財產權.司法制度與投資意願

Property Rights, Legal System, and Investment Incentives

林韋宇(Wei-Yu Lin)

指導教授 ： 莊委桐

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.02233

摘要

無資料

關鍵字

契約 ； 司法制度 ； 財產權 ； 投資

並列摘要

We present a world with a large population and random matching rule in trade and investigate the investment incentives under different court rules. The transparency of the decision made by the court is not able to implement the social optimal investment level; even the function improvement of investment efficiency by securing the property rights is doubted. Only under the circumstances the court is available to the information of the production, it is possible for the court to secure property rights to accelerate investment efficiency. We also confirm the solution provided by Coase (1960), which results in the social optimality.

並列關鍵字

Contracts ； Legal system ； Property Right ； Investment

參考文獻

Besley, Timothy (1995). “Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana,” The Journal of Political Economy , 103(5): 903–937.

Binmore, Ken, Ariel Rubinstein, and Asher Wolinsky (1986). “The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling,” The RAND Journal of Economics , 17(2): 176–188.

Bohnet, Iris, Bruno S. Frey, and Steffen Huck (2001). “More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding,” The American Political Science Review , 95(1): 131–144.

Coase, R. H. (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics , 3: 1–44.

Demsetz, Harold (1967). “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings , 57(2): 347–359.