配股政策與中國上市公司盈餘管理之研究

Earnings Management among China SPOs

楊炎杰(Yan-Jie Yang)

指導教授 ： 蔡揚宗

共同指導教授 ： 康榮寶

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/博士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2007.01734

摘要

本研究針對中國之配股政策所可能引發上市公司盈餘管理現象進行探討。囿於法令限制，中國上市公司舉債之管道並不暢通，使得股權再融資一直是公司首發後重要的籌資來源，而配股即為主要的股權再融資方式。然而，法令規定申請配股必須先滿足ROE門檻，因而可能提供管理階層從事盈餘管理的誘因。由於配股法令隨時間演進設定了不同門檻，所引發之盈餘管理亦可能有所差異。本研究藉由比較配股規定所設定之門檻，詳細檢視上市公司為符合配股門檻所可能涉及的盈餘管理行為。
配股規定可視為存在於中國證券主管機關，即中國證監會，與上市公司之契約安排，證監會藉由設定ROE門檻以評估公司是否合乎申請配股之資格，惟即便公司之獲利符合要求，證監會仍有權決定核准與否。儘管配股規定並未明文限制盈餘管理，但因證監會肩負確保資本市場有效運作、保障投資人權益之責任，若公司藉由投機行為如盈餘管理而獲取資本資源，將導致資源分配的不公平與不效率，證監會亦將蒙受輿論譴責；故為確保財務報表不致遭受重大誤導，證監會可能對盈餘管理保持警覺。學術文獻雖對盈餘管理之誘因與手段多有探討，但鮮少直接分析盈餘管理對資源配置之影響；而有關中國配股規定之研究，亦侷限於早期，未能涵蓋後續配股規定之演進。準此，本研究比較不同期間配股規定與上市公司盈餘管理之關連，並對基於會計資訊引導資源分配之經濟後果，提出完整之評估。
依據配股規定之適用期間，本研究將樣本分為1999年至2000年、2001年至2004年等二期間進行觀察，實證結果如下：
一、在配股門檻與盈餘管理之實證結果方面：1999年至2000年所適用之配股規定使得ROE在6%與10%形成門檻，上市公司之ROE分佈在略高於6%與略高於10%處形成不連續現象，隱含上市公司可能藉由盈餘管理以保有或通過配股門檻；藉由配對樣本之實證結果發現，ROE略高於6%之上市公司有明顯較高的裁決性應計數，顯示該等公司藉由經常性利潤之盈餘管理以保有配股門檻；而在略高於10%之上市公司，裁決性應計數與非營業收益率均顯著較高，顯示該等公司為通過配股門檻，經常性利潤與非經常性利潤均為重要手段。至於2001年至2004年期間，配股規定在0%與6%形成門檻，上市公司之ROE分佈亦在略高於0%與略高於6%處形成不連續現象；實證結果顯示，加權平均ROE略高於6%之公司，裁決性應計數明顯較高，但非營業收益率則不明顯，故僅經常性利潤之盈餘管理為通過配股門檻之主要手段。在略高於0%部分，則因公司可能普遍存有免虧之心裡門檻與下市緩衝機制影響，無法將略高於0%現象歸諸於為保有配股門檻。
二、在申請配股公司之實證結果方面：本研究觀察公司申請配股前一年時，過去二年之ROE或營業ROE平均數低於配股門檻者是否在申請配股前一年有明顯的盈餘管理。實證結果發現，1999年至2000年期間，過去二年ROE平均數低於10%之上市公司，申請配股前一年有明顯較高的裁決性應計數與非營業收益率，顯示該等公司藉由經常性利潤與非經常性利潤之盈餘管理拉抬ROE平均數，俾能通過配股門檻；2001年至2004年期間，過去二年營業ROE平均數低於6%之上市公司，申請配股前一年僅有明顯較高的裁決性應計數，故盈餘管理的方式轉而以經常性利潤為主。
三、在證監會審核配股申請時是否受盈餘管理程度影響方面：本研究將申請配股公司中，過去三年裁決性應計數幅度較大者區分出來，做為明顯藉由經常性利潤進行盈餘管理之指標；另外，以過去三年平均營業ROE與配股門檻之差距，做為藉由非經常性利潤進行盈餘管理之指標；進而探討該等指標與證監會核准配股申請之可能性是否有關。實證結果發現，1999年至2000年期間，公司越依賴非經常性利潤從事盈餘管理者，越不會獲證監會核准配股申請；但在經常性利潤之盈餘管理指標方面，無論是1999年至2000年或2001年至2004年期間，均與證監會之審核決策無關。
四、在獲准配股公司後續績效之實證結果方面：本研究探討公司申請配股前之盈餘管理與後續績效變動之關連。實證結果顯示，1999年至2000年期間，申請配股前一年裁決性應計數幅度較大之公司與越依賴非經常性利潤進行盈餘管理之公司，後續營業績效表現越差；類似地，2001年至2004年期間，申請配股前一年裁決性應計數幅度較大之公司，後續營業績效表現亦越差。故盈餘管理對於證監會欲達成資本資源有效分配之目標，存有負面影響。此外，因證監會對應計數之操縱不敏感，投資人當審慎評估上市公司為符合配股規定而導致財務報表產生重大不實表達之可能。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 配股 ； 資本資源分配 ； 證券市場管理

