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  • 學位論文

機構投資人持股與公司股利政策之關聯性研究

The Relation between Institutional Ownerships and Corporate Dividend Policies

指導教授 : 何耕宇
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摘要


Jensen(1986)提出公司發放股利可避免公司自由現金流量遭濫用,進而降低股東與公司經營者間的利益衝突。後續研究延續其論點蓬勃發展,探討解決股東與公司經營者之間代理問題的機制。機構投資人對公司影響力通常較大,其中投信機構投資人的投資決策相對較獨立且專業。本研究目的為探討投信機構投資人與公司股利政策之關聯性,以我國非金融業之上市上櫃公司2009年至2018年的資料進行實證分析。實證結果顯示投信機構投資人持股比例與公司股利發放率及公司獲利表現具顯著正向關係,而其他金融機構投資人持股比例則與公司股利發放率無顯著關係。整體而言,我國投信機構投資人對於公司的股利政策有重要影響力。

並列摘要


According to Jensen (1986), a firm’s dividend payouts can reduce the free cash flow problem and the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. The mechanisms of solving the agency problem between shareholders and managers have been widely studied. Institutional investors normally have much more influence on firms; among them, mutual funds are relatively independent and professional. As a result, the main purpose of this study is to explore the relation between mutual fund and corporate dividend policy, based on the listed non-financial firms in Taiwan from 2009 to 2018. The empirical results show that the mutual fund ownership has a significantly positive effect on firms’ dividend payouts and performance, while the financial institution ownership does not. The evidence suggests that mutual funds play an important role in firms’ dividend policies in Taiwan.

參考文獻


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