可轉換證券、控制權及風險性創業融資之研究

本博士論文主是由兩部份所組成,第一部份為「可主換證券在創投融資的角色」,第二部份為「新創事業的控制權及流動性需求」. 第一部份的研究重點為, 當創業家比創投家知道更多公司的訊息時, 可轉換證券新創事業融資所扮演的角色.我們證明一個經由良好設計的契約, 證券的換股比例可被作為傳訊工具以克服訊息不對稱的問題.如果報酬的變異夠大, 創業家將發現透過換股比例會披露一部份訊息, 也就是說,將產生「分離均衡」,此種均衡有別於「混合均衡」,後者將不會有披露私有訊息的效果.我們證明在投資和換股之間的決策時間差也將使創業家得到額外的利益,此即「時間價值」. 除此之外, 我們探究了「技術股」的影響,此時創業家沒有投資任何資金就得到股權.我們比較技術股和可轉換證券兩種融資工具,並解釋為何可轉換證券已經成為新創事業最普遍使用的融資工具. 在第二部份, 我們證明, 新創事業的最適可轉換證券融資契約,如何促使創業家提高工作誘因, 以及證券的報酬流量如何決定創業家干涉經營團隊的誘因.本文建立一個模型, 討論控制權配置和換股決策的關聯性,我們也發現, 對急欲達成投資效率的VC來說,或然的控制權(contingent control right)是重要的.

關鍵字

創投家；創業家；可轉換證券；訊息傳遞；控制權.

並列摘要

This dissiteration is consist of two parts:part one is "The Role of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Financing",and part two is "Control Right and Liquidity Demand for Star-up Firm". In part one, we study the role of convertible securities in the financing of start-up enterprises when the entrepreneurs are better informed than the venture capitalists (VCs).We demonstrate that for a well-designed contract the conversion ratio of the securities can be used as a signaling device to overcome the problem of information asymmetry If the variability of the return is sufficiently large, the entrepreneurs will find it desirable to rely on convertible securities with the conversion ratio revealing part of his information, that is, a "separating equilibrium" will arise. Such an equilibrium has the advantage of avoiding the incentive constraints that appear in the other "pooling equilibrium", in which the privately held information is not revealed. We show that the time-lag of decisions between investment and conversion will also benefit the VCs, with the extra return as the "time value". In addition, we study the impact of introducing "technical shares" with which the entrepreneurs are awarded equity shares without investment outlays. We compare the different financing devices with convertible securities and explain why convertible securities have become the most commonly used financial instrument for start-up enterprises. In part two, we show how optimal financing contract of convertible securities in star-up firm complements incentive schemes to discipline entrepreneur, and how the securities' return streams determine the VC's incentive to intervene in management.The paper build a model to discuss the correlation of control right allocation and conversion decision. We also find that contingent control right is important for VC to achieve the investment efficiency.

並列關鍵字

Venture capitalists ； Entrepreneurs ； Convertible securities ； Signaling ； Control right.

參考文獻

[1] Admati, Anat R. and Paul Pfleiderer (1994), "Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists,”Journal of Finance, 49 , 371-402.

[2] Aghion, Phillipe, Patrick Bolton, and Jean Tirole (2004),"Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentive," Review of Finance, 8 , 327-353.

"Short-term versus Long-term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors," Quarterly Journal of Economics,} 109 (4) , 1055-1084.

[5] Berkovitch, Elazar and Ronen Israel (1996),

"The Design of Internal Control and Capital Structure,"

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可轉換證券、控制權及風險性創業融資之研究

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