企業主管過度自信與企業技術更新、併購行為關聯性之研究

Strategic Roles of Managerial Over-confidence: a Behavioral Theory of Mergers and Technology Updates

林書羽(Shu-Yu Lin)

指導教授 ： 陳其美

共同指導教授 ： 周善瑜

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2015.02245

摘要

本研究透過建構賽局模型，旨在探討一個理性的企業家，面對兩種對相同資訊具有截然不同解讀方式的過度自信企業主管時，將會如何採用產業競爭策略，引進新技術或者進行併購。
本研究獲得以下幾項重要研究結果：
一、 過度自信的企業主管對於市場資訊的錯誤解讀方式，將會成為產業競爭中的一個承諾(commitment)，當企業主管對前景預期樂觀時，將會享有競爭優勢。反之，對前景預期悲觀時，則成為劣勢。
二、 若政府實行裁量式貨幣政策(discretionary monetary policy)，且在產業競爭中，至少存在一名因應政府政策而調整產出決策的企業主管，則理性類型企業主管所經營的廠商，其股價將上升。
三、 理性類型的企業主管，面對過度自信類型企業主管，可能因而採取看似不理性的「安於現狀偏誤(status quo bias)」行為，但實為一理性決策。
四、 在本研究中，造成併購發生的主因是，以對產品單位成本較樂觀的企業主管取代較悲觀的企業主管，可以提高一家廠商的競爭優勢。
五、 併購發生後，理性類型的主併公司以及被併公司的股價皆會上升，而其對手廠商的股價則會下跌。此外，對於市場中的消費者而言，消費者剩餘將上升。

關鍵字

過度自信 ； 裁量式貨幣政策 ； 安於現狀偏誤 ； 技術更新 ； 併購

並列摘要

The objective of this paper is to propose a model that allows for the presence of over-confidence, with over-estimate information type and under-estimate information type, and that incorporates the empirical and experimental findings as an evidence to illustrate the effect of managerial traits towards the industrial competitive advantage, the timing of technology update, and the merger. The main results are listed below:
1. The wrong belief of the information of the over-confidence entrepreneurs in a duopoly Cournot quantity-setting competition, via strategic complementarity, constitutes a commitment, which brings them a competitive advantage if they are optimistic about the future, and othterwise a disadvantage if they are pessimistic about the future.
2. With the discretionary monetary policy proposed by the Government, the output adaption decision made by at least one of the entrepreneurs will lead to the increase of the volatility of the equilibrium product price.
3. The rational entrepreneur facing the overconfident entrepreneur will not take an irrational status quo bias action but make a rational profit maximization decision.
4. The reason why the merger happens is that, in the duopoly market, the firm operated by the optimistic entrepreneur will be the acquiring firm and the other firm operated by the pessimistic entrepreneur will be the target firm, and that their action will enhance the firm’s competitive advantage.
5. After the merger succeeded, the stock price of both the rational acquiring firm and target firm will increase, and that of the rival firm will decrease. In addition, the consumer surplus will increase.

並列關鍵字

over-confidence ； discretionary monetary policy ； status-quo bias ； technology update ； merger

參考文獻

許培基、葉銀華、邱琦倫、王宛婷，2013，管理者過度自信、完成併購機率與併購後績效，期貨暨證券市場發展季刊，第九十八期，頁129-160。

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