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  • 學位論文

雙占產業中多產品之產能與技術賽局研究

Technology and Capacity Competition of Multiple Products in Duopoly

指導教授 : 吳政鴻
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摘要


本研究討論雙占產業中,領導廠商與跟隨廠商間產能擴充與技術研發之投資動態賽局,雙方決策目標為最大化銷售新舊世代產品之利潤。產能擴充可用於滿足產品需求,增加公司收益,為確定型投資。而投資於技術研發可降低生產成本或提高生產良率,然能否成功研發具不確定性。面對產品市場需求更迭並考慮雙方狀態與決策,兩廠商各自擬定投資策略以最大化長期利潤。決策順序為領導廠商先行決策,跟隨廠商觀察領導廠商之決策後再制定策略。 除投資動態賽局外,雙方於各期決定新舊世代產品生產數量,生產數量決策除受市場環境與自身產能水準影響外,也需考慮對方反應決策,形成一靜態生產賽局,其決策變數為新舊產品生產數量,受限於專用產能與彈性產能水準。此靜態生產賽局必存在唯一均衡解,將原生產賽局轉換成正則型式可找出雙方生產數量均衡解。 本問題之求解演算法結合動態規劃與賽局理論,以取得兩廠商最佳投資策略,並透過模擬了解雙方長期產能與技術投資行為。結果顯示,領導廠商與跟隨廠商於期初即展開產能擴充與技術研發,新購置的彈性產能可用於滿足正值高峰的舊產品需求,而改善生產技術能及早降低製造新產品所需的成本,最大化技術投資所帶來的效益。由於鉅額研發成本難以從剩餘期數回收,兩廠商於中期即停止技術研發。當領導廠商具初始狀態優勢時,其投資決策能有效維持優勢;反觀當跟隨廠商具優勢時,雙方投資策略組合迫使跟隨廠商喪失其初始優勢。最後進行參數分析以了解不同情境下兩廠商投資策略變化與相關管理意涵。

並列摘要


This research studies the dynamic competition of capacity expansion and technology development in duopoly. One of the investment options is flexible capacity expansion. Flexible capacity can be used for production of new and old generation products, thereby raising sales revenue. In addition to capacity expansion, firms can invest in technology development for lower production cost or higher yield rate. In each period, the leading company makes the decision first, and then the following company does. The investment decision consists of how much resources should be put into flexible capacity acquisition and technology development. Both firms follow the decision sequence and make the optimal investment strategy such that long-term payoff is maximized. In addition to the investment competition, each firm has to decide production quantities for the two products in each period, which forms a static production game. We prove that there exists a unique equilibrium in the static production game and transform the original problem into a normal form game for the solution of equilibrium. The equilibrium can be used to calculate sales revenues of the two firms. By combining dynamic programming and game theory to solve the dynamic game model, the optimal policy for each firm can be obtained. We use simulation to analyze the long-term capacity and technology investment behavior in this game. Finally, some parameter analysis is carried out for further investigation on two players’ strategies in different scenarios.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


邱繼群(2016)。科技演進不確定下之研發與產品線決策〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201602862

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