股東代位訴訟的研究——兼論多重代位訴訟

我國股東代位訴訟規範簡陋，並有使用範圍受限、欠缺訴訟誘因、效能不彰等缺失，導致缺乏實用性。而實務上甚少使用的結果，進一步造成修法時被忽略，此又導致制度無法與時俱進，並再次加深規範不足、欠缺實用性的問題，如此惡性循環，終將導致系爭制度成為「書本上的法律」，完全喪失功能。有鑑於此，本文欲汲取外國法經驗，並全面檢討我國股東代位訴訟制度，其中包含公司法214條、369-4條及投保法第10-1條。首先，本文統整並分析美（聯邦、德拉瓦、加州、模範公司法）、英、加、澳、港、星、日等10種立法例及其相關案例，以研究股東代位訴訟「應如何設計」，並兼論前述立法例中的「多重（二重）代位訴訟」。接著，本文焦點回歸我國法，就現行股東代位訴訟實務及學說進行討論與分析，並提供修法建議。針對公司法第214條，本文建議捨棄現行持股門檻，並從「訴訟須出於善意且有利於公司」及「強化公司對訴訟的控制權」兩個面向重構訴訟篩選機制。在鞏固訴訟篩選機制後，由於已能確保股東代位訴訟「有利於公司且不違反公司經營判斷」，則現行「提供相當之擔保」及「對於公司負賠償之責」等規定即可相應刪除，並增訂「法院得命公司補償原告訴訟支出（包含律師費）」之規定。除此之外，借鏡前述各國立法例，本文尚主張以下改革：一、就裁判費之徵收設定上限；二、擴大股東代位訴訟的被告範圍，而不僅限於董監事；三、明訂原告股東得為公司和解，惟須經法院許可；四、准許公司章程訂入「費用轉換負擔條款」，以安排公司的應訴支出由敗訴之股東負擔；五、增訂公司法第109-1條，使有限公司的股東亦得提出代位訴訟。次就投保法第10-1條，本文建議：一、降低起訴門檻，以增加投保中心得為起訴的情形；二、明訂投保中心的和解權限；三、增訂投保中心多重代位訴訟，擴大投保中心的監督範圍，以避免上市櫃公司之董事，利用子公司執行業務，藉此脫免投保中心追究責任。末就公司法第369-4條，本文建議：一、降低第3項的持股期間門檻，以便與公司法第214條同步；二、重新檢視本條的規範實益，或可以「控制股東忠實義務」及「關係人交易」相關法制取代本條。除前述有關單純股東代位訴訟的改革建議外，本文尚探討我國引進多重代位訴訟的可能性。首先，與單純股東代位訴訟相同，多重代位訴訟亦有「損害填補」及「遏止不法」的功能，故兩者具有相同的立法正當性基礎。其次，引進多重代位訴訟有：降低集團企業總部監控分子公司的成本、保障控制公司股東的權益、強化公司治理等效益，故本文建議我國引進該項制度。另就具體條文設計，本文參考前述各國立法例認為：一、多重代位訴訟可不限於代位公司100%持有的子公司；二、股東起訴前，應向母公司董事會，及子公司監察人（或董事會）提出書面請求；三、除前述請求要件稍有不同外，多重代位訴訟其餘規範（例如：原告適格要件、費用補償、和解等）皆可比照單純股東代位訴訟。

關鍵字

股東代位訴訟；多重代位訴訟；二重代位訴訟；投保中心；關係企業；集團企業

並列摘要

Taiwan’s statutory scheme (the “Scheme”) of shareholder derivative actions (“SDA”) is shabby. Limited availibility, deficiency of incentives, and ineffectiveness make SDA uncommon in legal practice. Consequently, legislators overlook importance of reforming the Scheme, then as time goes by, the problems deteriorate. At the end of the day, this vicious circle may make SDA “law in books” and lose actual functions. Given this concern, this thesis learns from international experiences, and thoroughly review the Scheme, including article 214 and 369-4 of the Company Act, and article 10-1 of the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act (“SIFTPA”). First, this thesis organizes and analyzes statutes and cases regarding SDA and multiple derivative actions (“MDA”) in ten different jurisdictions, including U.S. (Federation, Delaware, California and MBCA), U.K., Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan. Then, this thesis turns focus back to the Scheme, analyzes present legal practice and scholar comments of SDA, so as to suggest a reform. This thesis suggests article 214 of the Company Act abolish shareholding thresholds, and reconstruct action-filtering mechanism by requiring plaintiffs to act in good faith and accordance with companies’ benefits, and strengthening companies’ control over SDA. After reconstruction, the mechanism is capable of ensuring actions are beneficial to companies and not against companies’ business judgement, correspondingly, provisions regarding “furnish an appropriate security” and “liable for indemnifying the company” can be abolish, and the article shall introduce a provision that gives Courts power to order companies to properly reimburse plaintiffs for legal expenses, including attorney fees. In addition, learning from jurisdictions mentioned above, this thesis suggests further reformation, including: (1) introduce a cap on court costs (2) legalize SDA against people other than directors or auditors; (3) explicitly permit plaintiffs to settle after approved by Courts (4) allow companies to adopt a “fee-shifting bylaw”, which requires losing shareholder plaintiffs to pay companies’ legal fees, including attorney fees (5) the Company Act should introduce article 109-1, which permits SDA in a Limited Liability Company (LLC). For article 10-1 of SIFTPA, this thesis holds it should: (1) lower the threshold for the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center (SFIPC) to initiate derivative actions, in order to enhence the availability (2) clarify SFIPC’s power to settle derivative actions (3) allow SFIPC to initiate MDA, therefore directors of listed companies can no longer use subsidiaries as shields against SFIPC’s libility enforment. For article 369-4 of the Company Act, this thesis holds it should: (1) lower the shareholding threshold of paragraph 3 to correspond with artcle 214; (2) reconsider necessity of this article. Imposing fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders, or strengthening regulation of related-party transactions may be good alternatives. Besides reforming SDA, this thesis further argues the Scheme should adopt MDA. Firstly, MDA serves same functions as single SDA, including “deterrence of wrongdoeings” and “remedies of wrongs done to the companies”, so the very same reasons which justify the single SDA also justify MDA. Secondly, the adoption will provide corporate groups several advantages, including: (1) reduce administrative and procedural costs regarding intra-groups supervision; (2) protect interests of parent companies’ shareholders; (3) enhance corporate governance. Learns from jurisdictions mentioned above, this thesis holds the provisions of MDA should: (1) allow shareholders of parent companies to bring MDA wehther subsidiaries are wholly-owned; (2) require writing demands be made on parent companies’ board of directors and subsidiaries’ auditors (or board of directors, if defendents are not directors); (3) be similar to single SDA (e.g. standing to sue, fees compensation, settlement), except the difference mentioned before at (2).