數位權利管理系統架構的競爭策略

Competitive Strategy of Digital Rights Management Systems

吳宇菁(Yu-Ching Wu)

指導教授 ： 江炯聰

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2004.10322

摘要

Napster對於音樂發行業者所帶來的巨大衝擊，不得不讓這個先前是靠實體零售商店為主要通路的產業開始正視網路此一虛擬的通路。但是數位產品脫離載體的限制造成可輕易複製、傳送的特性卻又讓消費者和發行業中對於「合理使用」的定義漸行漸遠。為了重拾雙方的共識並讓數位音樂可以擺脫非法的陰影而成為真正的市場，數位權利管理系統(Digital Rights Management System)就順勢的出現了。目前以數位音樂檔案的使用作為管理對象的DRM系統領導廠商共有四家，分別是蘋果電腦的FairPlay、新力的OpenMG、RealNetworks的Helix與微軟的Windows Media DRM。

本論文首先將利用系統架構的理論來分析DRM系統，並進而推導出握有DRM系統架構的領導者可從系統的啟動性技術、應用階層等層面著手，直接訴諸系統的使用者來刺激對於其系統的需求；也可以透過參與標準組織以及發展軟體等平台等的方式從供給面著手來爭取其系統安裝基礎的擴大。雖然這四家領導者廠商均視其本身的能力與所擁有的資源來選擇不同的擴散策略，但因為微軟將DRM系統定位在延續其視窗作業平台在個人電腦以及利用網際網路作為傳輸層的硬體環境中既有優勢的策略性產品，所以其他三家廠商只能退而求其次，利用DRM系統定位的差別爭取和微軟共存的機會。在沒有和微軟的目標直接衝突、而且還可以一起「做大數位音樂市場」(make the pie bigger)進而提高對DRM系統需求的考量下，數位音樂的市場上會有足夠的空間讓一家以上的DRM系統同時存在。

關鍵字

數位權利管理系統 ； 系統競爭 ； 網路效果

並列摘要

The Napster phenomenon has brought great impact on the music Labels and these companies are now seriously considering Internet as an additional channel to the physical one which dominated most music sales before. The proliferation of Napster-like service has made it more than clear that digital music is just like an unstoppable train, and the days of stamping out albums by the million, stacking discs in record shops, and then ringing up huge profits are over.

But technology has imposed two inflection points on the digital music industry: The first was putting content in digital format, as opposed to physical forms such as tape and CD. Digital content can be copied with perfect fidelity. Unlike in legacy media, a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy is just as good as the original. The second point is the Internet, by which digital content can be sent from place to place instantaneously and extremely cheaply.

For these two reasons, there is widening gap between Labels and consumers in terms of the definition for “fair use”. Restoring the consense among sellers and buyers in this regard is the first step to establish a digital music industry with a real future, and this is why Digital Rights Management Systems come in for help. There are four non-interoperable DRM systems presently on the market- FairPlay from Apple Computer, OpenMG from Sony, Helix from RealNetworks, and Windows Media DRM from Microsoft.

This thesis will see the competitions between DRM systems as architectural competitions, so the company who holds the architecture of the system is the one responsible for forming the competitive strategy to win more install-bases, and usually there are two ways it could start with. The

first one is that the architecture-leader can boost the market demand for their systems by pushing the side where system users stand, either by activating the direct network effect from obtaining more installation or by the indirect network effect through raising the utility users can gain from using the system. The second one focuses on the supply side instead. By participating in relevant standard bodies and offering a software platform solution, the architecture leader can outpace its competitors in building a larger install-base through ubiquitous access to its system.

Apple Computer, Sony, RealNetworks, and Microsoft, these four DRM system architectural leader companies have chosen different competitive strategies according to its own unique strength and the resource it has. Since Microsoft has positioned its DRM system as a strategic product to extend its existing dominance in Personal Computer to more mobile devices with connections to the Internet and to other PCs, in view with Microsoft’s huge war chest, the rest companies should go after the a second goal as the major alternative to Microsoft. By differentiating their DRM system offerings, and avoiding a direct collision with Microsoft’s product, Apple, Sony and RealNetwork still have the chance to coexist with Microsoft in the DRM market.

For example, Apple and Sony use a lead/proprietary standard strategy and they do not license their technology to any third party developers or manufacturers. These two DRM systems are positioned to boost the hardware (portable digital music player) sales, thus a DRM system is more like a means than an ultimate goal to Apple and Sony. As for RealNetworks, its streaming technology has led it to choose a DRM market where most client devices have limited storage space, or where end users do not want to download the content, such as the emerging digital movie industry. For Microsoft, one of the benefits about having a rivary system to compete with is that the competition is very likely to make the digital music market bigger. As for content providers and service provider, in order for them to relish the thought of their business becoming heavily dependent on a standard that Microsoft has total control, there will be some room for another major player who can gain their trust and build innovative content services that bring value to consumers.

並列關鍵字

network effect ； Digital Rights Management Sytems

參考文獻

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