- 學位論文
公司股權結構與會計師選擇之關聯性研究
A Study on the Relationship between Corporate Ownership Structure and Auditor Choice
摘要
在我國股權集中的特性下，控制股東會透過金字塔結構、交叉持股及參與管理等方式來增強其控制權，造成控制權與現金流量權的偏離，使其有強烈的動機去剝奪小股東之財富，來圖利自己。根據代理理論(Jensen and Meckling, 1976)，在考量成本與效益後，控制股東可能藉由引進外部監督機制來減低與小股東間的代理成本。本研究以2003年至2007年之上市公司為研究對象，探討在我國股權集中的特性下，公司是否會自願選擇高審計品質之會計師事務所，提供投資人可靠的財務資訊，以減輕代理問題，而有益於公司治理的改善。本文以控制股東所持有之控制權及控制權與現金流量權的偏離程度，作為控制股東剝奪小股東的替代變數，衡量代理問題，以會計師事務所之聲譽，作為審計品質的代理變數，研究結果發現控制權愈高，控制股東侵佔公司資源牟取私利，並剝奪小股東之利益的動機愈強，控制權偏離現金流量權愈大，控制股東愈有能力且有誘因影響公司決策而侵佔小股東之財富，代理問題愈嚴重，公司愈需要高審計品質之會計師事務所查核，以減低與小股東間的代理成本。 此外，從控制股東的董事會組成發現，當控制股東同時擔任董事長、總經理或董監事時，控制股東可藉由對公司決策之控制力增強其侵佔效果，控制股東涉入公司的管理後，加深代理問題，則公司傾向聘任高審計品質之會計師事務所，以降低代理問題。
並列摘要
Based on the characteristics of ownership concentration, controlling owners can reinforce the controlling power through pyramid structure, cross-holdings and participating management so as to achieve the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights. In doing so, they are motivated to expand wealth by depriving the minority shareholders. According to the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling〔1976〕), controlling shareholders may introduce external monitoring mechanism that limit his or her ability to hold up minority shareholders and hence mitigate the agency conflict. This research focuses on the listed companies between 2003 and 2007. It is intended to discover whether companies would voluntarily employ accounting firms with high audit quality to assure outside investors of the credibility of accounting information and then mitigate the agency problem and then benefit the improvement of corporate governance. In this research, the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights are surrogate variables for controlling shareholders who deprive the minority ones. They review agency problem. Meanwhile, reputation of the accounting firm(s) is surrogate variables of audit quality. It is discovered that the higher the controlling power, the high motivation of controlling shareholders to occupy the company resources and deprive the minority shareholders; at the same time, the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights get wider, as the controlling shareholders are more capable to affect the company strategies, occupying wealth of the minority shareholders. At the time, the agency problems are getting worse so that the company will need accounting firms with higher audit quality in order to mitigate the agency problem. Besides, it is found that in the board of directors, when the controlling shareholders take the positions of directors, general managers or supervisors at the same time, they can reinforce the entrenchment effect through the controlling over the company strategies. When they are able to get involved in the management, worsening the agency problem, the company is inclined to hire accounting firms with high audit quality to mitigate seriousness of agency problem.