臺灣中央銀行的法律史考察：以央行與其他權力部門之關係為核心

An Analysis of the Legal History of Central Bank in Taiwan:the Relationship between the Central Bank and other Political Branches

黃有衡(You-Heng Huang)

指導教授 ： 王泰升

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201700991

摘要

本論文針對臺灣近代所經歷的二個政權帶來的中央銀行法制分別作歷史考察。第一個政權為日本明治政府，考究的時間軸線自1895年日本領臺起至1945年終戰為止，至於現代中央銀行於歐洲的起源和日本明治政權的引進，則簡略說明；第二個政權為中華民國政府，自1927年第一部《中央銀行條例》制定至2010年為止。討論的焦點著重於：
一、現代中央銀行法制的建立。
二、中央銀行獨立性觀念之出現，進而形成法律規定。
三、中央銀行在每個不同的政權及法律制度下，其獨立性的實踐如何？
　　研究發現，日治時期臺灣的殖民地中央銀行法制下，中央銀行為日本南進與殖產興業政策的工具，無論規範面或實踐面，皆無獨立性可言。中華民國中央銀行法制雖有若干保障中央銀行地位的條文，但整體而言法規範層面的獨立性並不高，實踐層面的獨立性於1988年以前亦相當低；1988年後，法律制度未有太大改變，中央銀行卻逐步在實際運行上取得高度獨立性。
　　中央銀行於1988年後在實際運作上產生獨立性的關鍵因素是什麼？本文並不採納常見的「民主選舉會造成政治景氣循環」的說法，反而認為1988年後貨幣決策的逐步透明化、政治民主化和自由化，才是中央銀行於1988年後仍在運作上創造並保持獨立的關鍵因素；而非常時期威權體制下民主制度的缺乏，則為以往缺乏中央銀行獨立性更進而釀成金融失序的重要原因。
　　本文最後以法律史為主，並參酌外國立法例和學說，嘗試提出中央銀行法制變革的「應然」建議：就大方向而言乃「獨立性」與「課責性」的補強，具體事項則分別為理事任期、預算自主、理事同意權、資訊公開及決策方式等變革。

關鍵字

中央銀行 ； 中央銀行法 ； 獨立性 ； 課責性 ； 獨立機關

並列摘要

This study focuses on the historical analysis of central banking legal systems in Taiwan which the two regimes brought in. First regime is the Government of Meiji Japan. the study starts from 1895 to 1945, including the outlines of the Central Bank’s origin in Western Europe and Japan. Second regime is the Government of the Republic of China, from the enacting of Central Bank Act in 1927 to 2010. The survey emphasizes :
1.the establishment of the modern central bank’s legal system
2.the appearance of the idea of central bank independency, and the formation of legal system.
3.the extent of the central bank independency during every different regimes and legal systems.
This research found that the Central Bank had been the tool of “the southern expansion doctrine” and “the industrial development policy” under the Japanese government. During this time, regulation or practice, there is no central bank independency. Although there are few articles which try to protect the central bank independency in the central bank law system of the Republic of China, the extent of independency on regulation was not high. The Central Bank also had been operating low independency in real practice before 1988. In spite of non-significant changes in legal system, the Central Bank gradually began to obtain the independency in real practice after 1988.
What was the key factor that the Central Bank operated independently in real practice? The general theory is “democratic elections generating The Political Business Cycle”. This study doesn’t adopt this theory. On the contrary, this thesis points out that the transparentization of monetary policies , political democratization and Political liberalization after 1988 are the key factors of Initiating and keeping central bank independency in real practice. The lack of democratic institution under the authoritarian regime is an important reason of the lack of central bank independency, even Financial disorder.
This study bases on the legal history and then refers to foreign legislative examples and theories, trying to give advice about the reform of the legal system of central bank: generally speaking, the advice is the Reinforcement of independency and accountability; specific items are reforms of “terms of directors”, “power to consent director”, “Information disclosure”, and “Information disclosure”.

並列關鍵字

Central Bank ； the Central Bank Act ； independency ； accountability ； independent regulation commission

參考文獻

王泰升（2010），《具有歷史思維的法學：結合台灣法律社會史與法律論證》，臺北市：元照。

王泰升（2014），《台灣日治時期的法律改革》，修訂2版，臺北市：聯經。

臺灣銀行經濟研究室（1953），《臺灣之金融史料》，臺北：臺灣銀行經濟研究室。

劉進慶（2001），《台灣戰後經濟分析》，臺北市：人間。

王泰升（1995），〈日本明治維新的法律近代西方化〉，《臺大法學論叢》，25卷1期，頁1-15。