政策利益分配的新途徑： 
以聯合分析法論析台北市老人政策資源分配

公共政策的目標是維持人類的基本人權以及提升民眾的社會福祉，但是公共政策背後隱含的分配價值，使決策者必須謹慎思考背後的分配邏輯：誰能獲得利益？為何是這群人獲得？應給予多少資源？社會認同理論闡述的社會決策以及個人決策的衝突導致的集體行為困境，即是在於如何體現分配政策的路線選擇－採取納入所有人的「普遍性政策」抑或設計排斥條款的「針對性政策」。不論在理論或實務上，莫不期待在政策設計階段能全面瞭解受益者的實際需求，並增強政策論述證明受益者是值得獲得利益且預算都是有效率的花費，以緩解分配政策的分群衝突。然而遺憾的是，既有的決策偏好調查中，多數未能有效地釐清不同族群、特質的受益者中多樣的需求，特別地方決策往往囿限選舉主義，使得擬定政策時雖有理想，但實務上卻難以落實資源分配的有效性與公平性的窘境。基於此一社會需要，本文選定以台北市2015年老人政策改革為例，提出分配政策設計架構，並透過聯合分析法同時也結合預算遊戲與因果推論方法，讓政府藉以思考如何有效理解受益者的需求和大眾不平衡的成因，進而緩解針對性與普遍性的選擇困境。本文透過實驗一與實驗二分別探究年長者的需求以及非年長者的不平衡感。在實驗一中發現台北市年長者與政府對於老人政策想像不同，認為改變後的針對性政策反而造福高社經地位的年長者，並沒有滿足其政策需求；而在實驗二則發現，多數與年長者無密切接觸的非年長者，容易忽視其他因素，認為經濟弱勢是領取政策資源的唯一標準。也就是說，政策並沒有滿足受益群體需求，導致出現增加補助的聲音，但是這卻成為非受益族群不平衡感的起源，甚至造成更為激烈的社會衝突與對立。本文期待透過新的調查方法的提出，更細緻的理解各族群需求，促進分配政策的討論能為證據為本的理性討論，緩解分群極化的社會，減少施政衝突並提升社會福祉。

關鍵字

分配政策；聯合分析法；預算遊戲；政策偏好；台北市

並列摘要

Social welfare aims to collect social resources and distribute them to enhance the wellbeing of people. However, in the discussion of distribution policy, several crucial questions emerge, such as “Who gets the benefits?” and “How much should be paid?” Social identity theory addresses these questions through irrational decisions at the individual and social levels. Furthermore, this dilemma can be observed in the selection of a real-world policy approach, that is, universal or targeting policy. To solve this dilemma, previous studies highlighted the importance of understanding the demands of the ingroup and resentments of the outgroup to mitigate social categorization. However, mitigation theories cannot be put into practice because the current tools for measuring preferences find difficulty in obtaining detailed information on the policy preferences of people, who are naturally bound to individual characteristics. Therefore, this paper proposed a theoretical framework and combined conjoint analysis and a bidding game to measure the demands and resentments of the ingroup and outgroup, respectively. The study was conducted in the context of Taipei’s aging policy reform in 2015. Two experiments were performed in four of Taipei’s heterogeneous administrative districts. The results demonstrated that the elderly deemed that the new policy failed to meet their demands and even targeted people with high socioeconomic status. Moreover, the nonelderly with less contact with the elderly stressed economic disadvantage as the only cut-off point for receiving policy benefit. In other words, the policy failed to meet the needs of the beneficiary groups, which led to increased subsidies. However, this aspect became the origin of the imbalance among nonbeneficiary groups, which instigated deeper social conflict. In conclusion, this paper expects, in the near future, that governments should take advantage of conjoint analysis with the bidding game to collect evidence during the policy decision-making process to enhance the wellbeing of citizens.