非垂直整合通路下，網際網路對於製造商產品線訂價與目標行銷策略之影響

The Optimal Pricing and Targeting Strategies for a Dual-Channel Multi-Product Manufacturer Facing a Physical Independent Retailer

康嘉晏(Chia-Yen Kang)

指導教授 ： 周善瑜 ； 陳其美

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2012.10792

摘要

隨著網際網路之發達，過去依賴零售商實體通路販售產品的製造商，紛紛自行設立網路通路，直接販售產品給消費者。本研究建構賽局模型，分析當非垂直整合製造商設立網路通路後，將會如何透過調整其產品線訂價與目標策略，減緩零售商誘因問題，以提升製造商利潤。

模型中假設非垂直整合製造商可生產高低端的兩種產品、並得以透過零售商的實體通路或自有的網路通路，將產品販售給對品質有不同偏好的高低端消費者。由於通路屬性不同，通路本身將影響消費者的購物效用，此形成了消費者對於通路的偏好，模型假設高端消費者比低端消費者對實體通路有較高的偏好。本研究獲得以下幾項研究結果：

一、設立網路通路後，製造商更傾向以完整的產品線服務市場。

二、當高低端消費者皆較偏好實體通路，製造商的網路產品價格得以牽制零售商的產品訂價，以緩解零售商誘因問題，而隨著高低端消費者網路通路效用損失差異由小而大，緩解效果由大至小。

三、當高端消費者較偏好實體、低端消費者較偏好網路，製造商得以分別使用其偏好的通路服務消費者，並完美的區隔消費者進行差別取價，因而製造商將傾向服務所有消費者。

四、當高低端消費者皆較偏好網路通路，隨著高低端消費者網路通路效用獲益差異由小而大，低端消費者可能成為網路通路的實質高端消費者，製造商將傾向將原本的高端消費者引導至實體通路，扭曲高端消費者的通路效率性。

關鍵字

直接網路通路 ； 通路協調 ； 雙通路訂價 ； 產品線訂價

並列摘要

With the rapid development of Internet Technology, there are more and more manufacturers, which depended solely on retailers’ physical channels in the past, choose to set up online channels and sell their products directly to consumers. Through building a game-theoretical model, this paper attempts to analyze how the manufacturer adjusts its pricing and targeting strategies to adopt the online channel as a mechanism to alleviate the retailer’s incentive problems, and hence improves the manufacture’s profits.
In our game-theoretical model, we assume that in a non-vertically integrated channel structure, there is a multi-product monopolistic manufacturer (M), which can sell its products through the brick-and-mortar retailer’s (R) channel or M’s direct online channel, to the two segments of consumers, who differ in their preference for product quality. We also assume that even if consumers buy identical products at identical prices, they would obtain different consumer surplus merely because they buy their products in different channels due to the differences of the channels’ attributes, and consumers in the high segment have a higher preferences toward the physical channel than those in the low segment.
We obtain the following results. First, M would incline to serve the market with a full product line, if it is endowed with the online channel. Second, when all consumers prefer a physical channel to an online outlet, M can use the online prices as a viable threat, and thus alleviate R’s incentive problems. As the gap between the highs’ and the lows’ online channel loss expands, the effect of channel coordination would decrease. Third, when the highs prefer a physical channel, whereas the lows prefer an online outlet, M can use the two channels to serve the two segments and discriminate the consumers perfectly. Therefore, M would incline to serve all consumers. Lastly, when all consumers prefer an online outlet to a physical channel, as the gap between the highs’ and the lows’ online channel gain expands, the lows may become the actual high-end consumers on the Internet, and M would incline to induce the original highs to the physical channel, distorting the highs’ channel efficiency.

並列關鍵字

Direct Online Channel ； Channel Coordination ； Dual-channel Pricing Strategy ； Product Line Pricing Strategy

參考文獻

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