行政院開發基金之研究─代理人理論之觀點

THE RESEARCH OF DEVELOPMENT FUND, EXECUTIVE YUAN ---FROM THE PERSEPCTIVE OF ANGECY THEORY

丁幸姬(Hsing-Ghi Tin)

指導教授 ： 蘇彩足

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/政治學研究所/碩士(2006年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2006.02691

摘要

民國62年，政府依據「獎勵投資條例」之規定，設立行政院開發基金；民國79年底，「獎勵投資條例」屆滿，行政院開發基金改依「促進產業升級條例」設立。行政院開發基金在特種基金的分類上隸屬於非營業基金中的作業基金，雖不以營利為目的，卻擁有龐大資金可供運用，並肩負著政策性之任務，其資金依據促進產業升級條例第二十一條規定，主要用於參加投資或融貸資金於產業升級或改善產業結構有關之事業或計畫，特別是民間無力興辦或資力不足者；或是經行政院專案核准者等政府主動投資的事業。
　　行政院開發基金設置管理委員會，負責基金的收支與運用，管理委員會由14位部會首長及專職人員、投資評估審議委員會與創業投資審議會所組成。針對一般民間投資案件之審查評估，主要先由投資評估審議委員會與創業投資審議會審查，通過後再經管理委員會審核同意後執行；至於配合政府政策性的專業投資計畫，通常以行政院專案核准之方式，直接是由管理委員會審理。近年來，行政院開發基金的投資案或釋股案是否發生弊端或有利益輸送之情事成為關注焦點，因此本文借用代理人理論，假設納稅人為原始委託人，代理人則為行政院開發基金管理委員會，從立法院公報、監察院公報、審計部決算審查報告、立法院預算中心之評估報告等公開的政府文獻，檢視身為代理人的管理委員會是否克盡其職，妥適運用行政院開發基金，且以納稅人的利益為優先考量，也避免不當力量的干擾。
　　研究發現開發基金轉投資的事業中，有半導體產業、創投業、金融業、電信業、石化業、機械業、鋼鐵業、生技產業、航太工業，也有高速鐵路、捷運、觀光遊樂區等，所涵蓋的產業範圍頗為廣泛，同時又曾被賦予紓困、融資、護盤的任務，使得開發基金的角色與功能變得模糊不清。在投資案件的審議程序上，配合行政院專案核准的投資案，容易偏離了專業與成本效益計畫評估原則，同時增加投資風險，進而影響基金循環運用的能力。開發基金由於身為政策工具之宿命，造成功能角色不清，讓它在從事業務時，常常是難以自主的，容易偏離成本效益之專業評估，投資於納稅人難以接受的高風險投資案，自然容易導致績效不彰。
　　此外在納稅人與開發基金管理委員會之委託代理關係中，雙方的契約設計不良、管理委員會面臨多重委託人困境、與管理委員會隱藏部分資訊是造成代理問題嚴重的原因。而事前決策透明化、事後監督管理機制之落實、建立誘因與獎懲機制則為降低代理問題的三個方法。為了減少決策資訊的失衡，應要求開發基金管理委員會將決策依據與審議流程之紀錄公開化，明確說明決策依據，以防止空白授權之缺失，審議流程之公開則可減少黑箱作業之批評。為了減少代理人不中立之機會，避免管理委員會之成員執行職務時，假藉職務以追求自身之利益，必須要求代理人們遵守利益迴避原則。同時，為避免開發基金管理委員會隱藏行動，必須要求管理委員會落實事後監督管理機制，定期檢討轉投資事業的成效並適時處理股權，對於營運長期欠佳的投資事業，需擬定退場機制並確實執行。此外開發基金必須要求轉投資事業落實公司治理，並定期以適當方式公布經營績效，且為維護納稅人的權益，需爭取應有的股權代表席次與遴派適當官股代表。最後建議增加適當人力，減少開發基金人力不足的壓力，並能明確釐清責任歸屬，增加代理人勇於任事的誘因，而非保守地追求低風險卻不符合促進產業升級目的之事業。

關鍵字

作業基金 ； 資訊不對稱 ； 道德危機

並列摘要

In 1962, Development Fund, Executive Yuan was Established by “The Statute for Encouragement of Investments” §76. Since 1991, Governing Regulations of Development Fund become “The Statute for Upgrading Industries” §21. In the categories of the central government’s Special Funds, Development fund belongs to operation fund. Although it doesn’t pursue profit, but has lots of money to operate. According to “The Statute for Upgrading Industries” §21, the capital of Development Fund is to finance or invest in major enterprises or start up projects or to engage in corporate restructuring, M&A, in accordance with the economic and industrial policies of the government to complement the investment activities of the private sector. And it also invests in enterprises or projects approved by Executive Yuan.
Development Fund sets up Development Fund Board in charge of fund affairs. Development Fund Board consists of Board of Directors (14 committee members appointed by politics), employees, Investment Committee, and Venture Capital Committee. Recently, Development Fund Board invests many controvertible investments, and some contestants consider these investments are abuses. Therefore, the research presumes the taxpayers (or the people) as a principal and Development Fund Board as an agent. The purpose of research is to use agency theory to survey whether Development Fund Board operates capital appropriately and whether has a priority to benefit of taxpayers.
The results of this study show the enterprises Development Fund invests include all sorts of industries, such as Tourism, VC, Telecom, Optoelectronics, Semiconductors, Finance, Aerospace, and Biotechnology etc. Beside the above-mentioned, Development Fund is often endowed with other assignments. Consequently, the role and function of Development Fund become vague and confused. In the investment process, enterprises or projects approved by Executive Yuan easily doesn’t be inspected by professional cost benefit analysis and increases risk of investment. Hence, Development Fund Board invests this kind of high risk investments taxpayers hardly accept, and induces the effects of the investments can’t be achieved.
In the principal-agency relationship between taxpayers and Development Fund Board, the origins of serious agency problem are imperfectly contract, multiprincipals, and Development Fund Board hides information about actions. To solve agency problems, the research suggests three methods: first, the process of investment approval must be transparent; second, make sure to execute measures of administration; finally, eastalish a mechanism about rewards and punishments or inducement.
In order to reduce asymmetric information about decision making, taxpayers should demand Development Fund Board to explain the reasons about decision making and make the proceedings known to the public. To prevent agents pursue private interest, taxpayer also need to request Development Fund Board to follow principles of conflict of interest.
At the same time, to avoid Development Fund Board to hide information about action, taxpayers must demand Development Fund Board to supervise enterprises and projects certainly, and make reviews about the operation about enterprises and projects invested. For those enterprises that are not good at management and operation, Development Fund Board should make rules to disinvest. Development Fund Board should continuously enhance the corporate governance of invested companies, monitor their operating results and make bulletins to the public.
For the sake of interests of taxpayers, Development Fund Board can strive for the shareholders’ attendances in enterprises invested and select professionals to monitor these enterprises. Finally, the research suggests Development Fund Board can increase manpowers to reduce the pressure of luck of manpowers. And taxpayers can ascertain that who should take the responsibility, increase agents’ inducement to do their best, and also avoid Development Fund Board conservatively to pursue low risk of investments that don’t accord with promotions about economic and industrial development and enhancement its national competitiveness.

並列關鍵字

operation fund ； information asymmetry ； moral hazard

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