本研究主旨在驗證Jensen(2005)所提出的權益市值高估之代理成本假說,探討公司治理機制對權益市值高估之影響。以1999年至2007年臺灣上市櫃公司為樣本為研究對象,探討公司治理的良窳,是否對權益市值高估的情形具抑制作用。主要證結果彙整如下: 一、擁有較高的股權偏離程度、較小之董事會規模、外部董事比率較高、法人持股比率較高且聘用四大會計師事務所進行查核之特性的公司,權益市值高估之情形較不明顯。 二、考量安隆事件對公司治理之影響,結果顯示具有較高的股權偏離程度、較小之董事會規模、外部董事比率較高、法人持股比率較高且聘用四大會計師事務進行查核之特性的公司,較能抑制權益市值高估之現象,但結果多未達一般統計顯著水準。 綜合言之,本研究之實證結果僅部分支持本研究之預期。
The main purpose of this study is to explore the hypotheses of “Agency Cost of Overvalued Equity” which Jensen_(2005) proposed, and examine the effects of corporate governance on overvalued equity. The sample of this study consists of observations selected from listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan from 1999 to 2007, and this study examine whether the corporate governance impact on overvalued equity or not. The empirical results are summarized as follows: 1.The extent of overvalued equity can be restrained by the characteristic of higher deviation between cash flow rights and control rights, smaller board size, higher outside board ratio, higher institutional ownership and the company chooses the big-4 auditor. 2.As we control for the effect of Enron scandal, we find that the extent of overvalued equity can be restrained by the characteristic of higher deviation between cash flow rights and control rights, smaller board size, higher outside board ratio, higher institutional ownership and the company chooses the big-4 auditor. Overall, the empirical results are only partially support our hypotheses.