權益誘因、盈餘管理與公費水準關聯性之研究

採用權益誘因的目的，在使經理人與股東目標趨於一致，以期降低代理成本，然而，卻也增加了經理人盈餘管理的程度，從而提高了審計風險。本研究探討權益誘因是否會增加盈餘管理的程度，並進一步地從查核人員角度切入，探討權益誘因是否會直接提高會計師的公費水準。本研究實證結果發現：權益誘因與盈餘管理呈現正相關，亦即當經理人薪酬的決定，包含權益誘因的比例越高，盈餘管理的程度越高。其次，當盈餘管理程度越高，公費水準也較高，隱含會計師會評估盈餘管理的風險而增加其公費。此外，並未發現權益誘因與審計公費有直接之關聯。本研究認為，或許係因會計師公費之決定，是透過盈餘管理而影響，而非直接由權益誘因影響所致，亦即，會計師在決定其公費水準時，並不僅考量到經理人薪酬中所包含權益誘因的程度不同而有所不同。

關鍵字

權益誘因；盈餘管理；公費水準

並列摘要

This thesis examines the relationship among equity incentive, earnings management, and audit fees. Using 3,396 firm-year observations of firms in the U.S., the empirical analysis shows that the proportion of equity incentive in CEO compensation is positively associated with the degree of earnings management; the latter is also positively associated with audit fees. Further, the proportion of equity incentive only affects audit fees indirectly through the effect of earnings management, but it does not directly affects audit fees.

並列關鍵字

equity incentive ； earnings management ； audit fees

參考文獻

Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G. F. Peters. 2006. Earnings management, litigation risk, and asymmetric audit fee responses. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 25 (1):85-98.

Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, G. F. Peters, and K. Raghunandan. 2003. The association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (2):17-32.

Armstrong, C. S., A. D. Jagolinzer, and D. F. Larcker. 2010. Chief executive officer equity incentives and accounting irregularities. Journal of Accounting Research 48 (2):225-271.

Ashbaugh, H., R. LaFond, and B. W. Mayhew. 2003. Do nonaudit services compromise auditor independence? Further evidence. The Accounting Review 78 (3):611-639.

Baber, W. R., S. Kang, L. Liang, and Z. Zhu. 2009. Shareholder rights, corporate governance and accounting restatement: Working paper, Georgetown University.

國際替代計量

權益誘因、盈餘管理與公費水準關聯性之研究

全文下載

主題瀏覽