為了適應國際金融市場全球化及自由化,我國於2001年7月9日公布實施金融控股公司法,使得台灣金融機構產生了結構性變化。本研究除了比較金融控股公司子銀行與獨立銀行的經營效率外,另外擷取數項公司治理變數,了解公司治理制度的實施對國內銀行業經營效率的影響。研究期間為2003年至2006年,並以國內三十一家銀行為研究樣本,透過資料包絡分析法(Data Envelopment Analysis,DEA)及Tobit迴歸模型,對國內銀行業進行經營效率分析,以了解國內銀行目前經營效率現狀及施行公司治理制度實施是否為銀行業帶來益處。 研究結果發現:1.除了2004年外,其他年度金融控股公司之子銀行技術效率皆比獨立銀行來的高,顯示成立金融控股公司的確能夠帶來綜效;2.技術效率與外部董事比例呈顯著正相關,代表外部董事為了避免聲譽受損,將以超然獨立態度監督管理階層各項決策,進而提升公司價值。技術效率與機構投資者持股比例呈顯著負相關。因為機構投資者對於管理階層過多的政策干預,使得決策單位喪失獲利機會;3.純粹技術效率與各自變數並無顯著關係存在;4.規模效率與董監事持股比例及外部董事比例呈顯著正相關,代表董監事持股比例及外部董事比例愈高,將可遏止管理階層不當投資決策。規模效率與機構投資者持股比例及董事會規模呈顯著負相關,代表機構投資者可能為了自身利益,勾結管理階層進行利益輸送。另外,董事會規模過大,將產生意見分歧,不利於投資決策。
In order to adapt to the international financial market liberalization and globalization, Taiwan announced the implementation of Financial Holding Company Act on July 9, 2001. Hence the financial institutions in Taiwan got structural changes. Besides comparing with financial holding company and independent banks’ operational efficiency this study, it captures several corporate governance aspects to understand the influence of the domestic banking efficiency by implementing corporate governance system. The sample period is from 2003 to 2006, in which 31 domestic banks are selected. It uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Tobit Regression Model to analyze the domestic banking operational efficiency and comprehends current status. This study provides whether corporate governance will bring more benefits to banking industry. The research has four major results. First, except 2004, the subsidiary banks’ technical efficiency of financial holding company is higher than independent banks’ during other years. It shows that the establishment of financial holding companies can bring synergy. Second, technical efficiency is significantly with outside directors’ proportion but it is significantly negative with institutional ownership. Outside directors have independent attitude to supervise management’s decision-making in order to avoid damage reputation, and thus enhance bank’s value. Decision-making unit loss profit opportunities due to institutional ownership’s excessive intervention. Third, pure technical efficiency doesn’t have significant relationships with each independent variable. Finally, scale efficiency is significantly positive with shareholding directors and outside directors. The higher proportion of shareholding directors and outside directors will be consistent with the minority shareholders’ position and curb the improper investment decision. Scale efficiency is significantly negative with institutional ownership and board size. Institutional ownership may collude management for interests. There will be many different opinions for adversely decision making if board size is too large.