equity pledge of directors and supervisors will deteriorate the agency problem. They expropriate minor shareholders’ benefits by taking advantage of their relationship with companies. This will also devalue companies and result in poor firm performance to increase the probability of financial crisis. When we exam the companies that had financial crisis before, we find that they all have one thing in common – high equity pledge ratio. In previous studies, most papers explain that by the wealth constraint of directors and supervisors. Thus, in this paper, we want to find out other elements that also influence the equity pledge behavior of directors and supervisors. At first, in order to test the relationship between equity pledge behavior of directors and supervisors and the characteristics of companies, we divide the data into two subgroups – companies with equity pledge and companies without equity pledge. And then, we also study on the difference in equity pledge ratio in different companies. We exam this from three perspectives: market environment, companies’ internal characteristics and corporate governance. The empirical result shows that there are indeed some differences in companies’ characteristics between companies with and without equity pledge. For example, small companies have better firm performance. Besides, we also find that external market environment doesn’t affect equity pledge ratio significantly. At last, our empirical result support that companies’ internal characteristics do affect equity pledge behavior of directors and supervisors. Greater debt ratio、smaller EPS and lower sales growth would lead greater equity pledge ratio in companies. Also, it’s more or less increase the explanation ability in equity pledge behavior of directors and supervisors after adding the corporate governance variable.