- 學位論文
改良式當事人進行主義之證據法則─以審判實務為中心
Rules of Evidence in the Modified Adversary System ─ With Focus on the Practice of Trial
摘要
我國自2003年9月改採改良式當事人進行主義之刑事訴訟制度，引進證據排除法則、傳聞法則，並採行交互詰問制度，由於變革非常大，或許因新修正條文簡略，經過3年6個月之實務運作，法官對新法之適用，仍存有某些疑義，致解釋上發生落差，有待探討改進。 本文從改良式當事人進行主義訴訟制度中之證據法則之特徵加以簡略說明，並與美國、日本之當事人進行主義之刑事訴訟制度互相比較，分別就我國不採取之陪審制、起訴狀一本主義及訴因制度加以論述，並就我國特有之規定，與美、日法制比較說明。另從最高法院審判實務上表示之不同見解，加以類型化分析，如違背法定程序取得之證據如何判斷其證據能力、審判外陳述之證據能力之處理、證據調查程序及方式等方面，歸納出爭點所在，提出問題之核心，並分別從學說、理論及實務面加以分析比較，提出本文見解之法理依據。此外，司法院釋字第592號解釋與第384號、第582號解釋之矛盾、無罪判決應否敘述採取傳聞證據之理由等問題，亦值得討論；新刑事訴訟法施行後，現行部分判例雖經最高法院檢討不再援用，仍有漏網之魚，本文依研究所得，再檢討現行判例，提出不再援用之理由，以供最高法院嗣後檢討之參考。 新刑事訴訟法施行，關於證據法則所引進之新制度，其規定之條文簡略，致發生適用上之疑義，如違背法定程序所取得之證據，發生違背法定程序之範圍如何、應否均排除其證據能力，及是否均以本法第158條之4為排除之依據；在法官或檢察官面前所製成之陳述筆錄，有無證據能力？有無以經被告之反對詰問為前提要件？釋字第582號解釋公布後有無不同？本法施行法第7條之3但書之真意？特信性文書之內涵如何？同意法則是否以不符合第159條之1至同條之4為要件？新型態證據之調查是否均應於審判期日為之等等，均從最高法院之判決中發見前後有不同之見解，有部分可能涉及法制不完備之處，有些可能純屬法條文義解釋之問題，最高法院對此仍未達成共識，這必定會造成下級審於適用同一法則時無所適從，似有必要儘快召開刑事庭會議，以作成決議之方式，達成統一見解之目的。至於法制不完備之處，建議修改刑事訴訟法第159條之1第1項、第2項、第159條之4第4款、第165條之1第2項之規定，以符實際。
並列摘要
In September 2003, Taiwan began to adopt the modified adversary system for the criminal litigation system, and in the process, the Exclusionary Rule of Evidence, Hearsay Rule and the cross-examination system are introduced. Because the scope of this reform is broad, and the revised articles are yet too simple, judges remain befuddled by the application of the new law even after 3 years and 6 months of practice, resulting in a discrepancy in interpretation. The situation has yet to be improved. This paper briefly introduces the Rules of Evidence in the modified adversary system, and compares the Rules against that adopted in the U.S. and Japan, respectively. It discusses the procedures adopted by Taiwan, including the rejection of the jury system, Principle of Unitary Indictment and cause of action system, which are then compared against their American and Japanese counterparts. In addition, the different interpretations provided by the supreme courts are analyzed according to the issues addressed, such as the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, the admissibility of hearsay evidence and the general investigative procedures involved in obtaining evidence. The purpose of the paper is to first discuss the issues in general terms, identify the core problems, analyze the problems through academic, theoretic, and practical aspects, and finally offer some legal basis for interpretations. Furthermore, it is worth discussing the discrepancy between Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 592, on the one hand, and No. 384 and No. 582, on the other, in determining whether hearsay evidence should be the sole ground for an acquittal. Finally, legal precedents should also be unified: After the implementation of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, some courts still cite legal precedents that are no longer cited by the Supreme Court. This paper also reviews several current precedents based on the outcome of the trials, and proposes that the Supreme Court should refrain from using those precedents in the future. Because the new Code of Criminal Procedure is still in its infancy and remains primitive, there is uncertainty in the application of the law in areas such as determining the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence and how to properly handle the evidence: Should the admissibility of such evidence be excluded entirely, and if so, should it be excluded based on Article 158-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? Are statements made before a judge or prosecutors admissible? Is the defendant required to be cross-examined? Is there a different interpretation before and after the announcement of J.Y. Interpretation No. 582, the proviso of Article 7-3 of the Criminal Procedure with respect to contents of special documents? Is the Rule of Consent still consistent with Article 159-1~4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? Should new evidence be admitted and investigated during trial? These issues have led to inconsistent interpretations issued by the Supreme Court, some are perhaps due to incomplete laws, while others are due to different interpretations of legal terms. The Supreme Court has not reached a consensus on these issues, which will only result in confusion and contradictions among the lower courts. Therefore, it is necessary to hold criminal division meetings to reach, by resolution, a uniformed interpretation. Items 1 and 2 of Article 159-1, Item 4 of Article 159-4, and Item 2 of Article 165-1 should also be revised to make the procedures more complete and to meet practical application.