司法院大法官作為代位立法者？－－以法律違憲宣告模式為中心

如何畫出違憲審查者及立法者之權限範圍，實為司法違憲審查機制之永恆難題。而此一難題在大法官作成之諭知有形成規範並且替代規範之性質時，則顯得更為棘手。本文之研究客體即聚焦在此種「以解釋替代立法之諭知」，嘗試分析並評價此種解釋宣告模式是否逾越權力分立之界線。而核心之問題意識即在於，「違憲審查者」之角色除作為「司法者」外，得否具有形成規範之功能而作為代位之「立法者」？又若可以代替立法者，大法官又應如何代替立法者？　　對此，本文從違憲審查者之權限出發，確立規範賦予了大法官保障人民基本權利及確保國家權限劃分之功能任務。如此，大法官作為違憲審查者，一方面具有「審判機關」之地位發揮解決爭議之功能，另方面亦具有「憲法機關」之地位而確保並落實憲法作為最高規範之拘束力。而基於如此之雙重地位，大法官解釋之「執行」即不再僅止於對法院給付判決之狹義執行概念，毋寧為對於憲法法院裁判結果之落實及貫徹而言。簡而言之，即為對於合憲法律狀態之落實。而對此之落實，從客觀法律角度觀之，為對於憲法秩序之「事實上」維持；從主觀權利角度察之，則為對於人民基本權之「實際上」保障。是以，為使憲法作為有拘束力之最高規範不僅為空談，大法官即應具有能夠實際上有效除去違憲侵害、並且回復合憲狀態之規範形成權限。　　而進一步之問題為，司法者如此之規範形成權限是否與權力分立原則相容？對此，本文從功能法之論述取徑出發認為，權力分立之目的在於使國家決定應盡可能正確地被作成，以落實對於基本權利之保障，因而容許國家機關間權限之分享以及合作。然而，如此並不代表權力間並不存有界線，其界限在於，在功能上該憲法機關仍得以繼續維持其應有之通常領域之權限及責任，而不會使任何憲法機關獲得全面凌駕於其他機關之獨斷地位。而於大法官作成替代立法之諭知時，立法者仍得保有其立法以及修法之權限，只要其嗣後再為立法或修法即可立即贏回對於規範之主導權。是以，在此之下，賦予大法官具有形成規範之權限並無違於權力分立。相反地，當大法官諭知之內容造成對於立法者地位之長期或永久壓制時，即難以免於違反權力分立之指謫。而對此事實上則連結到了本研究第二層次之問題意識，即大法官作為代位立法者如何可能之問題。　　就此，本文基於對我國司法實踐之觀察，針對大法官有為替代立法諭知之案件，歸納整理為五個部分──「平等授益範圍之擴張」、「人民給付請求之創設」、「人身自由侵害之調整」、「程序保障義務之落實」以及「憲法訴訟制度之建構」。並嘗試透過相類案件之對比，以分析大法官形成諭知背後可能之理由。進一步透過理由之分析及證成，嘗試抽繹出可能之規則，作為未來檢驗大法官替代立法諭知正當性高低之標準。　　最後，本文綜合全文所提出之評價規則，而發展出類似於比例原則之操作模式。針對「替代立法諭知作為手段」與「達成落實基本權保障此一目的」之手段目的關聯性，提出不同層次之審查重點，並對於違憲宣告模式有以替代立法諭知部分之類型化進行重構。希冀能藉由審查模型之建立，提供未來於評析大法官有以諭知為替代立法之相關解釋或裁判時，檢驗並評價個案中大法官是否已經逾越了權力分立界線之標準。

關鍵字

憲法法院；大法官；代位立法者；違憲宣告模式；司法造法；權力分立；諭知；違憲審查；執行

並列摘要

Defining and separating the authority of constitutional courts and legislators has always been a difficult issue in the realm of judicial review, and it is all the more problematic when the declaration made by the Grand Justices contributes to the formation of legal norms. In response, this thesis focuses on such declarations where interpretation is in place of legislation, while analyzing and reviewing whether this declaration mode is ultra vires from the perspective of the separation of powers. The core research question is as follows: is a constitutional court entitled to contribute to the formation of legal norms as a positive legislator? If the constitutional court is entitled, how should the Grand Justices act in such a role? To answer this question, the thesis first establishes the authority of constitutional courts, i.e. the Grand Justices’ authority to protect citizens’ fundamental rights and ensure the separation of powers. As constitutional court, the Grand Justices not only resolve disputes as a judiciary, but are also constitutionally entitled to ensure the Constitution is the binding fundamental principles. Based on this dual role, the implementation interpreted by the Grand Justices means more than a execution made by the court (the narrow definition); instead, it signifies the fulfillment of the judgment in a constitutional court, i.e. the implementation of constitutionality. From a perspective of objective law, it is a “de facto” maintenance of constitutional order; from a perspective of subjective right, it is a “practical” guarantee of the citizens’ fundamental rights. Hence, to make sure the Constitution serves as the binding fundamental norm instead of mere words, the Grand Justices shall be entitled to effectively remove unconstitutional violation so as to retain constitutionality. Furthermore, the thesis probes into the question whether the judiciary’s entitlement to form legal norms is compatible with the principle of separation of powers. From a functional model perspective, known as “funktionell-rechtlicher Ansatz” in German, separation of powers is to ensure the decisions regarding the state are formulated as correctly as possible, so as to implement the protection of fundamental rights. Hence, state agencies are allowed to share authorities and collaborate; however, it does not mean that boundaries do not exist among powers. The constitutional agency can functionally retain its designated authorities and duties without overriding other agencies. As a declaration, which serves as judicial lawmaking, is made by the Grand Justices, legislators are still entitled to form and amend the laws, and this ensures their dominance in the field of legislation. Hence, the Justices’ entitlement to form legal norms is not in violation with the separation of powers. Nevertheless, when the declaration made by the Grand Justices overpowers the legislators, either for a long term or permanently, the constitutional courts will be accused of violating the principle of separation of powers, and this leads to the second tier of the research question, i.e. how should the Grand Justices act as a positive legislator? In this regard, this thesis analyzes cases in which declaration is made by the Grand Justices and serves as judicial lawmaking and organizes such cases into five parts based on its observation of Taiwan’s judicial practices. By comparing these cases with similar ones, the research analyzes the possible reasons which may influence the Justices’ decision to formulate a declaration. By analyzing and justifying such reasons, the researcher attempts to deduce possible patterns, which can serve as standards to examine the Justices’ legitimacy in making a declaration which acts as judicial lawmaking in the future. Last but not least, the research concludes all the patterns and standards to develop a modus operandi similar to proportionality, i.e. different tiers of review targets that examine the correlation between “declaration as judicial lawmaking” and “protection and implementation of basic rights” while restructuring the categorization of declaration modes of unconstitutionality. By means of establishing a judicial review model, the researcher aims to offer a set of standards to examine whether the Justices have violated the principle of separation of powers in such cases.

並列關鍵字

Constitutional Court ； Grand Justices ； Positive Legislator ； the Declaration Modes of Unconstitutionality ； Judicial Lawmaking ； Separation of Powers ； Declaration ； Judicial Review ； Implementation