高階經理人薪酬與限制員工權利新股

Named Executive Officers Compensations and Restricted Shares

陳苑霖(Yuan-Lin Chen)

指導教授 ： 許文馨

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2015.02038

摘要

本研究主要介紹並分析台灣甫通過相關法令之薪酬工具：限制員工權利新股，並進一步以個案分析之方式探討宏碁高階經理人薪酬結構與績效之關聯性。
首先，先探討台灣2011年6月修法完成之薪酬工具：限制員工權利新股。透過比較台灣限制員工權利新股與美國已行之有年的選擇權及限制型股票之現況，包含了兩國之企業使用比例、既得條件是否以時間條件或為績效提件、績效條件是否以財務指標或非財務指標、績效條件是否選取標竿樣本，以及既得期間長短之差異，對於未來台灣企業在發行限制員工權利新股時，提出可以加強其激勵效果之薪酬結構。
接著，為了更深入了解單一公司實際薪酬設計的細節，我藉由個案分析之方式，以宏碁公司做為分析對象，介紹其公司成立背景並深入探討宏碁近期高階經理人之薪酬結構，同時以華碩與戴爾做為國內外之比較公司，比較三者之間高階經理人薪酬結構之差異及其薪酬績效關聯性之強弱。綜觀台灣美國市場分析，以及同產業的公司分析，我提出對宏碁薪酬制度之建議。

關鍵字

個案分析 ； 高階經理人薪酬 ； 限制員工權利新股 ； 宏碁股份有限公司 ； 權益薪酬

並列摘要

The objective of this research is to analyze the practice of restricted shares in Taiwan, which was launched by Corporation Law in 2011. I first constrast the current structures of restricted shares in Taiwan with the structure in the US (where restricted shares have already been used for a long time) in four aspects: the vesting condition in terms of time and performance, the performance criteria in terms of financial performance and non-financial performance, the benchmark of performance in terms of absolute performance and relative performance and the performance horizon. To shed further lights on the practice in an individual firm, I then conduct case analyses on Acer Inc. I analyze the compensation structure of its executive compensation, and compare its practice with two international peers, ASUS Inc., and Dell Inc. Based on the analyses for the overall market in the USA and Taiwan, along with the industry peer analyses, I form my suggestions to ACER Inc.

並列關鍵字

case study ； named executive officers (NEOs) compensation ； restricted shares ； Acer Inc. ； equity-based compensations

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