Over the recent years, the average cash-to-net-asset ratio for Taiwanese firms in many industries has risen dramatically. Firms may choose to hold cash for either transactional or precautionary motives. However, excessive cash holding may cause agency problems, leading to lower market value for the firm. The literature has shown that corporate governance would mitigate the value destruction associated with excessive cash holding. In this paper, we use the firms’ degree of information disclosure as our main measure of corporate governance and use “The Ranking Result of the Public Companies Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System” issued by Securities and Futures Institute as a proxy for the degree of information disclosure. Using these sample data, this paper attempts to investigate how the interaction between the degree of information disclosure and cash holding is related to firm value. The results from this paper show that, for firms in the Electronic and Biotechnology & Medicine Industries, the higher a firm’s degree of information disclosure, the lower its market value derived from a marginal dollar of cash. However, for firms in the other industries, the higher a firm’s degree of information disclosure, the higher its market value derived from a marginal dollar. Conclusively, we suggest that industrial characteristics and sources of cash may lead to different results for different industries.