霍特林模型下兩家店家考量外送服務之訂價決策與市場競爭

Pricing Decision and Competition of Two Stores Considering On-Demand Economy Under the Hotelling Model

林妤臻(Yu-Chen Lin)

指導教授 ： 黃奎隆

國立臺灣大學/工學院/工業工程學研究所/碩士(2022年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202201816

摘要

近年來外送平台逐漸興起，消費者逐漸轉換消費模式，過去需要到店裡面購買，現在可以透過外送平台點餐節省時間成本(距離成本)，尤其在2020年初的新冠肺炎(Covid-19)爆發後，更是加速了餐飲業者營運模式的改變，因此本研究提出一個霍特林模型(Hotelling model)描述消費者消費行為以供店家考量是否要加入外送平台，在不同平台收費標準下，是否適合加入或不適合加入。但在過去的研究，大多考量兩家店家皆使用同一種策略來做競爭的對稱均衡市場(Symmetric equilibrium)，因此本研究除了討論對稱均衡市場的情境，也就是兩家都加入平台或是兩家都不加入平台的情況外，也加入非對稱均衡(Asymmetric equilibrium)的情境，一家店家加入而另一家不加入的情況，並首先假設自取及外送價格相同，探討若是均衡解成立，將會如何影響兩家店家的價格、利潤、市場大小以及消費者購買的決策。以及將市場分為完全覆蓋與部分覆蓋討論。我們發現在完全覆蓋市場的情況下，店家會選擇加入運費高的平台，而在部分覆蓋市場下店家則會選擇運費低且抽成低的平台以擴大其市場。最後，再考量當自取與外送價格不同時對於店家的利潤影響，我們發現當兩間都加入外送平台的情境，僅有在抽成相對低且運費高的時候，店家適合採用相同價格。其他情況則會採用不同價格策略，其中當抽成很低且運費高的情況時，店家外送價格比自取價格低。

關鍵字

外送平台 ； 對稱均衡 ； 非對稱均衡 ； 賽局理論 ； 霍特林模型

並列摘要

In recent years, due to the progress of Internet and mobile phones, food delivery platforms have gradually become widespread in people’s life, and the new services also alter people’s consumption pattern. The number of transactions and the revenue on the platform increase year after year, especially, after the restriction on social distance and working from home have accelerated the transformation due to Covid-19 in 2020. Hence, the stores or restaurants need to take appropriate measures to deal with the transform. Therefore, this study uses a Hotelling model to describe consumer behavior and model the competition between two stores. Particularly, we investigate whether stores should join the delivery platform under various conditions based on the charging standards and how to set the associated prices of meals or goods.
In chapter 3, we assume that the selling prices and the service fee on the platform for both stores are the same. We divided the market into two parts (fully covered or partially covered) based on their product value. Majority of research only considered symmetric equilibrium market that the two stores both provide or not provide the meal delivery service. This study has a case with an asymmetric equilibrium market where only one store provides meal delivery service and the other one remains no strategy.
In addition, we discuss the setting with different selling prices and the service fee in a general model and determine the optimal service strategy and the optimal profit. We found that stores under fully covered market would prefer to join the platform with relatively high delivery fee. On the contrary, the stores under partially covered market would prefer to join the platform with relatively low delivery fee and low commission rate. Furthermore, we discuss about whether the stores should adopt differentiated pricing or uniform pricing strategy in the extended model. Interestingly, our result show that the stores would adopt uniform pricing only when the commission rate is relatively low and the delivery fee is high. Therefore, stores would adopt differentiated pricing under the other situation.

並列關鍵字

On-Demand Economy ； Delivery platform ； Game theory ； Hotelling model

參考文獻

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