短時段同質性頻道拍賣機制與平台設計

本論文研究主題是短時段次級頻譜市場(Secondary Spectrum Market)拍賣機制與平台設計。研究首先探討未來對短時段次級頻譜市場的需求性，包括哪些新興應用服務可能應用短時段頻譜空檔、低使用率頻帶空檔是否存在及特性及MNO有何動機出租頻道給MVNO使用。市場中參與的成員包括有行動營運商(Mobile Network Operator，MNO)、行動虛擬營運商(Mobile Virtual Network Operator，MVNO)及頻譜仲介者。現存VoIP的頻寬交易市場並沒有頻譜仲介者的需求，本研究增設了頻譜仲介者作為公正第三者的角色，以Williamson，1986，所提出的市場有效管理概念佐證需設置頻譜仲介者的需求，以促進市場交易有效進行。針對短時段次級頻譜市場的特性，本研究選定單一回合密封標拍賣作為市場交易的機制，除了可以有效率分配頻道資源，又能依MVNO對頻道的需求程度來反映頻道價格。頻譜仲介者則為拍賣進行流程的主持人，其選標(Bid Selection)模型為求解最大標金總額的背包問題(Knapsack Problem)。贏家支付標金規則採用支付次高價(Pay second price)模式。因此在MVNO決策數學模型設計上，MVNO以使用者服務需求估算所需競標的頻道數，再經由營收、營運成本、期望獲利及客戶服務不滿意指標等來估算頻道對MVNO的價值，以計算欲投標的金額。分析所建立的拍賣模型在不同的投標策略下可得以下結論： (1) MVNO以對頻道真實鑑價投標為最佳投標策略，頻譜仲介者則分配頻道給對頻道有最大需求的MVNO。 (2) 積極出價的競標者相對於保守出價者能贏得較高頻道比例； (3) 在贏家支付次高價模式下，MNO須設定頻道底價； (4) 贏家支付次高價模式適合競爭強度較高市場。本論文研究採用Flash CS4介面設計軟體、MySQL 4.0.24資料庫、Apache 1.3.33網站伺服器及PHP伺服器端語言等軟硬體設備，將所設計的短時段頻譜拍賣機制實作為短時段頻譜拍賣(SISA)平台，此平台包括單一回合密封包機制、MVNO決策數學模型及頻譜仲介者選標模型等模塊，並建立自動化(Automatic)、手動(Manual)及監管(Supervised)三種MVNO決策模態(mode)，可供數值模擬或人為決策實驗之用。

關鍵字

短時段次級頻譜市場；行動營運商；行動虛擬營運商；頻譜仲介者；支付次高價；選標模型；標金決策模型；背包問題；短時段頻譜拍賣平台

並列摘要

The theme of this thesis research is on the design of the short-interval secondary spectrum market mechanism and platform. We first assessed the future needs of new services for leasing spectrum channels/bands in a short-interval secondary spectrum market in, the availability of idle spectrum channels/bands, and the motivations for license holders to lease out channels. The participating players in the market include a Mobile Network Operator (MNO), Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), and a spectrum broker. Although there are no spectrum brokers in the existing VoIP (Voice of Internet Protocol) spectrum trading market, we adopt a spectrum broker as an impartial third party in the short-interval spectrum market based on the concept of market efficient governance proposed by Williamson in 1986. Based on the characteristics of the short-interval secondary spectrum market, a single round, sealed bid auction is chosen for detailed design. It is aimed to allocate channels efficiently, and reflect the value of the channels according to the requirement of MVNOs. The spectrum broker is also the auctioneer who coordinates the auction procedure. In the auction, the auctioneer selects winning bids by solving the Knapsack problem that maximizes bid price combination. The winners settle the payment according to a second price scheme of multiple objects. In making bid offer decision, individual MVNOs estimate the number of demand channels based on their respective customer service demand. MVNOs calculate the channel values according to the expected revenue, running cost, expected profit rate and customer service dissatisfaction. Analyses of the auction model under different bidding attitude lead to the following findings: (1) MVNOs offering bids based on their true valuation of channels is the optimal bidding strategy. The spectrum broker thus allocates channels to MVNOs who value the channels most. (2) MVNOs bidding aggressively can win a higher percentage of supply channels than bidding conservatively. (3) The MNO needs to set the reserve price for the channels when the winner settlement rule is to pay the second price. (4) The second-price settlement rule suits an intensely competitive market We designed and implemented the auction mechanism on a short-interval spectrum auction (SISA) platform, which adopted Flash CS4 for interface design, MySQL 4.0.24 as the database, Apache 1.3.33 as the web server, and PHP for the server-side programming language. The SISA platform has modules of the auction mechanism, the MVNO bid decision model, and the spectrum broker bid selection model. In order to simulate the auction result or human decision, the platform also includes three MVNO bid decision modes: automatic, manual, and supervised.

並列關鍵字

short-interval secondary spectrum market ； MNO ； MVNO ； spectrum broker ； pay the second price ； bid selection model ； bid decision model ； knapsack problem ； short-interval spectrum auction platform

參考文獻

[AbG07] Zoe Abrams and Arpita Ghosh, “Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search,” Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions, 2007.

[ALV06] I. Akyildiza, W. Y. Leea, M. C. Vuran, and S. Mohantya, “NeXt generation/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks： A Survey,” Computer Network, Volume 50, Issue 13, pp. 2127-2159, Sep. 2006.

[Aus97] Lawrence M Ausubel, “An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects,” Technical report, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 1997.

[ChL07] J. M. Chaplin and W. H. Lehr, “The Path to Market Success for Dynamic Spectrum Access Technology,” IEEE Communications Magazine, Volume 45, Issue 5, pp. 96-103, May 2007.

[CMS71] John Martin Currie, John A. Murphy and Andrew Schmitz, “The Concept of Economic Surplus and Its Use in Economic Analysis,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 81, No. 324, pp. 741-799, 1971.

國際替代計量

短時段同質性頻道拍賣機制與平台設計

全文下載

主題瀏覽