摘要
在國際經濟秩序劇變的時代，亞洲開發銀行等國際組織首先面對發展中國家崛起的挑戰，凸顯出既有國際開發機構的治理問題。國際組織是否獨立於大國權力而存在向來是國際關係學界爭辯的問題，其中多邊發展機構是否受到援助國利益的介入更可能影響援助有效性，然而即使許多研究證實國際開發機構受美國、日本等主要援助國的自身利益影響，這些國際組織的決策機制與治理模式始終是模糊的。開發銀行的決策是如何產生？既有強國如何影響組織的決策？影響的程度有多大？本文欲以亞洲開發銀行為研究對象，探究這些治理問題。 在本文中，我們透過非正式治理理論探討美國與日本兩個強國如何影響亞銀的決策。透過訪談與文獻分析亞銀的決策過程後，我們發現強國透過董事會中的正式投票權發揮的影響力是有限的，然而制度設計卻隱含了強國透過非正式管道發揮影響力的可能性，亞銀的資金來源與人事任用反映了非正式影響力的大小。量化檢證的結果進一步確認了美國、日本對亞銀貸款援助分配的普遍影響力。美、日兩國立場的一致性使亞銀管理層在資源分配方面獲得高度授權，保留了很大的非正式治理空間。 本文的研究回應了當前國際組織制度改革的呼聲，不僅是正式投票權的重分配，更須注意到非正式管道的制度化。非正式治理理論中，強國若不節制非正式影響力的使用就可能減損組織的正當性，這可能是當下亞洲新興多邊倡議方興未艾的原因。
並列摘要
In the era of rapidly changing international economic order, international organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) stand at the forefront of the challenge. The challenge that emerges from the rising importance of the BRICS reflects the leaning governance structure in favor of existing powers within the international financial institutions. International Relations theories have long debated whether international organizations are independent from the influence of powerful states. In the case of ADB, even though many researches have verified that donor interest is important, especially that of the U.S. and Japan, the real decision-making mechanism remains vague. How do development banks make decisions? How do existing powers influence the decisions of the banks, and to what extent? These questions are investigated here through studying the case of ADB. In this thesis, the theory of informal governance is used to explore how Japan and the U.S. influence the decisions of ADB. After analyzing the decision making process of ADB, using interview and content analysis, it is found that the influence exerted by formal voting is indeed limited. Instead, informal channels are embedded in the institutional design as major means to influence the bank’s decisions, mainly through funds donation and personnel recruitment. The quantitative model further testifies the general influence of Japan and the U.S. in the distribution of resources in the ADB. The converging interest of these two countries results in a high level of delegation ownership by ADB officials, leaving sufficient space for informal influence. This research responds to the current calls for institutional reform in international organizations. The thesis argues that to correct the leaning governance structure, not only formal voting rights require redistribution, but also decision-making channels need to be formalized. The theory of informal governance indicates that the overuse of informal influence will undermine the legitimacy of the organization, which could very well be the underlying cause of the new multilateral initiatives in Asia.