控制系統與內外團體對信任及資源投入決策之影響

Effects of Control System and In-group Favoritism on Trust and Cooperative Decisions in a Social Dilemma Setting: An Experimental Investigation

鄭涵(Han Cheng)

指導教授 ： 杜榮瑞

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2006年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2006.02001

摘要

Coletti et al. (2005)發現，控制系統透過財務誘因激發合作，並將合作結果回饋給合作者。本論文將檢視上述歷程是否可以建立信任，進而激發後續合作，更進一步探討內外團體對上述歷程是否會有所影響。

實驗結果顯示，控制系統對信任的影響是由控制系統激發的合作中介，且該信任激發後續合作。不論在內團體或外團體的情況下，控制系統對信任的影響完全是被控制系統激發的合作中介。信任對後續合作的影響也並非被內外團體的因素所調節。

關鍵字

控制系統 ； 信任 ； 內團體偏好 ； 合作 ； 囚犯困境

並列摘要

This thesis examines whether a control system can induce cooperative decisions and then help develop trust among pairs of partners in making decisions regarding resource contribution to a joint project. It also explores the role of in-group favoritism in the above relationships. A 2 (strong control system vs. no control system) x 2 (paired with an in-group member vs. paired with an out-group member) between-subjects design is adopted to examine these issues in a prisoner’s dilemma setting.

Seventy eight graduate students participate in a computerized experiment and are asked to make 20 periods of decisions on the level of resource they will devote to a joint project of which the outcome is jointly determined by himself (herself) and the paired partner. After 20 periods of decisions, they make another 20 periods of decisions, all without the existence of any control system. The results show that a strong control system can induce the participants’ cooperative behavior. The observed cooperation mediates the relationship between control system and trust. The trust built in the previous periods induces trust in the subsequent periods. In addition, in-group favoritism has positive effects on cooperative behavior and on the build up of trust. Further, in-group favoritism moderates the mediating effect of cooperation on the association between control system and trust. Limitations and implications are discussed.

並列關鍵字

Control system ； Trust ； In-group favoritism ； Cooperation ； Prisoner’s dilemma

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