關係人交易為我國上市、櫃公司常見的交易型態,而關係人交易普遍讓人有負面的觀感,國內先前所爆發的的舞弊案件均與關係人交易有關,可見關係人交易的發生可以被視為公司發生問題或掏空的警訊;董監事將股權進行質押係董監事其個人之行為應該與公司的營運狀況無關,但在爆發舞弊案件中亦發現存在著董監事有著高質押的情形,因此,檢視董監事股權質押與關係人交易之間的關聯性。 本研究以101-104年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本進行實證,最後實證顯示當董監事將股權進行質押時,愈會進行各類型的關係人交易,支持本文研究假說,表示當董監事為避免出售股票而喪失公司之經營權,將持有之股票進行質押後,為避免質押的股票遭到斷頭,則會利用關係人交易來操縱業績及盈餘是以維持公司股價,因此當董監事將股權進行質押則公司愈會有關係人交易。
The study aims to investigate the relationship between shares collateralized by board of directors and related party transactions. Related party transaction is one of the common transaction types for public listed companies at stock exchange market and at over-the-counter market in Taiwan. Many fraud cases are caused from related party transaction which tends to give us a negative impression. Thus related party transaction is considered as a warning of a company fraudulent bankrupt. Generally speaking, the personal behavior of the board directors collateralize their shares doesn’t matter with the company’s operations. However, there is a significant correlation between fraud case and the shares collateralized by board of directors. The sample of the study includes the public listed companies at stock exchange market and at over-the-counter market in Taiwan during 2012-2015. The result reveals a positive correlation between the shares collateralized by board of directors and related party transactions, i.e., when the board directors collateralize their shares, they usually adopt different types of related party transactions to manage or manipulate the performance and profit of the company in order to keep stock price high.