摘要
過去研究發現，企業經理人的個人特質皆會影響經理人的經營風格與營運決策，並有多篇文獻探討個人特質與盈餘管理行為間的關係。美國於2002 年安隆案爆發後頒布沙賓法案(The Sarbanes-Oxley Act)，主管機關希望能要求公司揭露更多資訊予報表使用者，並且以更嚴謹的監督要求公司提供更允當表達之財務資訊。沙賓法案之頒布將使經理人受到沙賓法案之監督而減少盈餘管理行為。本研究之目的係探討經理人之調節焦點(Regulatory focus)對於盈餘管理行為在沙賓法案發布前後是否有不同影響。依據調節焦點理論(Regulatory Focus Theory)，經理 人可以分成促進型目標定向(Promotion Focus) 者與預防型目標定向(Prevention Focus)者。促進型目標定向的經理人具追求成就之傾向，利用機會達成其所期待之正向結果；反之預防型目標定向之經理人具堅守責任之傾向，正確的拒絕錯誤以規避其所想避免之負向結果。基於以上兩種論述，本文探討具有促進型目標定向之經理人受到沙賓法案之限制而降低盈餘管理行為，是否在程度上與具有預防型目標定向之經理人存有差異。本研究使用"操控盈餘以符合分析師預期之傾向"與"異常應記數"作為盈餘管理之代理變數。研究結果發現沙賓法案之頒布與盈餘 管理行為成負向關係，肯定該法案之成效，然相較於預防型定向之經理人，具有目標型定向之經理人較不受沙賓法案之限制，選擇追求個人利益與成就而承擔額外的風險，與盈餘管理行為呈現正向關係，而預防型定向之經理人則強調其責任與不願承擔額外風險而進行較少的盈餘管理行為。
並列摘要
Previous research has extensive findings about the impacts of psychological attributes of managers on operating decisions. Since the scandal of Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is promulgated in the hope that companies can provide fair presented financial statements under an environment with stricter overseeing and more information disclosure. It is expected that earnings management behavior can decline due to the legislation constraints. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether CEO regulatory focus can affect earnings management after the adoption of SOX. In accordance with the regulatory focus theory, individuals with promotion focus are more concerned with accomplishments and are more inclined to ensure holding opportunity to attain the positive outcomes. In contrast, individuals with prevention focus are more concerned with responsibility, and are more inclined to ensure correct rejections to avoid the negative outcomes. Using the tendency of beating the analysts’ forecasts and discretionary accrual model to measure earnings management, I find that the adoption of SOX can reduce earnings management. However, the results are more pronounced for CEOs with prevention focus than CEOs with promotion focus. The results imply that CEOs with prevention focus, who emphasizing more on their responsibility and due diligence, engage in less earnings management. In contrast, CEOs with promotion focus, who emphasize more on their own profits, are not fully constrained by SOX to reduce earnings management.
參考文獻
延伸閱讀
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