中國市場結構轉型中的社會治理機制－－四種類型案例

中國大陸市場經濟的結構轉型，導致政治、經濟資源的系統性重組。這不時引發社群行動和社會力量的反應，從而帶來新興挑戰和危機。以制度化機制化解這些挑戰和危機，維持政治社會秩序，成為基層社會治理的必要條件，也構成支撐宏觀政權體制穩定延續的基礎。廣袤的地域中，出現許多制度實踐、應用、選擇、創新。部分案例處於市場結構轉型背景，在社會危機擴散蔓延的威脅下進行制度改革，卻建立起格外醒目的社會治理績效，成為省部級甚至中央表揚推廣的模式。這些案例經歷了特別漫長而完整的制度路徑。　　然而，各地進行制度改革、建立社會治理績效，其路徑、機制、形式往往南轅北轍。這些路徑機制分別呈現為何種類型？為何存在這些差異？它們形成和運作的機制邏輯為何？面臨何種趨勢和局限？與宏觀政權體制之間存在何種連結，又具有何種意義？本文圍繞這組問題意識，透過對於基層治理相關實踐案例長期持續的追蹤、調研、田野工作、參與實踐、反思，以及想像，進行類型比較和邏輯演繹。本文結合「體制/社會分界」和「基層社會文化」兩個維度。參照制度經濟學理論脈絡，各以「體制政治經濟資源依附性」和「社群文化意識抽象性」作爲依據，區分出「基層社會格局背景」的四種情境類型：「抽象依附」、「特定依附」、「特定自主」，以及「抽象自主」。　　這四種社會格局背景類型，對於基層政權體制的制度決策，造成相異局限條件，突顯不同的機制特質，如吸納、滲透、嵌入、排斥等等。同時，也形塑了基層社群行動的型態。局限條件下的制度決策，能否透過制度機制，使基層社會格局背景及社群行動型態形成契合關係，成為基層社會治理績效的關鍵。契合關係的治理型態分別展現為：規制滲透的全能型、關係滲透的包聯型、關係吸納的傳統型，以及規制吸納的法制型。這個架構形成理解基層社會治理的參照系。　　基於四種社會格局背景和機制類型，本文選擇四個典型案例。分別位於東北老工業基地、陜西南部貧困縣、江西宗族社會，和廣東沿海發達地區。四個案例皆曾遭遇重大社會危機往上、往外蔓延的威脅，皆進行制度體系的改革決策，並分別以四種治理機制形式，取得了顯著的社會治理績效。本文詳細展現四種機制實踐過程，並力圖呈顯：基層治理機制的決策和實踐，相當程度需要對基層提供因地制宜的裁量空間。而宏觀政權體制的穩定和局限，也與基層微觀治理績效密切相關。　　然而，政權體制內生的性質，造成宏觀政權體制與微觀基層治理間的矛盾張力。回歸「黨家體制」邏輯，政權協調矛盾的方式則有「依附化」乃至「全能化」的傾向，並表現為中央權力的集中，和對基層幹部的直接控制。本文的創新和貢獻，在於超越宏觀體制類型和特殊性案例敘事，爲基層社會治理機制過程，提供一種兼具類型學意義和政策價值的理論視角，同時透過基層治理過程與宏觀政權體制的關係，展現黨家體制的一般性邏輯。

關鍵字

市場結構轉型；社會治理；體制吸納；體制滲透；黨家體制

並列摘要

The structural transformation of market economy in China results in a systematic rearrangement of political and economical resources. This rearrangement triggered community actions and reactions from social forces, thus bringing new challenges and crisis. Using institutionalized mechanisms to resolve these challenges and crisis, and maintain the order in political society becomes a necessity for grassroots society governance and also forms the basis of the stable continuation of a more grandeur political power regime. Within the vast territories of China, there were a lot of different institutional practice, application, choice and innovation that existed. Some of these cases were within the background of market structure transformation, doing institutional reform under the threat of an expanding social crisis, yet achieved an extraordinary social governance performance, making it a executing template for provincial level to central level governments. These cases went through an exceptional long and complete path in an institutional sense. But the institutional reforms, its governance performance, path, mechanism and forms in different places are usually different. What kind of institutions do these paths result in? Why are there differences? How do they form and what is the mechanism of them? What trend and limitations do they face? And what connections and meanings are there between the grassroots institutions and the grand regime institution? This article tries to compare and deduct between the different types of institutions through research, field studies, participation, reflection and imagination. And tries to combine the two dimensions of regime-society boundary and grassroots social culture. With references from institution economics theory, we use ideas of the dependence of political and economical resources of regime and abstractness of culture consciousness of communities as guidance to distinguish four types of grassroots social layout background, which includes “abstract dependence”, “particular dependence”, “particular independence” and “abstract independence”. These four different social layout background types become different limitation conditions in institutional decision-making of different grassroots regimes, showing different traits between these mechanisms. Such as inclusion, penetration, embeddedness and exclusion. Meanwhile, they also define how would the grassroots communities act. Whether the institutional decision-making under limitations can form a matching relationship between the grassroots social layout background and its community actions become the key to grassroots social governance performance. The governance type of these matching relationships are: “totalism of regulate penetration”, “subcontract of Guanxi penetration”, “traditionalism of Guanxi inclusion” and “rule by law of regulate inclusion”. This framework forms the frame of reference for comprehension of grassroots social governance. According to the four different types of grassroots social layout background and mechanism, we selected four ideal type cases in this article as examples for each. One is a north-eastern old industrial base, one is a poor county in Shaanxi province, one is a clan society in Jiangxi, and one is from the more developed areas of Guangdong. All these four cases had encountered major social crisis that might spread upwards and outwards. All of them undertook the decision-making of institutional reform, and achieved immense results in social governance through one of these four governance mechanism types. We examined the execution process of these four mechanisms, and try to show that the decision-making and execution of grassroots level governance need, to some extent, basal level discretion that differ from place to place. And the stability and limitation of grand political institution also affect the performance of micro governance at grassroots level. But the inherent properties of political institution also result in the conflicting tensions between the grand political institutions and grassroots micro governance. Back to the logics of party-royalty regime, the ways that political institutions try to resolve conflict are leaning toward “dependent” way or even “totalism” way, and appear as the concentration of power in central level and direct infiltration and control of grassroots level. The insight and contribution of this article lies in the types that transcends grandeur institution and special case narratives, providing a theoretical perspective that has both typological meaning and policy value. And at the same time, we try to display the party-royalty regime and the common logic of political development in modern China through the process of grassroots governance and its relationship with grand political institution.