股東新股認購權之探討

A Study of Shareholders’ Pre-Emptive Rights

陳柏翰(Po-Han Chen)

指導教授 ： 曾宛如

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.00908

摘要

所謂股東新股認購權，係指公司於通常發行新股時，股東得依其持股比例優先於他人認購新股之權利。股東既然享有權利得以優先認購新股，其即有機會得以繼續維持其於該公司所占之股權比例，藉以維護其對於公司所擁有之支配利益與經濟利益。我國公司法第二百六十七條第三項規定：「公司發行新股時，除依前二項保留者外，應公告及通知原有股東，按照原有股份比例儘先分認，並聲明逾期不認購者，喪失其權利；原有股東持有股份按比例不足分認一新股者，得合併共同認購或歸併一人認購；原有股東未認購者，得公開發行或洽由特定人認購。」即係我國採取股東新股認購權制度之明文。
然股東新股認購權制度有其發展之歷史背景，而當時空背景已有所不同，例如公司規模、股權結構、股東人數、股東對於公司經營之參與程度等因素均與過去有所差異時，股東新股認購權制度能否依然發揮其功能，即已值得懷疑。由國內外之實務運作觀察，股東新股認購權實際上已不再是一項具有吸引力之法律制度，其不僅成為了公司發行新股時之困擾與麻煩，其更無法再繼續有效發揮保護股東權益之功能，甚至其存在反而有不利於股東之可能，尤其對於大型之公開發行公司而言，更是如此。
是以，外國法上即逐漸不再將股東新股認購權視為股東所享有之固有權利，而將其視為一任意規定，法院實務並發展出各種得以排除股東新股認購權之例外情形，使得公司於發行新股時更加容易且簡便。直至今日，無論是美國法或英國法，均已允許公司透過章程規定或股東會特別決議之方式，讓公司得以自行決定是否賦予其股東新股認購權，而不再強制公司必須一律採納該項制度。但於尊重企業自治的同時，為兼顧股東權益，外國法上即更加強調董事忠實義務之功能，要求董事於發行新股時，須善意地為公司全體之利益為之，並且須於股東間表現公平，而不得有恣意之差別待遇。因此，對於外國法之公司而言，即使股東新股認購權制度已不再重要，股東權益仍然得以受到妥善之保障。
就我國法觀之，基於確實保障股東權益之理由，實務與通說見解向來強調，股東新股認購權係股東所享有之固有權利，而公司法第二百六十七條規定係屬於強制規定，故公司於發行新股時即負有遵守之法定義務，否則董事會決議即屬違法而無效，該新股發行亦因此而無效。然而，如此嚴格之作法未免太過僵化，不僅未能符合企業之實際需求，也未必能有利於股東。且由於我國法律上已設計有諸多之例外規定，導致公司得輕易透過安排，規避法定義務之遵守，從而大幅壓縮股東新股認購權制度之適用空間，則對此我國是否還能謂股東新股認購權係股東所享有之固有權利？有無再繼續堅持其為固有權利之必要？又對於此種透過形式上合法之手段所排除股東新股認購權之不公正發行新股，股東又有何救濟管道得以尋求？董事忠實義務之要求能否於我國法中發揮作用？此類諸多問題，均實有必要加以檢討與反省，且相信將對於我國法日後之發展與提升有所助益。

關鍵字

股東新股認購權 ； 固有權利 ； 股東平等原則 ； 忠實義務 ； 不公正發行新股 ； 主要目的原則 ； 不公平損害 ； 公司自治

並列摘要

The so-called “pre-emptive rights” of shareholders in a corporation are rights that additional shares shall not be issued without first offering to all existing shareholders having similar rights a reasonable opportunity to take ratable amount of the additional shares. Since the original shareholders have priority to participate pro rata in any distribution of shares by the company, they can preserve the percentage of their shares and protect their proportionate voting strength and economic interests. Article 267 (3) of Taiwan’s Company Act provides that “In issuing new shares, a company shall make public announcement and advise, by notice, its original shareholders to subscribe for, with preemptive right, the new shares, except those reserved under either of the preceding two paragraphs, in proportion respectively to their original shareholding and shall state in the notice that if any shareholder fails to subscribe for new shares, his right shall be forfeited. Where a fractional percentage of the original shares being held by a shareholder is insufficient to subscribe for one new share, the fractional percentages of the original shares being held by several shareholders may be combined for joint subscription of one or more integral new shares or for subscription of new shares in the name of a single shareholder. New shares left unsubscribed by original shareholders may be open for public issuance or for subscription by specific person or persons through negotiation.” This is the clear demonstration that we adopt the doctrine of pre-emptive rights.
However, shareholders’ pre-emptive rights was originally adopted because in the cases under certain historic background, when the situations and considerations are all different now, such as the scale of company, the ownership structure, the number of shareholders, the degree of participation in company operation of shareholders, etc., it’s doubtful that pre-emptive rights can still perform its functions. To observe the practical operation of companies from Taiwan or other countries, we can find that the doctrine of shareholders’ pre-emptive rights is no longer an attractive legal design. It not only becomes the nuisance and problem when the company issues new shares, but also can no longer continue to protect shareholder’s interests effectively. And there may be a possibility that pre-emptive rights can even be harmful to shareholders, especially for those in large-sized and public companies.
Gradually, the legal systems of the U.K. and the U.S. regard the doctrine of pre-emptive rights as a default rule rather than shareholders’ inherent rights, and the courts have created lots of exceptions which exclude the application of shareholders’ pre-emptive rights, enabling companies can issue shares much more easily and conveniently. Until now, both U.K and U.S. have allowed the company to specify in its articles of association or make a resolution of shareholders meeting whether or not the pre-emptive rights to subscribe to new shares is reserved, and the pre-emptive rights are no longer mandatory, hence every companies can make their own choice by themselves. Besides, U.K and U.S. have placed more emphases on the functions of directors’ fiduciary duties, demanding directors have to act bona fide and perform their duties for the benefit of its members as a whole, and when issuing shares they must treat all shareholders fairly and evenly, so although pre-emptive rights are not important now, shareholders’ interests can still be safeguarded properly.
As to Taiwan, in order to protect shareholders’ interests certainly, our courts and scholars always claim that pre-emptive rights are shareholders’ inherent rights and article 267 (3) of Taiwan’s Company Act is a mandatory statute, hence companies have the obligation to follow the provision, and if they did not, the resolution of the board of directors and the issuance of shares would be invalid. Nevertheless, this view is too rigid to fit in with the actual need of enterprises, and it could be harmful to shareholders as well. Furthermore, since there are so many legal exceptions in our law, companies can easily make an arrangement to circumvent the shareholder’s pre-emptive rights, causing the extent of application has become much smaller than before, and then how can we call pre-emptive rights are shareholders’ inherent rights? Do we have to continue to hold on to this view? And when a company uses this kind of lawful appearances to exclude the application of shareholders’ pre-emptive rights, how can a shareholder to seek a relief for this inequitable issuance of shares? Can directors’ fiduciary duties perform its function to solve problems in Taiwan? Such questions should be considered and introspected, and it is believed that it would be helpful for the future development and enhancement of Taiwan’s law.

並列關鍵字

shareholders’ pre-emptive rights ； inherent right ； equitable treatment of shareholders ； fiduciary duty ； inequitable issuance of shares ； primary purpose principle ； unfair prejudice ； company autonomy

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