- 學位論文
次貸風暴後金融機構治理之研究－以薪酬機制為中心
The Impact of US Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis on the Corporate Governance of Financial Institutions –Focus on the Mechanism of Remuneration
摘要
2008年全球金融風暴醞釀成國際性之經濟崩毀，在諸多風暴之成因中，金融機構之薪酬制度無疑是檢討聲浪裡的「亮點」。國際經濟組織或歐美各國，皆有針對金融機構之薪酬制度討論或提出建議。薪酬制度檢討之重點，在於風險控管所衍生出之整個公司治理問題，包含僅考量短期績效、未考量超額風險承擔行為之薪酬誘因等。針對上述問題，本文分別介紹G20財政部長與中央銀行主席會議、金融穩定理事會、歐盟、英國與美國等近期之相關立法改革與建議，此些改革動態頗值得我國借鏡。 我國現行法制中，在薪酬結構方面，經濟部將公司法第196條第1項之董事「報酬」限縮於委任關係之對價，本文認為與該條之立法目的不符。董事薪酬考量重點，應是所受領之薪酬是否與績效具連結性、是否影響機構長期經營的穩定性、是否減損機構之風險管理，故不論薪酬的態樣為何，只要是金融機構為了換取專業服務而授予之經濟上利益，皆應納入薪酬之範圍。另外，經濟部亦否認得以股權形式做為董事之薪酬，惟本文則認為，董事一定的持股加上適當的限制與不利誘因設計，如追回利益機制、持有期間的限制或股票選擇權的運用，可使董事之績效與公司之長期利益結合，故應由公司自行決策是否運用股權薪酬，實無強制禁止之必要。 在薪酬委員會方面，本文認為薪酬委員會應設置於監察人會或單軌制董事會中。薪酬委員會職責為評估與訂定薪酬政策，除經理人之薪酬最終應提交董事會決議同意外，薪酬委員會訂定董事與監察人之薪酬結構與具體薪酬數額後，應直接提交股東會決議，無庸再經董事會討論。 在金融產業之薪酬結構中，業務人員之薪酬結構易與短期績效連結，惟若過份重視短期績效的獎勵，可能危害金融機構長期的穩定經營，甚至造成客戶與投資者的損害，近期的薪酬改革中，「信託業營運範圍受益權轉讓限制風險揭露及行銷訂約管理辦法」、「信託業薪酬制度之訂定及考核原則」及「保險業招攬及核保理賠辦法」皆已明定業務人員的獎勵應與長期績效與風險連結。另外，為了提升金融機構經營者薪酬的透明性，金融控股公司、銀行與票券金融公司之年報應行記載事項準則，配合「公開發行公司年報應行記載事項準則」第10條之修正，放寬應揭露個別董事、監察人及總經理酬金之事由，以強化投資者對經營者之監督。
並列摘要
The late-2000s global financial crisis has resulted in universal credit crunch. Among the numerous causes, the remuneration of the financial institutions undoubtedly attracts the most attention. Many international economic organizations and European/American countries have submitted reports with respect to the remuneration practice of the financial institutions. The key issue is the problem of corporate governance, which is derived from risk management, including merely taking short-term performance into account, failing to consider the incentive of excessive risk-taking, etc. The author respectively introduces the latest legislative reforms and recommendations of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meetings, Financial Stability Board, European Union, U.K. and U.S.A. These developments are worth of refering. According to our current legal system in respect of the structure of remuneration, the director’s “compensation”, entitled by Article 196 of the Company Act, has been narrowly tailored into the consideration of the mandate by Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). The author believes that this definition is inconsistent with the legislative intent. The keys of directors’ remuneration we should rather take into account are whether the remuneration aligns with the performance, whether the remuneration affects institutions’ long-term stability, and whether the remuneration harms the institutions’ risk management. Therefore, no matter what type of the remuneration is, it should be deemed as the “compensation” in Article 196 of the Company Act and be reviewed by remuneration committee if it is an economic benefit granted by financial institutions in exchange for professional services rendered by staff. Besides, MOEA doesn’t accept equity-based pay for director’s remuneration. However, the author believes that the stockholding of directors combined with proper restriction and negative incentives will align the director’s performance with institution’s long-term benefits. Thus, there is no reason to forbid company to use equity-based pay. With respect to the remuneration committee, the author recommends that it should be set up in supervisory board or one-tier board. The responsibility of the remuneration committee is reviewing and setting out remuneration policy. Except the managers’ remuneration, in which the board of directors makes the ultimate decision, the director and supervisors’ remuneration laid out by remuneration committee should be directly submitted to shareholders for resolution and ignore the board of directors, In financial industry, the remuneration structure of business agent tends to link with short-term performance. Nevertheless, the compensation which is based on overvaluing short-term performance may harm the long-term stability of the financial institution and even the clients or investors’ interests. The latest remuneration reforms, including “Regulations Governing the Scope of Business, Restrictions on Transfer of Beneficiary Rights, Risk Disclosure, Marketing, and Conclusion of Contract by Trust Enterprises”, “Directions for Establishing and Appraising of the Remuneration Systems of the Trust Enterprises” and “Regulations Governing Business Solicitation, Policy Underwriting and Claim Adjusting of Insurance Enterprises”, have provided that the compensation of the business agent shall align with long-term performance and risk. Besides, the annual reports regulations of financial holding companies, banks and bills finance companies have been revised to add more situations that financial holding companies, banks and bills finance companies shall disclose the remuneration paid to each individual director and supervisor and its president, in order to improve the transparency of executives’ remuneration and strengthen investors’ supervision.