股東代表訴訟之再建構

股東代表訴訟作為追究董事責任的手段之一，其重要性自不待言。惟我國實務上使用頻率較低，而立法者亦數次修法調降門檻，以期促進制度利用。然而本文並不認為調降持股門檻能夠反應股東代表訴訟之癥結，並且對立法者修法方向存有疑義，亦即本文旨在思索於促進制度利用、防止濫訴以外，股東代表訴訟制度修正是否存在第三路線之可能。首先，本文觀察現行法缺失以及梳理學說批評，藉以劃分本文討論範圍，除了公司法現有問題以外，亦對我國投保中心代表訴訟進行檢討，且著重於投保中心之特殊地位，探求賦予其特殊功能之可能性。其次，本文欲藉由觀察美國法股東代表訴訟之制度運作，提供我國制度修正之借鏡。從理論基礎出發，可發現衡平法則扮演至關重要之地位，並體現於各項要件中。在制度目的方面，美國法上股東代表訴訟的功能於當代似乎產生變動，填補損害不再是首要目標，而公司治理和解的大量運用成為美國新課題。本文觀察聯邦民事訴訟法、模範公司法以及德拉瓦州法之重要規範，以期達到完整性，並試圖歸納出美國法制度之精神。另外，本文亦針對美國實務所肯認之二重代表訴訟進行討論，提供企業集團化經營下股東代表訴訟之突破。最後，本文回歸我國規定，試圖從美國法之精神重新建構股東代表訴訟制度。本文藉由不同角度思考股東代表訴訟之制度設計，跳脫一般以濫訴防止與促進利用之思維，透過原告股東在訴訟中的角色形塑其應有之權限與義務，避免原告股東於代表訴訟中產生代理問題，以期保護公司及其餘股東之利益，並且針對我國特殊的投保中心賦予不同功能，期望藉由功能轉型降低地位模糊的正當性疑慮。至此，則希望透過對於股東代表訴訟制度之再建構，達成代表訴訟所預期之制度目的，並且維持股東、公司及董事間之衡平。

關鍵字

股東代表訴訟；二重代表訴訟；公司治理；股東權

並列摘要

As a means of bringing a suit against directors, shareholder derivative litigation is an important mechanism in corporate governance. Given that there are few derivative actions in Taiwan, legislators have amended the Company Act several times in order to enhance the utility of this litigation. However, this thesis disagrees with the way of the amendments and the purpose of this thesis is to promote another approach to reconstruct shareholder derivative litigation. First of all, this thesis organizes the weakness of current litigation and criticism from scholars so as to define the scope of the thesis. In addition to Company Act, this thesis also discusses Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act and focuses on the distinctiveness of the Investor Protection Center in order to ascertain the possibility of entitling it special functions. Secondly, this thesis conducts comparative study on the U.S. shareholder derivative litigation. Starting from theoretical basis, this thesis finds that the rule of equity plays a crucial role and embodies in the elements of litigation. As for the purpose of derivative suit, the weight of the functions seems to have been changed at present. For example, compensation is no longer the most significant mission, however, a growing number of settlements of corporate governance is becoming a new problem for the U.S. This thesis examines Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Model Business Corporation Act, and Delaware law and generalizes the essence of U.S. derivative actions. Also, this thesis discusses double derivative actions which courts allow shareholders bring suits on behalf of subsidiary against wrongdoers alleged to subsidiary. After observing U.S. derivative litigation, this thesis reconstructs shareholder derivative litigation of Taiwan which is different from current viewpoint. This thesis emphasizes the fair and adequate representation of shareholder-plaintiff in order to avoid agency cost in derivative suits and protect the interest of corporation and shareholders. Moreover, this thesis entitles the Investor Protection Center the right to agree settlements of corporate governance and bring double derivative actions. By doing so, this thesis justifies the existence of the Investor Protection Center. Finally, through the reconstruction of shareholder derivative litigation, the thesis aims to the purposes of derivative action and strikes a balance between shareholders, directors, and corporation.