公司治理與企業保險費用支出關聯性

本研究主要檢驗超額公司治理指數與公司保險費用支出間的關聯性。本研究在控制公司產業類別、公司特性以及經理人特性後，採用Jenter and Lewellen (2015)、Fich, Harford and Tran(2015)二階段迴歸方法，以台灣2011-2019年間的上市櫃公司為研究樣本，建構出可對同類型公司的治理績效進行相對比較的超額公司治理指數。本研究實證結果顯示，超額公司治理指數與企業保險費用支出呈顯著正相關，表示公司治理績效優良的企業，管理階層將更願意考慮購入保險以管理風險增進公司價值。另外，本研究發現當董事長與總經理非同一人、機構投資人持股比率越高、資訊揭露與透明度越高，因監督增強而促使企業提高對風險管理的重視，對企業保險費用支出有顯著正向影響。再者，本研究觀察到獨立董事比率與企業保險費用支出之間有負向影響，推測與我國獨立董事有兼職繁忙以及缺乏獨立性情形，造成管理層更容易操弄風險管理費用有關。最後，實證指出經理人持股率與企業保險費用支出之間有正向影響，此結果支持當經理人內部持股越多，決策態度會傾向風險規避的風險趨避說。

關鍵字

公司治理；超額公司治理指數；風險管理；企業保險費用支出；董事會結構

並列摘要

This paper examines the relationship between the abnormal governance index and firm insurance expenses. After controlling the industrial category, corporate characteristics, and manager characteristics, we follow the methodology in Jenter and Lewellen (2015), Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015) while using listed or OTC-listed firms in Taiwan between 2011 and 2019 as the sample, to build the abnormal governance index that can relatively compare the governance performance of the same type of companies. The empirical results show that there is a significant positive relationship between the abnormal governance index and firm insurance expenses, which means firms with good corporate governance performance, the manager will be more willing to consider purchasing insurance to manage risks to enhance firm value. In addition, the results also prove that when without CEO duality, higher institutional investors' shareholding ratio, and higher information disclosure and transparency have a significant positive relationship with firm insurance expenses, because the enhanced supervision promotes managers to pay more attention to risk management. Furthermore, the results indicate that the independent directors' ratio is negatively related to firm insurance expenses, which we speculate the busy part-time and lack of independence of independent directors in Taiwan making it easier for managers to manipulate risk management expenses. Finally, the results suggest that the CEO shareholding ratio is positively related to firm insurance expenses, supporting the managerial risk-aversion theory.