獨占廠商之最適產品線與網路通路策略

The Optimal Product Line Design and Internet Channel Strategies of a Monopolist Firm

楊憶慈(I-Tzu Yang)

指導教授 ： 周善瑜

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.01081

摘要

本研究旨在以賽局分析的方法，探討獨占製造商在面對網路此一新的通路選擇時，如何因應不同市場區隔的消費者特性以設計產品線與通路策略，利用產品線與通路兩行銷工具的互動達到目標行銷的目的。假設市場可依消費者對產品品質的偏好強度差異而區分為高端消費者與低端消費者，兩群消費者對於售前服務的需求亦有不同，消費者使用實體通路將花費出門購物的交通成本，而在網路購物則將因欠缺在銷售點之售前服務而造成效用的損失。研究結果如下：
一、假設所有消費者均能使用網路，當高端消費者對售前服務的需求高於低端消費者，製造商將低端產品置於高端消費者評價較低的網路通路上銷售，可減緩高端消費者轉而買低端產品的誘因，發揮通路的區隔效果，因而提高高端產品的定價。
二、假設所有消費者均能使用網路，製造商的最適通路策略會將高端產品置於高端消費者的效率通路銷售，而當區隔效果夠大時，製造商會將低端消費者引導至不效率通路上。
三、通路的區隔效果可減緩產品線競蝕。當高端消費者對售前服務的需求高於低端消費者時，將低端產品置於高端消費者評價較低的網路通路上銷售，隨著高低端消費者對售前服務的需求差異擴大，區隔效果將逐漸增加，而低端產品的品質亦可獲逐步提升，甚至達到社會效率水準。
四、當只有部分消費者能使用網路時，製造商的最適通路策略除了受到區隔效果與效率效果的影響外，也會受到各通路所能涵蓋市場大小的影響。當高端消費者以實體通路為效率通路時，製造商會將高端產品放在效率的實體通路上銷售。當高端消費者以網路通路為效率通路時，製造商會以雙重通路銷售高端產品，以同時兼顧通路效率性與市場涵蓋。
五、當只有部分消費者能使用網路時，當高低端消費者皆以網路為效率通路，即使通路並無設置成本，製造商的最適通路策略仍可能只使用網路通路銷售低端產品，以提高高端產品的價格。

關鍵字

多重通路訂價 ； 差別取價 ； 網路通路 ； 產品線設計

並列摘要

In this paper, we analyze the optimal product line design and channel strategies of a monopolistic manufacturer, who provides two kinds of products with different quality, and can sell them through the traditional or the Internet channel. We consider the manufacturer facing two segments of consumers with different valuations for quality and for presale services. Consumers when shopping at traditional channels can obtain presale services but have to incur a transportation cost. Consumers who are able to access the Internet can also choose to purchase through the Internet channel and save the transportation cost. We find the following results:
1. When all consumers can access the Internet channel, we find that if high-valuation consumers also have higher demands for presale services than low-valuation consumers, selling a low-end product through the Internet channel can reduce the high-valuation consumers’ incentive to buy the low-end product. As a result, the manufacturer can achieve better screening and hence raise the price of the high-end product.
2. The manufacturer’s optimal channel strategy is to sell the high-end product at the channel which is efficient for the high-valuation consumers. As for the low-end item, the manufacturer may optimally induce the low-valuation consumers to shop at an inefficient channel for them when the screening effect is sufficiently high.
3. Thus the manufacturer can use its distribution strategy to alleviate its cannibalization problem in its product line. When consumers’ heterogeneity in presale services increases, the quality of the low-end item sold through the Internet channel can be raised, even toward the socially efficient level under some conditions.
4. When not all consumers can access the Internet channel, the manufacturer’s optimal channel strategy will also depend on its concern for market coverage implied by different channel strategies. When the traditional channel is efficient for the high-valuation consumers, the manufacturer’s optimal channel strategy is to sell the high-end product through the traditional channel. When the Internet channel is efficient for the high-valuation consumers, the manufacturer should sell the high-end product though the dual channel in order to achieve efficiency and to cover the whole market of high-valuation consumers at the same time.
5. As for the low-end product, when the Internet channel is efficient for both segments of consumers, it may be optimal for the manufacturer to sell the low-end product only through the Internet channel even if the marginal channel cost is zero.

並列關鍵字

Price discrimination ； Multiple-channel pricing strategy ； Internet channel ； Product line design

參考文獻

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