異質識別力下之無成本訊息傳遞賽局

Cheap-talk Games under Heterogeneous Discernment

王棋瑩(Chi-Ying Wang)

指導教授 ： 陳俊廷

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2018年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201801516

摘要

本論文研究在一個握有資訊的傳訊者與一個沒有資訊的接收者之間的訊息傳遞
問題，並且雙方的識別能力（能夠區分不同狀態或行為的能力）可能是私有資
訊，且這樣的識別能力可以加諸限制於雙方的策略上。當雙方的識別能力是共
同知識時，傳訊者只有在當識別能力比接收者差時才會完全地揭露自己的私有
資訊。而當識別能力是私有訊息時，則在某些情形下會產生語義的不確定性。

關鍵字

無成本訊息傳遞 ； 私有識別力 ； 溝通 ； 語義的不確定性

並列摘要

This paper studies the information transmission between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver, where their “discernment” – the ability to discriminate states or actions – may be private information and can impose restrictions on their strategies. When agents’ discernment is common knowledge, the sender would never fully reveal his private information unless he is worse at discriminating states than the receiver. When agents’ discernment is private information, it is shown that indeterminacy of meaning might exist under certain situations.

並列關鍵字

Cheap talk ； Heterogeneous Discernment ； Communication ； Indeterminacy of Meaning

參考文獻

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