退休基金與公司治理

Pension Fund and Lorporate Governance

李繼玄(Jih-Shyuan Lee)

指導教授 ： 柯承恩

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/高階公共管理組/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.02354

摘要

我國退休基金的發展相對歐美等先進國家落後，同時缺乏實質的治理政策，也無投資政策說明書。本人因工作關係，對此深有體會，故在為退休基金的下一步發展找尋方向的願景下，嘗試用公司治理的內涵要素，對退休基金作一縱切面的體檢。因此，以退休基金產業結構價值鏈為基礎，訂出使命政策、內部治理、誘因行動、價值創造，以及對公司治理的影響、對公司治理應有的作為等六個構面，在每個構面的討論與實證中，歸納出退休基金應有的方向、重點。茲對構面要點說明如下：
一、使命政策：先進國家退休基金的使命說明書、政策說明書對基金的發展、運作皆有明確的藍圖規劃，以讓工作人員有所依循，不會犯了「一朝天子一朝臣」、政策因人而異的窘境。
二、內部治理：退休基金的法理形式和參與類型雖有不同，但基本的治理結構─董事會的責任、角色與行為準則是雷同的，而獨立董事的參與也是共同的趨勢，在董事會下，掌握日常運作機制的管理單位則是運作成敗的關鍵所在。
三、誘因行動：誘因與代理問題不再隱晦不明，而是新近的熱門議題。薪酬是解決代理問題的關鍵因素之一，受託人行為的規範是因素之二，而利益衝突與政治干預也須挑明，尤其在國內，這個問題還處在非常敏感與困難的階段。
四、價值創造：資產配置、風險控管、資訊透明等「三位一體」是基金永續經營的基礎，無論在理論上或實證上皆已得到證實。
五、對公司治理的影響：退休基金作為機構投資人中新興的主力地位，其一舉一動在金融市場動見觀瞻，尤其公共退休基金是機構法人的典範，扮演著更重要的角色。退休基金在股東行動主義的實踐上，應起帶頭作用，以保護投資人的權益，也提升基金的經營績效。
六、對公司治理應有的作為：退休基金具雙重代理的角色，在自行經營方面，它是基金參與者的代理人；在委託經營方面，受託機構是基金的代理人。雙重代理皆須對投資標的公司的公司治理有所要求，退休基金本身亦應在公司治理上有所作為。
最後，本論文冀望於退休基金率先實行公司治理政策，發揮機構投資人的領導者角色，以市場機制驅動國內公司治理的進一步發展。

關鍵字

退休基金與公司治理

並列摘要

Corporate governance has become an issue of international concern and many countries are actively engaged in a reform program to ensure their practices meet international standards. In this the role of shareholders is considered critical, and much attention has been focused upon the international investors’ concerns. What is equally important is the role that domestic institutions can play in promoting corporate governance reform. In this study, I briefly map out the trends in pension fund asset growth which bring them to a potentially dominant position in ownership in many markets and playing an increasingly important role as both channels for retirement savings and as intermediaries in financial markets. This combined role makes them a prime concern of governments and regulators from a variety of perspectives. Considering recent developments in corporate governance reform relevant to developing countries, and how pension fund reform can promote corporate governance reform in a mutually reinforcing sets of initiatives.
But, it is clear that if pension fund are constrained by conflict of interest, and do not ensure professional competence in management, investment and administration, and operate without clear mechanisms of accountability, and transparency, the governance problems which undermine the corporate can undermine the effectiveness of the pension fund. Many of the same governance problems apply. Principal-agent problems, agency cost, asymmetry of information, conflicts of interest can equally apply to the governance of pension funds. The costs of this agency problems, the inefficiencies resulting from asymmetry, and potential conflict of interest can result in the pension fund allocating funds inefficiently, tolerating poor management performance, making inadequate provision for risk management and ultimately contributing to lower returns and poor reputation with the beneficiaries. These are all problems which have had to be faced in developed markets, with scandals, poor performance, and loss of confidence by the public and beneficiaries.
Fortunately, the outpouring of pension fund activism-led largely by public pension funds in both the US and UK – has led to a vigorous debate on the role and responsibilities of institutional investors. The notion is that the character of pension fund investors can provide the role of ‘guardian’ in the private sector, where the state is unwilling and unable to provide effective oversight. The question now for policy maker establishing or reforming our own pension system is how to ensure that the government framework for pension funds fosters an active role in corporate governance.
The results from this study would be develop recommendations on best practice in pension fund governance and basic requirements to ensure that pension funds are suited to play an active role in corporate governance.

並列關鍵字

Pension Fund and Lorporate Governance

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