並列摘要

This study investigates potentials of earnings management among SPOs (secondary public offerings, hereafter SPOs) in China. Due to regulatory constraints, listed companies in China are practically unable to raise capital through debts financing or bonds issuing. Therefore, equity financing such as SPO is the primary source to raise additional capital after initial public offering. However, the related regulations require a ROE threshold for applying SPO, which may promote incentive to manage earnings. According to the related regulation, this study closely examines earnings management potentials among China SPOs.
A SPO could be regarded as a contract between China security regulator; that is, the CSRC (Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, hereafter CSRC) and listed firms. Generally, the CSRC sets ROE as a primary measure to justify whether a listed firm is qualified to raise capital through SPO. However, the CSRC has final authority to approve the application of SPO. The CSRC is constantly concerned with potential earnings management because it could contain fraud behavior in the stock market, for example, insider trading. The CSRC found listed companies would like to manage their earnings through non-operating transactions among related-parties; thus, the CSRC ever removed non-operating gains from calculation of ROE in 2001 and set this as regulation. Therefore, to keep transparency of financial information from being misled by earnings management is one of major responsibilities of the CSRC. This study that rigorously examines the potential of earnings management among SPOs in China could provide evidence to the CSRC and assist investors to understand the quality of financial information in the process of SPOs in China.
Based on periods of regulatory change, this study divides samples into two periods, including 1999-2000 and 2001-2004 sample periods. The research findings are as follows:
Ⅰ. For the sample in the 1999-2000 period, firms with ROE slightly exceed minimum regulatory threshold present significantly positive discretionary accruals, and those with ROE slightly exceed required regulatory threshold present both significantly positive discretionary accruals and non-operating income. For the samples in the 2001-2004 periods, firms with average weighted ROE slightly exceed required regulatory threshold only present significantly positive discretionary accruals. These empirical results suggest that the revised SPOs related regulations really weakened the incentives of earnings management by use of non-operating income.
Ⅱ. Moreover, the empirical evidence of this study shows that firms tend to manage their earnings numbers a year before they file for application, when their average past two-year ROEs or operating ROEs are below the required regulatory threshold. In addition, management prefers to applying discretionary accruals for the designated testing periods. Only the sample selected from the 1999-2000 periods evidenced a significantly increasing non-operating income. Therefore, the regulatory requirements lead the incentive and approaches of earnings management.
Ⅲ. Generally the CSRC’s approval decisions negatively correlated with the indicators of abnormal non-operating income in samples of the 1999-2000 periods. These empirical results suggested that CSRC may rule out the firms who suspiciously apply non-operating income to boost earnings. Additionally, the evidence of this study shows the CSCR is not really concerned with whether the applicants have significantly changed in discretionary accruals both for the samples in 1999-2000 and 2001-2004 periods.
Ⅳ. Furthermore, the empirical results also evidence the negative correlation between earnings management measure and post-application performance of the firms approved by the CSRC. Thus, the CSRC should educate their staffs to justify earnings quality. Also, the CSRC should establish class act lawsuit mechanism to encourage investors justifying potential criminal resulting from earnings quality and capital applications.

並列關鍵字

Earnings Management ； SPO ； Capital Resource Allocation ； Regulation of Stock markets

參考文獻

6. 官月緞，2006，中國大陸下市緩衝機制與盈餘管理，中國大陸研究，第49卷，第3期：93-118。

7. 夏侯欣榮，2000，台灣增資新股(SEO)上市後長期績效之整體研究，管理評論，第19卷，第2期：1-33。

10.陳彩稚、李書行與蔡璧徽，2006，會計準則、資訊不對稱對中國大陸證券市場盈餘宣告之市場反應的影響，會計評論，第43期：1-25。

1. Aharony, J., C. J. Lee, and T. J. Wong. 2000. Financial packaging of IPO firms in China. Journal of Accounting Research 38(1): 103-125.

2. Balsam, S. 1998. Discretionary accounting choices and CEO compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research 15(3): 229-252.