我國機構管理規範下投資顧問服務監管問題之研究

我國證券投資信託及顧問法以證券投資顧問業為主要監管對象，此係指向主管機關取得許可，直接或間接自委任人或第三人取得報酬，對有價證券、證券相關商品或其他經主管機關核准項目之投資或交易有關事項提供分析意見或推介建議之機構。惟經本文研究發現，近年來我國傳統證券投資顧問業在非法投顧業者、技術分析軟體、理財機器人及其他金融業（證券業及銀行業）紛紛跨足並瓜分投資顧問業務之趨勢下日漸式微，於此同時，我國現行證券投資顧問監管法制似又未能涵蓋或捕捉前述各式投資顧問服務。立基於前述觀察，本文以「我國證券投顧法制檢討」及「我國特定金錢信託關係中投資顧問服務監管不足問題」作為主要問題意識，並得出兩點結論。其一，我國證券投資信託及顧問法中「直接或間接自委任人或第三人取得報酬」之判準於我國實務存在若干爭議，如財經論壇獲取之「廣告費」或技術分析軟體業者收取之「軟體銷售費用」是否屬之？於此不僅存在司法上之認定困難，亦成為我國許多非法投顧業者脫免罪責之主要抗辯。就此英國金融服務暨市場法（FSMA2000）採取整合功能規範方式，乃突破機構管理規範之監管侷限，舉凡針對特定投資標的所提供之建議服務即屬受監管之投資顧問服務，並未以獲取一定對價為必要；此外，我國就證券投顧事業之資本額、組織部門設置及人員專業資格設有諸多門檻限制，然而新興技術分析軟體及理財機器人之證券分析與投資建議主要係透過程式設計及演算法所做成，我國現行以法人組織及確保自然人投資顧問服務品質等嚴格之開業門檻作為立法設計出發是否仍合於時宜或有礙於普惠金融之推行，非無值得探究之餘地。其二，我國證券業及銀行業透過轄下理財專員針對特定金融商品為投資推介並就此獲取手續費、信託費及通路銷售獎勵金等對價，此於形式上雖看似為民法上特定金錢信託契約關係，惟論其實質應已構成投資顧問服務。然而我國現行法院實務卻仍多以信託關係中受託人僅機械性受委託人運用指示投資為由認定無證券投資信託及顧問法之適用。此一認定結果，使得我國特定金錢信託關係中之投資顧問服務僅適用金融消費者保護法及信託相關法規，產生金融機構間同一行為不同監管問題。從比較法之面向來看，美國證券交易委員會於2019年發布之Regulation Best Interest試圖為多年來存在於美國投資顧問與證券商間差異規範之論辯找出可能之解套；英國則採取單一整合規範而無所謂金融機構間同一行為不同監管問題，就此比較法之趨勢值得供我國做為借鏡。

關鍵字

投資顧問；特定金錢信託；理財專員；機構管理規範；功能規範；信賴義務；通路銷售獎勵金

並列摘要

The Securities Investment Trust and Consulting Act of Taiwan regulates the securities investment consulting enterprises (SICE) which provides the analysis and recommendations for investment, security transaction, certification of the competent authority, acquisition of compensation as a return from a principal or third party with the permission of the competent authority. Despite, given an increasing rise of the illegal investment advisory businesses, technical analysis software, robo-advisors, and other financial industries (e.g., securities and banking) within the current market of the investment advisory business, the role of the SICE mentioned above has steadily faded away. Meanwhile, the regulatory regime at the institutional level in Taiwan makes the Securities Investment Trust and Consulting Act hardly applicable to the SICE. To address, this study conducted 1) the review of the Securities Investment Trust and Consulting Act and 2) exploration of inadequate investment advisory services supervision in non-discretionary money trust. Following the analyses, this study made the correspond conclusion. First, the Securities Investment Trust and Consulting Act does not ideally clarify controversies in defining the possession of direct and indirect remuneration from the appointing person or a third party in the most recent court and law systems. For instance, it is still unclear to determine whether the definition of remuneration possession is applicable to advertising fee obtained from the advertising supplier via the financial forum and the nonrecurring expenditure for software sales provided by the technical analysis software industry. These factors not only form barriers to implementation of the Securities Investment Trust and Consulting Act but the foundation to exonerate the illegal investment from the law regulation by illegal investment advisories during the main defense process. To bridge the gap between the current law systems and practical law implementation, the U.K adopts functional supervision regime and categorizes the element of remuneration as unnecessary for regulated investment advisory services, which might be conducive to the formation of an approach to reform the current law systems. Notably, for the same purpose, imposing threshold limits on capital, departments requirements, and professional qualifications of investment advisors has been enacted as an intervention in Taiwan. Despite, positive changes brought by the Securities Investment Trust and Consulting Act are still limited given hardships in coping with systemic risks stemming from programming and algorithms of technical analysis software and robo-advisors. Therefore, further efforts are still required to analyzed how to improve the caveat of the current law systems. Second, the banking and securities industry in Taiwan provide advisory services and receive remuneration such as commission, trust fees and channel remuneration payments through the financial consultants in wealth management by advising specific financial products in form of non-discretionary money trust to their customers. Differential supervision regime of the same financial services among financial institutions exists due to the Taiwanese courts hold the belief that the advisory services under non discretionary money trust relationship could be exempted from the application of the Securities Investment Trust and Consulting Act. Relatively, the Regulation Best Interest published by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in 2019 and the integrated regulatory regime of Financial Service and Markets Act 2000 issued by the U.K. both suggests the global trend of Integrated financial regulation and may be used as references for Taiwan’s future practical operation and legal policy.

並列關鍵字

Investment Advisor ； Non-Discretionary Money Trust ； Financial Consultants in Wealth Management ； Institutional Regulatory Regime ； Functional Regulatory Regime ； Fiduciary Duty ； Channel Remuneration Payment