本國上市櫃銀行與金融控股公司股權結構對經營績效之影響

The relationship between shareholding structure and performance in Taiwan banks and financial holding companies

周雨樵(Yu-Chiao Chou)

指導教授 ： 劉順仁

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2006年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2006.10309

摘要

論文摘要
二次金改造成台灣銀行與金控之震盪，其中社會所詬病之原因之一即為圖利「財團」。但不僅是銀行與金控，台灣上市公司最明顯之特質就是家族握有決定性之股權比率，並且家族成員位居管理階層之情形也相當普遍。換句話說，大部分家族所掌控之公司所有權與經營權並未分離。過去國內外文獻在探討股權結構與經營績效之關係，多將樣本限定於非金融業，鮮少針對金融業來探討。本研究將以本國上市櫃銀行與金融控股公司為研究樣本，並且參考Morck et al.(1988)等文獻，建構股權結構對經營績效之模型。另外，參酌La Porta et al.(1999)所提出最終控制者觀念，將樣本中家族控制之銀行抽出，額外進行研究，看家族控制下是否會有不一樣的結果。之後再藉由沈中華(2005)股權偏離指標，探討股權偏離對經營績效之影響。實證結果歸納如下：
1.本國上市櫃銀行之內部人持股對經營績效同時具有利益收斂與利益掠奪兩種情形，且內部人持股對經營績效存在時間上的落差。研究並發現，大股東持股與外資持股對經營績效具顯著之正向關係，表示外部大股東與外資可以適時的監督管理階層。另外，道德偏離指標和經營績效之間的關係並不穩定，不過大致上成顯著之負向關係，且國際型道德偏離指標對經營績效之影響及顯著性皆較本土型道德偏離指標大。
2.金融控股公司只有大股東持股對經營績效具顯著之正向關係，其餘持股結構變數並未有顯著影響，股權偏離指標也對經營績效產生負向不顯著之影響，所以本研究並不能明確推論股權與績效之關係。不過，內部人持股與外資持股對經營績效卻產生顯著之時間上的落差，表示內部人與外資持股對後一期績效才會產生影響。
3.最後，目前家族控制之上市櫃銀行並未有利益掠奪之情形發生，且其表現也較非家族控制之銀行好。

關鍵字

銀行 ； 金融控股公司 ； 股權結構 ； 一股一權 ； 經營績效

並列摘要

Abstract
In Taiwan, the second-stage financial reform has a significant impact on banking industry and financial holding companies. One of the controversial issues is the second-stage financial reform may benefit only a few family-owned banking conglomerates at the expense of the general public. Besides banking industry and financial holding companies, it is obvious that family members control large proportion of shares and serve as high position managers in listed companies. In the past, literatures about ownership and management focus on non-financial industry. My research will mainly focus on banking and financial holding companies. My research model is about shareholding structure based on Morck et al. (1988). Besides, this research sample is divided into two groups based on controlling shareholder concept which is proposed by La Porta et al. (1999). One of the two groups is family-controlled banks and the other is non-family-controlled banks. My research wants to examine how family affects the performance of banks. Finally, we use the international moral hazard and local moral hazard which are provided by Shen Chung-Hua(2005) to test the relationship of moral hazard and performance . My results are as follows：
1.In banks, insider shareholding has both interest convergence and interest entrenchment, and also timelag effects toward performance. Additionally, large stockholders and foreigner shareholders both have significant effects on performance. The result represents that outside investors could supervise management. Moral hazard has negative effect on performance, while international moral hazard has more significant effect on performance than local moral hazard.
2.In financial holding companies, only large stockholders have positive and significant effect on performance. Other shareholding variables do not show significant effects. My research could not identify accurately the relationship between ownership and performance. But insider shareholding and foreigner shareholding both have significant timelag effect on performance.
3.In family-controlled banks, there is no entrenchment in insider shareholding. However, the performance of family-controlled banks is generally better than non-family-controlled.

並列關鍵字

Bank ； Financial Holding Company ； Shareholding Structure ； One-Share One-Vote ； Performance

參考文獻

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