大國抉擇：漢唐中國對周邊的「衝突－回應」模式

中國崛起撼動東亞各國與全球秩序，此一現象引起從國家能力、物質利益、中國歷史、東亞特殊國際秩序與東方系絡中「關係」等角度來研判中國對外決策的論者們分別得出樂觀與悲觀的論點並彼此交鋒。面對此一課題，我們透過歸整既存理論認為國家能力與親疏遠近為中國對外決策的兩大關鍵要素，並希望藉由爬梳中國歷史上的兩大百年盛世：漢、唐兩代由新生到強盛過程中，面對來自周邊衝突的回應模式作為借鑑。本文從漢唐周邊衝突與回應策略的史實出發，據以了解當一個大國（統一且強盛）面對來自周邊的挑戰時，大國如何抉擇回應方式以及動武規模，歸納出一個可資依循的大國「衝突－回應」決策路徑。首先依據國力強弱將漢唐兩代區分為新生時期與盛世時期，分別檢視新生漢朝、盛世漢朝、新生唐朝以及盛世唐朝這四個時段，當與其他國家發衝突時的起因、過程與中國面對衝突的處理方式，並透過將與漢唐中國發生衝突的對手國以「親疏遠近」（名分秩序）為分類標準，據此梳理出漢唐中國的外在衝突處理模式，分別是： 1. 「新生漢唐vs藩屬國」：無挑戰時，較和善；面對挑戰時反應並不激烈。 2. 「新生漢朝vs敵國」：姑息型扈從，以和親與避戰方式面對衝突。 3. 「新生唐朝vs敵國」：抗衡型，主要以防禦面對衝突，也會伺機突襲。 4. 「盛世漢唐vs藩屬國」：無挑戰時，極和善；面對挑戰極強硬。 5. 「盛世漢唐vs敵國」：直面衝突，主要以進擊面對衝突，也會伺機突襲。並進而驗證了我們所提出的四個主要的假設，包括：當國力較弱，中國（漢唐）面對外來挑戰會以國家存續考量為優先，面對高度外在威脅時，中國會試圖採取抗衡策略迎接挑戰。若抗衡不可能，則轉為扈從或避險策略。另一方面，當國力鼎盛，中國（漢唐）面對外來挑戰會以維繫天下秩序為優先，面對威脅時，會根據挑戰來源國不同而做出不同反應，越親近者反應越強烈，而當對手國並未做出挑戰時，為維繫天下秩序中原王朝會極力保護與拉攏親近者，也會伺機攻擊可能破壞天下體系的敵人。本文既挑戰了儒家世界必然和平的定論，也回應了權力轉移必定帶來戰爭的困境。我們將焦點放在大國興起過程中面對衝突的回應模式，如此，既避免只注重大國行為的誤區，同時也突顯一旦儒家文化圈內出現衝突時中國的態度，並將朝貢體系理論與關係理論相互結合並加以衍伸，進而完善歷史中國的「衝突－回應」決策模式，試圖以「跨時限域」的方式將研究所得供論者思考今後中美、東亞、臺海關係發展以及可能的和平路徑。

關鍵字

關係；藩屬國；漢唐；中國崛起；天下秩序；衝突處理模式

並列摘要

The rise of China has shaken East Asian and global order. Researchers in the field of Chinese foreign policy hence have gone head-to-head with optimistic and pessimistic arguments stemming from national power, material interests, Chinese history, the unique international order in East Asia, or the “Guangxi” factor in the Eastern context. I argue that national power and intimacy in relation are two key factors affecting China’s foreign policy decision-making after the induction of existing theories. I therefore use history as a guide with a focus on two prosperous eras, the Han and Tang China. The newborn and flourishing periods of both dynasties last over one century. By focusing on the four historical periods, I investigate the two dynasties’ reaction patterns toward conflicts with surrounding areas. Based on historical facts of the Han and Tang China, this dissertation reviews the process through which unified and prosperous great powers chose their reacting mode and the scale of force used to deal with challenges from surrounding states. This study then summarizes a general “Challenge-reaction” decision-making pattern. This study begins with a division of the newborn and prosperous periods of the Han and Tang China respectively. The division is made based on the change of national power of both dynasties. The study examines these four periods (the newborn Han Dynasty, the prosperous Han Dynasty, the newborn Tang Dynasty, and the prosperous Tang Dynasty) with a focus on the causes and processes of conflicts against other states and the respective counteractive approaches. By categorizing the degree of “intimacy” (through the order of titles) between rival states, the study reveals the patterns by which the Han and Tang China handled external conflicts: 1. The newborn Han/Tang vs. vassal states: comparatively friendly when no challenge is posed; when facing challenges, no impetuous response. 2. The newborn Han vs. enemy states: appeasing or adopting bandwagon strategy, by marriage alliance and avoiding wars when facing conflicts. 3. The newborn Tang vs. enemy state: adopting balancing strategy, mainly with defensive posture when facing conflicts; also launching raids as opportunities arise. 4. The prosperous Han/Tang vs. vassal state: extremely friendly when no challenge and extremely tough when facing challenges. 5. The prosperous Han/Tang vs. enemy state: dealing with confrontation proactively, by making attacks when conflicts occur, also by launching raids as opportunities occur. I then further verify my four main hypotheses. When possessing weak national power, China (Han and Tang) prioritized the dynasty's survival and took a balancing strategy when high external threats occurred. If balancing was impossible, China opted for a bandwagon or hedging strategy. Yet, when possessing strong national power, China preferred to uphold the concept of Tianxia to maintain the order in areas under its control. When facing threats, China responded differently based on relational intimacy with the challengers. The closer the challenging state was, the stronger the response China would exert. Even when the opponent state did not pose any challenge, the Central Kingdom proactively protected and won over close states, at the same time, it waited for opportunities to raid and attack enemies that might jeopardize the integrity of the Tianxia system. This study not only challenges the theme of Confucian peace, but also responds to the theory that power transition inevitably brings about wars. It focuses on the Han and Tang China’s patterns of responses to conflicts in the periods when their power was on the rise. With this focus, the study avoids overemphasizing the behaviors of great powers to the neglect of the lesser states. It also highlights China's attitude when conflicts occurred in the Confucian cultural circle. The tributary system theory and Guangxi approach are integrated to refine the decision-making patterns of “Challenge-reaction” of historic China. I believe this study, territory specific, yet also transtemporal, will make contribution to future studies of Sino-US, East Asia, and Cross-Strait relations. It will also shed light on the possible paths toward peace.