重省閉鎖性股份有限公司之公司治理——以代理問題與股東協議為中心

為鼓勵新創及中小型企業之發展，營造更有利之商業環境，另因應科技新創事業之需求，賦予企業有較大自治空間，我國立法院於西元2015年6月15日完成「公司法增訂閉鎖性股份有限公司專節」之法案三讀程序，且於同年9月4日正式施行生效。立法理由與一般論者均認為此一專節立法係為回應我國長期忽略中小型企業法制規範之呼聲，然而專節施行至今，似仍未能全面滿足中小型企業運作之需求與問題，例如股權集中而導致之少數股東受壓迫等代理問題，以及股東人數較少而公司運作整體較偏向合夥型態的企業運作自由化等問題。是故，本文以「代理問題」與「股東協議」為中心，重省我國施行至今之閉鎖性股份有限公司的公司治理問題，在比較法上以美國法為出發，探討閉鎖性公司制度的起源與基本特徵、檢討我國現行閉鎖性股份有限公司之制度並嘗試提出解決方案。本文認為，閉鎖性公司良好之公司治理在於提供中小企業彈性治理需求外，亦須兼顧利害關係人利益，以使其等願意挹注資金。然觀現行專節事實上仍以「管制」作為規範邏輯，僅在相當有限範圍內授權企業自治；又儘管在以特別股或表決權契約容許股東權力高度集中時，亦欠缺相應的配套保護少數股東措施，從上可知現行法實與閉鎖性公司良好之公司治理仍有所差距。由於現今公司法修法趨勢提倡大小分流，又從表決權契約之修法經驗來看，閉鎖性股份有限公司專節可能被視為修法先鋒，本文建議我國法得進一步參考美國法制有關代理問題解決與股東協議之經驗，引入完整之少數股東救濟規範與股東協議規範。

關鍵字

閉鎖性股份有限公司；公司治理；控制股東；少數股東；代理問題；股東協議

並列摘要

In order to promote the development of start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises and create a more suitable environment for investment in Taiwan, and in response to the demand of more space for corporate governance from tech start-ups, Legislative Yuan passed “Close Company” section in chapter V, section 13 on July 1, 2015, and the new section also officially implemented on September 4, 2015. No matter the purpose of statute or general comments considered that the new section was made to response to the public opinion about the lack of proper legislation especially designed for small and medium-sized enterprises for a long time in Taiwan. However, even the new section has been implemented until now, neither the problems of small or medium corporations such as agency problems caused by the ownership concentration nor the demands from tech start-ups such as corporate autonomy seems to not be fixed or fulfilled. As a result, the thesis revisits the corporate governance of close company and centers on agency problem and shareholders’ agreement through cases and regulations of U.S., where is the origin of the act of the close company. In order to figure out how to improve the “Close Company” section, the thesis goes through not only the origin and basic concepts of close companies but also reviews and criticizes the existing section in Taiwan. The thesis argues that a good corporate governance of close companies is not only to provide flexible governance choices for small and medium-sized enterprises, but also to take into account the interests of all kinds of interested parties such as shareholders and creditors, so that they are willing to inject more funds to close companies. However, in fact, the current section still regards "control" as the normative logic, and only authorizes corporate autonomy within a very limited scope; and although due to current section the preferred stock or voting agreements allow a high degree of shareholder power to be concentrated, there is also a lack of corresponding supporting protection for minority shareholders. As a result, there is still a gap between the current legal practice and the good corporate governance of closed companies. Since the current corporate act revision trend advocates the separation of big and small enterprises, and from the experience of the revision of voting rights contracts, the “Close Company” section may be regarded as the vanguard of law revision. This thesis suggests that our country's law should further refer to the U.S. legal system on agency problem resolution and shareholder agreement and introduce complete minority shareholder relief norms and shareholder agreement norms.

並列關鍵字

close company ； closely-held corporation ； corporate governance ； controlling shareholders ； minority shareholders ； agency problems ； shareholder agreements