得自願選任獨立董監公司之選任行為暨宣告即將選任消息之市場反應之研究

The researches on the voluntarily election of independent directors/independent supervisors and on the market responses to announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon

紀邦燦(Pang-Tsan Chi)

指導教授 ： 王泰昌 ； 劉嘉雯

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2004.01548

摘要

民國九十年十月，立法院對公司法進行大幅修改。根據修改後之公司法，董事及監察人已不再須具有股東身份。證交所與櫃買中心把握此一機會，一方面研議修改相關之上市上櫃審查規則，強制民國九十一年二月二十二日、二月二十五日後初次申請上市、上櫃之公司設置獨立董監，一方面制定「上市上櫃公司治理實務守則」，期望透過軟（如公司治理實務守則）硬（如上市上櫃審查準則）兼施的方式，全面實施獨立董監制度，落實公司治理，以實現主管機關民國九十一年為我國「公司治理年」的構想。
處於獨立董監制度初步實施階段的我國，欲從事相關政策之研議時，國內的相關文獻是很重要的。因此，本研究之目的，即期望透過實證的方式，研究得自願選任獨立董監公司（即在民國九十一年二月二十二日、二月二十五日前申請上市、上櫃之公司）之特性、其選任獨立董監之情形以及市場對於其宣告即將選任消息的反應，以瞭解現階段獨立董監制度在我國的實益，以為相關政策之實施與否提供實證建議。
本研究分別以台灣經濟新報社之獨立董監人數資料推算選任與否情形並做為應變數、財務資料為自變數，使用Logistic二元迴歸模式進行分析。同時，本研究亦以公開資訊觀測站列示之公司宣告即將選任獨立董事或獨立監察人消息之日為基準，計算宣告消息產生之異常報酬率，並以複迴歸模式對其進行分析。
本研究之實證結果如下：
一、內部人持股比例愈高、長期負債比率愈低、規模愈小、成長機會愈大、預期將有融資活動、營運狀況不佳、監察人人數愈多、應收帳款及票據佔總資產比率愈高以及屬於電子業之公司，其選任獨立董監的可能性較高。
二、市場對於公司宣告即將選任獨立董事或獨立監察人之消息幾乎沒有正面反應，絕大部分皆產生負的異常報酬率。
三、股權集中程度愈高、監察人人數愈少、規模愈大、即將選任之消息若伴隨股東會相關消息而宣告之公司，其宣告產生之異常報酬率累計數較大。

關鍵字

異常報酬率 ； 獨立董事 ； 代理問題 ； 獨立監察人

並列摘要

On October 2001, the Legislature Yuan passed the amendment of Company Law. According to the new version of Company Law, it is not necessary that directors and supervisors of a company are also shareholders of it. The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (“TSEC”) and the Republic of China GreTai Securities Market (“GTSM”) then amended the criteria for review of securities listings and the securities exchange criteria governing review of securities traded on Over-the-Counter (“OTC”) markets, which requires that companies applying initially for listing of its stock before February 22, 2002 or trading securities at OTC markets before February 25, 2002 shall elect independent directors/independent supervisors. At the same time, TSEC and GTSM also jointly adopt the” Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies.” TSEC and GTSM hoped to put the system of independent directors/independent supervisors into practice totally by these two ways and realize the objective of the Competent Authority: making 2002 “the Year of Corporate Governance.”
It is important for policy making to refer relative native researches at the trial step of the system of independent directors/independent supervisors. This thesis, therefore, tries to find characteristics of companies that elect independent directors/independent supervisors voluntarily(that is, companies applying for listing before February 22, 2002 or trading securities at OTC market before February 25, 2002 ) and observe the market responses to announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon empirically. By doing so can we realize the benefit of this system to Taiwan and make some suggestion to policy makers.
First of all, this thesis uses the data of the amount of independent directors/independent supervisors of companies of Taiwan Economic Journal Co. (TEJ) as proxy for dependent variable: companies elect independent directors/independent supervisors or not, and uses the companies’ financial data of TEJ as independent variables. Binary logistic regression model is used to analyze the relation among the dependent variable and independent variables. Secondly, this thesis computes the abnormal returns resulting from announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon. These announcements are found in the Market Observation Post System. Finally, multiple regression model is used to analyze the relation among the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and several explanation variables.

The research findings are as follows:
I.Companies that elect independent directors/independent supervisors have higher proportion of insider shareholdings, lower ratio of long-term debt to total assets, smaller firm size, larger growth opportunities, higher possibility of issuing stock in cash or debt in the future, worse operating performance, larger amount of supervisors, and higher ratio of receivables to total assets. Companies that belong to electronic industry are more likely to elect independent directors/independent supervisors than others.

II.The abnormal returns resulting from announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon almost are negative.

III.For companies that have higher degree of concentrated shareholding structure, smaller amount of supervisors, and larger firm size, the CARs resulting from announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon are larger. If these announcements occurred with announcements of affairs about the meeting of shareholders, the CARs are larger, too.

並列關鍵字

Abnormal Returns ； Independent Supervisors ； Independent Directors ； Agency Problem

參考文獻

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