控制股東的質押行為與公司績效

The Controlling Shareholders’ Pledging Behavior and Firm Performance

蘇莞婷(Wan-Ting Su)

指導教授 ： 陳業寧

共同指導教授 ： 胡星陽(Shing-Yang Hu)

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2004.00800

摘要

中文摘要
本論文主要研究和質押相關的課題。近年來，公司治理的領域蓬勃發展，不論是學術研究或是實務上都將公司治理看成是影響公司績效的指標。質押是台灣金融市場相當普遍的現象。資料顯示，雖然有些公司的大股東不從事質押，但有些公司的大股東卻將手中持股百分之百的質押。以質押方式融通和傳統負債的主要不同之處就在於擔保品。傳統負債的擔保品多為固定資產，如土地、機械廠房等。但質押的擔保品為公司股票，其價值會受每天股市波動所影響，一旦股票價值低於當初所設定的價值時，借款人很可能就面臨必須補提擔保品或是被銀行斷頭的危機。在2000年的金融風暴時，釵h後來爆發財務危機的地雷公司，被發現其大股東們從事相當高比例的質押行為，因此也引發了之後對於質押問題的研究。
本文第一個貢獻是經由實證資料探討公司的大股東從事質押的原因。文獻指出，因為大股東們自身存在著財富限制，又想維持其在公司的地位，所以經由質押這個舉動來融通資金，減輕財富限制。如果這個假說成立，那麼質押比例應該和公司的財富限制有著正向的關係存在。我們引用了幾個代理變數來代表公司的財富限制，例如控制權與現金權的偏離程度、現金權、董事會的持股比例等等。用這些代理變數的原因在於，如果大股東的財富限制越嚴重，那麼便有可能去從事較多的如交叉持股或是金字塔結構持股的方式來維持其控制地位，如此一來，控制權與現金權的偏離程度會越大；如果財富限制假說為真，那麼質押比例和控制權與現金權的偏離程度應該存在著正向關係。另外，財富限制越緊也可能會導致現金權偏低或是董事會持股比例較低；如果財富限制假說為真，那應該會觀察到質押比例與這兩個變數間的負向關係。實證結果都顯著支持以上說法。
第二個面向要看的是質押行為如何影響公司營運績效。不論是由迴歸分析或是由分組的方法都顯示，質押比例越高的公司，其公司未來一年的股價表現和營運績效表現(ROA)都比低質押比例的公司來的差，其公司所面臨的營運風險則相對較高。但是我們更發現，如果短期內提升其質押比例的公司，未來的營運表現反而比較佳。原因可能在於，質押比例是一個長期累積的結果，出自於大股東的財富限制。但是大股東短期內對於質押比例做出調整，則是基於其對未來的預期。因為質押這種負債行為風險較高，所以只有當對未來前景預期樂觀時才會向銀行多借一點。
第三點要研究的經由質押所引發的代理問題，究竟是經由何種管道來損害公司價值。我們從關係人交易的資料中發現，質押比例越高的公司，傾向去從事一些關係人交易，而這些交易可能會圖利某特定人士卻損害公司的整體價值。也就是說，質押行為可能會誘發大股東去從事違背公司利益最大化原則的事情，加深了代理問題。

關鍵字

質押 ； 關係人交易 ； 控制股東 ； 代理問題 ； 財富限制

並列摘要

Abstract
This essay mainly investigates the pledging behavior of corporations. Over the past few years, the field in corporate governance, an indicator of the performance of each firm, has prospered. Pledging is a commonplace among Taiwan firms. However, the difference between the traditional debt contract and the pledging is the collateral. Some fixed assets, such as the land, the machinery or a factory are usually the collateral of the traditional debt contract. Unlike the traditional debt, the collateral of the pledging is the stock whose value will be volatile every day. Once the value of the collateral falls lower than its original value, the borrower may have to submit more stock or their possessions will be sold out. During the financial crisis of 2000, many bankrupt firms were found to engage in some highly pledging behavior. This evidence also illuminates the research of the pledging.
The first contribution of this paper is to explore hidden rationales for the pledging behavior. Literature has documented that the controlling shareholders may pledge stocks and get financial aids to maintain their controlling status in the firm or overcome some financial constraints. For those controlling shareholders, the pledging is an accessible financing way to release their financial constraints. If the hypothesis is true, the pledging ratio should be positively correlated with the magnitude of the wealth constraints. We employ many proxies to represent the magnitude of financial constraints, such as the separation of ownership and control, the cash flow right, and the ownership of the board. If the controlling shareholders face tighter financial constraints, they may engage in the cross shareholding or the pyramid structure that will make the cash flow rights deviate from the controlling right. If the hypothesis about the financial constraints is true, then the pledging level and the separation of ownership and control should be positively correlated. In addition, tighter wealth constraints may lead to smaller cash flow right or the smaller ownership of the board. The pledging level and these two proxies should be negatively correlated if the hypothesis about the financial constraints is correct. The empirical results in this study also justify the hypothesis. Meanwhile, firms in a financial-tight group tend to have higher pledging ratio in terms of their group structure data.
The second contribution of this paper is to verify the correlation between the pledging behavior and the operating performance in a firm. We employ certain methods, like the regression and the portfolio sorting, and conclude that the pledging level has negative impact on the stock performance and the ROA of the firm and will increase the firm’s operating risks. On the other hand, if the controlling shareholders expand the pledging level in a shorter period of time, the future operating performance of the firm tends to be better. This may suggest that the pledging level ought be accumulated over a longer period of time out of the wealth constraints. Nevertheless, controlling shareholders accommodate their pledging level in accordance with outlooks about the firm. The pledging itself is a risky financing facility so that the controlling shareholders might borrow more as they hold optimistic views about future
The third point is to inspect how the agency problems take place and how the pledging damages the value of the firm. With the data received, we discover that firms with higher pledging level tend to involve in some kinds of related party transactions which will benefit specific people at the cost of he firm value. That is, the pledging behavior may induce some controlling shareholders to violate the principle of value-maximization of the firm and increase the agency problems.

並列關鍵字

Wealth Constraints ； Agency Problem ； Personal Stock Loan ； Pledging ； Controlling Shareholders ； Related Party Transactions

參考文獻

成奶j學會計學系碩博士班。

李春旺、劉維琪與高孔廉，民78，股價行為與規 模效應：台灣股票市場實證研究，管理評論，頁99-121。

沈仰斌與黃志仁，民90，子公 司操作母公司股票：資料特性與操作行為，中國財務學刊，第九卷第三期，頁53-70。。

劉綠萍, 國立台北大學/企業管理學系/92/博士/董監事股權質押的代理問題與公司價值關聯性之研究

La Porta R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A.Shleifer, (1999),“Corporate ownership around the world,” Journal of Finance54, 471-517.