管理階層收購法制-美日司法審查之比較

The Study on Management Buyout and Comparison of the Judicial Review in America and Japan

李佳芳(Chia-Fang Lee)

指導教授 ： 蔡英欣

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201603045

摘要

在企業的生命週期中，企業所適合的資本關係非恆常不變，股權變動的頻率變高、法令遵循成本高昂、代理成本居高不下，當公開發行市場利益逐漸走向式微時，管理階層即有可能選擇下市重整股市的想法，以國巨案為例，管理階層認為國巨股本過大，經營團隊的努力無法適切反映在每股盈餘上，而有將激勵制度調整，使經營與所有逐漸合一，來消弭代理人的問題，使國巨聚焦長期策略，而非短期效益。管理階層在由其所設立專責收購目標公司之特殊目的公司中佔有一定股數甚至是大多數之股份，把持收購主體居於收購所任職之目標公司此收購主之地位，於身為收購方時劃定交易風險、設定成本，尋求交易上最大利益來向目標公司股東收購股份，然身為目標公司管理階層，執行目標公司職務業務，遂行其營利事業，背後有廣大的投資者，管理階層本背負公司利益最大化之義務，此時利益衝突如何消彌，董事可能有何受託義務之違反為本文探討之重心。
在比較法之方面，以美國對於管理階層收購之行政管制，以及司法審查來進行介紹，並以司法審查為主，由司法審查為交易設置程序法上誘因，使董事在事前設置保護少數股東之機制，該等機制對於利益衝突嚴重之交易尤為重要；在行政管制將介紹資訊揭露之部分，管理階層隨著其底價揭露之義務，展現出公司對於少數股東保護措施配套之重要性，該等消弭利益衝突之配套與司法上之安全港程序不謀而合，更加強調此種變形的自我交易特別需求該等配套措施。
在日本法方面，包括日本經濟產業為提升企業價值以及確保公正之手續，形成最佳運作實務，於2007年公布MBO交易指針，該等指針雖不具有法效力，然其企業文化相較於我國較為恪遵自律規則，而司法審查上更重視此指針，更產生管理階層遂行交易時之誘因；其司法審查區分為對公司之MBO盡力完善義務，以及對全體股東之確保股東共同利益之義務，探究日本司法如何具體化董事之善良管理人注意義務，並因其等繼受商業判斷法則之型態與我國類似進而認為該等義務可得為我國於管理階層交易當中進行受託人審查時所使用。

關鍵字

管理階層收購 ； 變形化自我交易 ； 受託人義務 ； 完全公平原則 ； 特別委員會 ； MBO交易指針 ； MBO盡力完善義務 ； 確保股東共同利益之義務

並列摘要

Management buyout ( MBO ) means management set a special company to acquire the company that managers work for, especially whose objective is taking the objective is taking the company private ( going-private transaction )to avoid the costs of remaining a publicly traded entity, while the transaction in which the controlling shareholder is the acquirer represents an opportunity for abuse. Because controlling shareholders often have significant influence over the board of directors as well as over management, not to mention that they are even the members of the board of directors or the managers themselves, having access to substantial nonpublic information. Regarding to the possibility to detriment of minority shareholders in the management buyout, this thesis aims to go through the present regulation of tender offer of Taiwan’s Securities and Exchanges Act, the fiduciary duty of Taiwan’s the Business Mergers And Acquisitions Act and Company Act, and the relevant administrative regulations to describe the defect of the recent legal system and try to construct the pattern of judicial review in the management buyout.
Examine the standard of the fiduciary duty used in the U.S. and Japanese court practice, there is a difficult dilemma between the Business Judgement Rule ( BJR ) and the unfair enough resulting in detriment of minority shareholders. Delaware courts have traditionally subjected going-private mergers to entire fairness review, with the burden on controlling shareholder defendants to demonstrate that such freeze-out transactions are entirely fair to minority shareholders, while endorsing BJR review for going private mergers with dual procedural protections. Compare to the U.S., Japanese courts try to use a traditional pattern to use the Japanese’s Business Judgement Rule to construct the whole new model to review the board of the directors’ loyalty and the duty of care. Even more, the Japanese courts broaden the scope of the duty to all the shareholders to protect minority shareholders from the abuse of the fair procedure covering the determination of a fair but unreasonable price by directors.
Based upon the reflections of legal practices in the U.S. and Japan, this thesis tries to provide a new pattern, which is divided into two parts, to examine the duty of the directors. Learning from the pattern used in Japanese courts, this model separates the duties of directors into two categories, one is owed to the company under paragraph 1 of article 23 of Taiwan’s Company law and paragraph 1 of article 5 of Taiwan’s the Business Mergers And Acquisitions Act and another is owed to the shareholders. And suggest endorsing Japanese’s BJR review for going private mergers with dual procedural protections, based on the U.S. IX pattern. Besides, directors might obtain the nonpublic information about the pricing through their daily work. Sometimes they may ignore the high possibility to get higher price, only giving the reasonable but lower price within the fair range instead higher price in the fair range. To prevent directors from making profits over the shareholders’ rights, Taiwan’s court could review the directors’ duty owed to shareholders according to paragraph 2 of article 23 of Taiwan’s Company law, by the point of view of tort in the civil law system, for the negligent omission tort liability of the directors to protect minority shareholders.

並列關鍵字

management buyout ； going-private transaction ； fiduciary duty ； Business Judgement Rule ； self-dealing ； Entire Fair Review

參考文獻

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