私有化交易之法制建構

The Construction of Legal System in Case of Going Private Transaction

謝育錚(Yu-Cheng Hsieh)

指導教授 ： 蔡英欣

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201700714

摘要

私有化交易通常由公司之控制股東主導，於交易完成後，公司由公開轉變為閉鎖之性質，同時伴隨著股權結構之變化與公司組織和財務的重新建構，其規範之重點在於以妥適之金融監理與法規範制度，為少數股東之權益帶來保障。於股權相對集中的台灣交易市場，公司之未來營運發展方向多由控制股東所主導，於高度利益衝突之私有化交易中，為避免少數股東權益受有不公平之對待，如何創造誘因，令控制股東或管理階層於進行少數股東權益凍結時，願意主動將少數股東之權益保障放在心上，是立法政策上尚待討論之問題。

於私有化交易原則上應尊重公司之企業自治而不應有過多嚴厲之管制，少數股東之保護在特別委員會相關規範成熟後，組織與程序設計均權責分明的前提下，應可達成一定程度之資訊揭露並對少數股東權益有所保護，在經由被賦予充分權限且清楚知悉其任務係尋求公平交易以保障少數股東之特委會通過交易案時，政府管制即不應過度介入，而應盡可能避免相關私有化交易案破局。然為避免仍有不當交易案之產生，於注重併購效率的大前提下，在符合前述前提之下，應令其先行併購，再輔以控制股東義務制度以及股份收買請求權等方式，令少數股東有求償之機會，以為衡平，或許是可行之解決方式。

我國目前用於規範商業交易型態之現行法規範，多以公司董監事之責任義務為規範內容，特別委員會搭配控制股東義務制度，並與現行既有之公司法制相結合，可達互補之效果。蓋於交易初期，即可透過特委會而對少數股東權益提供相當程度之保障，諸如提升其談判地位與資訊獲取更為充足等，控制股東義務制度則可作為控制股東之行為規範準則；而於交易後期，亦可藉由控制股東義務的建構，建立一不用附隨於董事相關規範之獨立義務規範，作為公司或少數股東事後救濟之請求權基礎，使經營管理階層之董事、實質董事或控制股東等交易案關係人，其責任追究受到全面性的覆蓋。同時，亦應特別針對私有化交易明文制定一個完善之資訊揭露事項規範，與前述提及之法制規範建議結合，特委會委請獨立專家提供專業意見，並進而針對系爭交易案之公平性與合理性作出審議報告，並提報予股東會，而控制股東義務制度之規範，則將資訊揭露義務納入其規範之範疇內，二者著重於在執行面之面向，均可與前述資訊揭露義務制度面之完善化，達成相輔相成之效果。

關鍵字

私有化交易 ； 逐出少數股東 ； 少數股東之保障 ； 特別委員會 ； 控制股東義務 ； 資訊揭露 ； 安全港機制

並列摘要

Going private transactions are usually dominated by the controlling shareholder of the company. After the completion of going private transactions, the nature of the company changes from public to close. It also changes the ownership, organization and finance structure of the company. We should focus on the construction of the legal system and financial supervision for the purpose of protecting the interests of minority shareholders.
The future path of the company is usually dominated by the controlling shareholder since the shareholding structure in Taiwan is relatively concentrated. Therefore, in order to avoid unfair treatment to minority shareholders’ interests in the circumstances of going private transactions, which often occur serious conflict of interest, we should work on how to create incentives for controlling shareholders or the management to be willing to take the initiative to protect minority shareholders’ interests. These are the issues needed to be discussed.
Generally, corporate autonomy should be respected in going private transaction, instead of harsh control. The protection of minority shareholders should be made to a certain extent under the premise that the relevant regulations of the special committee are well-established, the organization are well-designed and the procedure are clearly set. Disclosure of information also plays an important role in the legal system construction of going private transactions. The government should not overly intervene when going private transactions are authorized to proceed by the special committee which has been given full authority and is clearly aware of its mandate to seek fair trade in order to protect minority shareholders. However, in order to avoid the occurrence of improper transactions while still maintain the efficiency of going private transactions, the going private transactions should be allowed to proceed in line with the premises mentioned above. Instead of being stuck in a deadlock, minority shareholders will have the appraisal right and controlling shareholders should be held responsible for such improper transaction. It may be the solution to balance the rights and obligations among interested parties in the event of going private transactions.
The combination of the role special committee plays, the fiduciary duty imposed on controlling shareholders and the existing laws regulating commercial transactions, mainly focusing on the responsibilities of directors and supervisors, will surely create a complementary effect. In the early stages of transactions, minority shareholders can be provided with a considerable degree of protection through special committee, such as enhancing the intensity of the negotiating on behalf of minority shareholders and obtaining more adequate information. A well-established obligation system of controlling shareholders can be used as a code of conduct for controlling shareholders in the deal and can also be considered as the ground of legal claim for companies or minority shareholders. The directors, de facto directors, shadow directors or controlling shareholder and other concerned third parties shall hence comprehensively be held responsible. At the same time, a complete information disclosure regulation should also be emphasized as constructing the legal system of going private transactions. The special committee will appoint independent experts to provide professional advices, review the fairness and reasonableness of the deal subject to the advice and submit the review report to the shareholders' meeting. The obligation of information disclosure will be included in the fiduciary duty imposed on controlling shareholders. From the perspective of enforcement, the special committee and the fiduciary duty imposed on controlling shareholders may ultimately perfect the information disclosure system and complement one another.

並列關鍵字

going private transaction ； freezeout ； the protection of minority shareholders ； special committee ； the fiduciary duty imposed on controlling shareholders ； information disclosure ； safe harbor

參考文獻

4. 王文宇（2011）。〈從國巨案談管理階層收購的爭議〉，《會計研究月刊》，308期，頁78-86。

7. 王志誠（2006）。〈閉鎖性公司少數股東之保護〉，《政大法學評論》，89期，頁193-274。

10. 林國彬（2007）。〈董事忠誠義務與司法審查標準之研究－以美國德拉瓦州公司法為主要範圍〉，《政大法學評論》，100期，頁135-214。

12. 林建中（2014）。〈美國德拉瓦法上股份收買請求權的計算方式與衍生問題〉，《政大法學評論》，137期，頁99-150。

16. 章友馨（2012）。〈美國控制股東「公平對待義務」之法制探源—兼論我國控制股東之濫權問題〉，《政大法學評論》，130期，頁51-158。