主權者與公共理性：《利維坦》絕對主義新解

本文旨在分析湯瑪士‧霍布斯在著作《利維坦》發展的絕對主義理論，並據此評判歷來兩支詮釋霍布斯式絕對主義的對立觀點。筆者主張，霍布斯為其政治理論的構成預設了筆者稱為「自然性」與「創發性」的兩個人觀面向，而二者之間的張力關係貫穿了政治共同體的理論架構。基此，本文依循著此一線索，檢視了霍布斯式絕對主義論證從早期的《法律的元素》、《論公民》直至《利維坦》的演進;筆者並聚焦於四個問題意識作為論證的核心，這分別是：人類本質和人際互動的真實樣貌為何、政治生活如何成立、以及成立後的政治生活何以維繫。在本文的第一章中，筆者首先回顧了兩種對於霍布斯式絕對主義的既存詮釋，這分別是以約翰‧洛克為代表的批判途徑，以及由Quentin Skinner基於脈絡主義方法論提出的辯護途徑。在第二章的部分，筆者則處理了人類的本質在霍布斯的唯物主義認識論體系中如何獲得闡釋，並指出他在這樣的基礎上，架構起了「激情」（自然性）和「理性」（創發性）兩種人類心智官能的對立關係。接續著在第三章中，筆者指出霍布斯將此二種對於人類本質的設想擴展到了人際互動的層次，分別派生出了反映自然性、呈現為人際互動衝突本質的「人的自然境況」與「戰爭狀態」，以及由創發性指示的、脫離衝突的有效途徑：自然權利與自然法。第四章探討了霍布斯如何在自然徑引致的衝突困境之基礎上，鋪陳象徵創發性實踐的政治共同體之建構邏輯;其中，筆者概述了「取得的共同體」、「建制的共同體」之組建，並宣稱兩者在《利維坦》虛擬人格理論之框架下獲得了收束。而霍布斯由此將共同體的存廢與成員的效忠緊密相連，進而否決了恣意統治合乎共同體的組成目的。最後在第五章的討論中，筆者主張霍布斯對於統治方式的描述，體現了創發性的實現必須應對自然性的挑戰之顧慮。筆者指出，霍布斯賦予了主權者「公共理性」的角色、意謂著共同體賴以運作的實證法應當以自然法為本，主權者有義務施行合乎道德的統治;而鑑於臣民有充分的自由背棄臣屬關係，霍布斯強調主權者必須基於「審慎」的能力、因時度勢的制定統治方略，如此才能確保共同體和平的維繫。基於上述的觀察，本文的最後重新檢視了霍布斯式絕對主義的兩支詮釋途徑，筆者並主張由Skinner所代表的詮釋觀點更加符合《利維坦》呈現的理論樣貌。換言之，霍布斯並非如洛克等論者宣稱的，建構了一個自我矛盾的論證系統;反而，霍布斯的絕對主義理論應該被理解為一套修辭術，應允他在護持主權者絕對統治權利的同時，亦充分地提示了統治手段的箇中風險。

關鍵字

霍布斯式絕對主義；約翰‧洛克；脈絡主義；唯物主義認識論；激情與理性；自然法與公共理性；審慎的統治術

並列摘要

This thesis aims to analyze Thomas Hobbes’s absolutism theory as developed in his work Leviathan, and evaluates two opposite interpretations of Hobbesian absolutism accordingly. The contention of the thesis is that Hobbes lays down two sides of conception of humanity, which the author names as naturalness and inventiveness, as underpin for his political theory. The two conceptions compose a tension that runs through the theoretical structure of Hobbes’s commonwealth. This thesis follows such clue while investigating the evolution of Hobbesian absolutism from the early Elements of Law, De Cive, to Leviathan, and its core argument focuses on how Hobbes states the four following questions: what is the nature of human beings and what kind of interaction follows, how is political life established, and how it can be sustained after the establishment. The first chapter of this thesis reviews two opposite interpretations of Hobbesian absolutism. One of them is what the author calls “critique-path” as represented by John Locke, while the other one is the “defense-path” proposed by Quentin Skinner on the basis of contextualistic methodology. The second chapter deals with Hobbes’s interpretation of human nature in a system of materialistic epistemology, and points out that Hobbes sets up an opposition between two faculties, “passion” (naturalness) and “reason” (inventiveness), basing on such interpretation. Following this observation, the third chapter shows that Hobbes extends his understanding of human nature to the level of interaction. This derives the contentious “natural condition of mankind” and “state of war” as reflecting the naturalness side of human interaction, and the effective way to escape contention as shown by the inventiveness side, which is natural right and natural law. Chapter four examines the way Hobbes set up the constructing logic of commonwealth, which symbolizes the inventiveness side put into practice, basing on the conflictive dilemma derived from the naturalness side of human beings. This chapter overviews the setting up of “commonwealth by institution” and “commonwealth by acquisition”, and claims for their cohesion under the theory of artificial person in Leviathan. From this Hobbes closely connects the sustainment of commonwealth and its members’ allegiance, which then overrules the compatibility between an arbitrary ruling and the objective of establishing a commonwealth. Finally, the fifth chapter claims that Hobbes’s description of governance shows the realization of inventiveness is constantly challenged by naturalness. Hobbes’s endowment of the sovereign as the “public reason” indicates that positive law, which is core to the operation of the commonwealth, ought to inscribe natural law, and the sovereign is obliged to rule morally. Considering subjects have all the liberty to denounce subjection, it is Hobbes’s emphasis that a sovereign needs to possess the ability of prudence and rules according to the circumstances. Only through this can peace be secured. In the end, this thesis contends the interpretation represented by Skinner corresponds to the theoretical picture presented by Leviathan. In other words, Hobbesian absolutism is not a paradox as claimed by Locke, but should be understood as Hobbes’s rhetoric that upholds absolute right to rule and the risk of it at the same time.

並列關鍵字

Hobbesian Absolutism ； John Locke ； Contextualism ； Materialistic Epistemology ； Passion and Reason ； Natural Law and Public Reason ； Prudential Statecraft