考量信用擔保機制於供應鏈下雙供應商採購模式之研究

Supply Chain Dual Sourcing Model with Credit Guarantee Mechanism

林家平(Chia-Ping Lin)

指導教授 ： 蔣明晃

共同指導教授 ： 陳穆臻(Mu-Chen Chen)

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/博士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.02241

摘要

在全球化及降低成本趨勢下，廉價或新興國家(如：中國與印度)採購(low-cost or emerging country sourcing)的商業模式在實務及學術上受到高度的重視。在進行廉價採購時，品牌商主要是尋求低價的代工廠商，因此把採購定位在交易層級，將會透過第三方的採購公司作為仲介，向代工廠商採購。在廉價採購模式中，採購公司必須承擔代工廠商有可能發生違約，無法交付採購商品的風險；而代工廠商通常為中小企業，其營運資金較不充裕，可能須要透過向銀行融資，才能夠進行生產。受限於代工廠商的會計帳紀錄不夠完整，也缺少過往借貸的信用紀錄，加上無法提出合適的抵押品，故銀行對代工廠商之放款條件將相對嚴苛或甚至拒絕放款，使得代工廠商的融資成本墊高，獲利減少或根本無法取得充分的資金接單進行生產。
有鑑於此，本研究嘗試以雙供應商採購與信用擔保機制來解決廉價採購模式中採購公司與代工廠商所遭遇的問題，進而提出一考量信用擔保機制於供應鏈下之雙供應商採購模式，並依據採購公司為供應關係的領導者，兩家代工廠商為跟隨者，將模型建構為一領導者追隨者賽局(stackleberger game)。研究使用後向歸納法(backward induction)求解模型，以了解採購公司的採購行為及兩家代工廠商的生產行為。再透過模型參數的敏感度分析及實驗設計分析，探討模式參數對於模型均衡解移動的影響。

關鍵字

供應鏈風險 ； 廉價採購 ； 信用擔保 ； 領導者追隨者賽局 ； 混合0-1規劃

並列摘要

In the trend of globalization and lowering cost, low-cost or emerging country sourcing is attracted highly attention in practice and academy. In the low-cost or emerging country sourcing, finding the cheapest contract manufacturers (CMs) is transaction orientated, and brand firm will sourcing though sourcing companies. Sourcing companies have to bear the risk of defected by CMs. The CMs who are usually small and medium enterprises and lack of work capital need to grant a loan from banks. However, the condition of the loan would be very disadvantage on the CMs or the bank even does not approve the loan because the CMs’ incomplete accounting records, absence of historical loan records, and lack of collateral. Those would seriously affect the margin of CMs, and the CMs even reject the order from sourcing company on account of insufficient working capital to produce the order.
Therefore, in order to solve the difficulty encountering by sourcing companies and CMs in low-cost sourcing, this study attempt to propose a supply chain dual sourcing model with credit guarantee mechanism. The relationship between a sourcing company and two CMs is taken into consideration in the proposed model though formulating the model as a stackleberger game. In the game, the sourcing company is a leader and the two CMs are followers. The backward induction is used to solve the proposed model. After solving the optimal behaviors of the sourcing company and CMs, the numerical experiment is employed to explore the effect of model parameters on the movement among the equilibriums.

並列關鍵字

Supply Chain Risk ； Low-cost or Emerging Country Sourcing ； Credit Guarantee ； Stackleberger Game ； Mixed 0-1 Programming

參考文獻

葉明憲(2011)，應用賽局理論探討信用擔保機制於供應鏈採購模式之研究，國立台灣大學商學研究所碩士論文。

曹瑜珊(2009)，運用信用擔保機至於供應鏈採購模式之研究，國立臺灣大學商學研究所碩士論文。

Beck, T., L.F. Klapper, and J.C. Mendoza (2010) The typology of partial credit guarantee funds around the world, Journal of Financial Stability, 6 (1), 10-25

Chen, Y., B. F. Hobbs, S. Leyffer, and T. S. Munson (2006) Leader-follower equilibria for electric power and NOx allowances markets, Computational Management Science, 3, 307-330.

Cowling M. (2010) The role of loan guarantee schemes in alleviating credit rationing in the UK, Journal of Financial Stability, 6(1), 36-44