用經濟學實驗研究：為什麼有人願意跳出來為大眾服務

Other-regarding Preferences in Experimental Dynamic Volunteer’s Dilemmas

林政澤(Cheng-Tse Lin)

指導教授 ： 王道一

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.01334

摘要

現實生活中，許多公眾享受的好處來自於個人的志願行為。例如，在公車站等車，至少需要一位乘客注意並即時舉手攔下公車；一個系所需要一位教員擔任系主任為全系服務；嬰兒在深夜哭鬧時，夫妻兩人至少有一位要犧牲睡眠安撫嬰兒，否則兩人都不得安寧。在這些情境下，愈早有人挺身而出，所有人能享有的好處更多。例如: 在嬰兒深夜哭鬧的例子中，愈早有人起身安撫嬰兒，兩人都能得到更多睡眠時間。然而，志願者必須付出額外的成本，才能提供此「服務」，如: 擔任系主任必須犧牲研究。因此，所有人希望等待別人挺身而出，自己坐享其成。過去的文獻僅在自利的假設下分析志願者的行為，並未加入「考量他人的偏好」(other-regarding preferences)。本文以經濟學實驗驗證「考量他人的偏好」是否影響人類的志願行為。實驗中，參與者兩兩分組，並決定何時跳出來為全組服務。選擇最早挺身而出的人為志願者。由於挺身而出花費一定成本，志願者的報酬將低於非志願者。受試者亦與電腦配對進行相同的實驗，以資對照。本文發現: (一)當挺身而出的成本較小，受試者較願意挺身而出。(二)相較於受試者兩兩配對，當受試者與電腦配對時挺身而出的傾向較大。因此， 「考量他人的偏好」的確在志願行為中扮演重要角色，但並非利他使得人們較願意挺身而出，而是忌妒使得人們較不願意挺身而出。

關鍵字

志工服務 ； 動態志工兩難賽局 ； 社會困境 ； 社會偏好 ； 經濟學實驗

並列摘要

Dynamic volunteer's dilemmas have been modeled as individuals deciding whether to volunteer or not based on cost-benefit analysis, as in the war of attrition game. However, this analysis is usually carried out assuming self-interest, without other-regarding preferences. In this paper, we investigate the role of other-regarding preferences in dynamic volunteer's dilemmas using lab experiments in which two players decide when to jump in and volunteer for the pair and contrast the results with a control treatment where subjects play against computers. We find that subjects are more likely to volunteer when dealing with the computer rather than with other participants. Our experimental data provide direct evidence that other-regarding preferences do play a critical factor in this problem, but through envy instead of altruism.

並列關鍵字

Volunteerism ； Dynamic Volunteer’s Dilemma ； Social Dilemmas ； Social Preferences ； Laboratory Experiment

參考文獻

Anderson, Jon, Burks, Stephen V., Carpenter, Jeffrey, Gotte, Lorenz, Maurer, Karsten, Nosenzo, Daniele, Potter, Ruth, Rocha, Kim, and Rustichini, Aldo (2013), “Self-selection and variations in the laboratory measurement of other-regarding preferences across subject pools: Evidence from one college student and two adult samples”, Experimental Economics, 16, 170–189.

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Bilodeau, Marc and Slivinski, Al (1996), “Toilet cleaning and department chairing: Volunteering a public service”, Journal of Public Economics, 59, 299–308.

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