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  • 學位論文

論當代儒學重構之問題與方法:以牟宗三與勞思光為例

On the Question and Method of Contemporary Reconstruction of Confucianism: A Reflection on Mou Zong-San and Lao Sze-Kwang

指導教授 : 杜保瑞 李賢中
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摘要


若從思維內容來看,傳統義理約略等同於中國哲學。但從論述模式看,傳統義理和中國哲學的主要差異,在於前者多以經典注釋的形式呈現,而後者則採用了一套問題設定,這是把文本材料解讀為對於這些哲學問題的描述、解釋與回應,並賦予古代學說賦予以系統性的形式。這是一種儒學重構,在此過程中,研究者所設定的哲學問題,打造了古代學說的邏輯結構,形塑了研究成果的主要內容。所以,問題設定的恰當與否,決定了研究成果的品質與評價。 牟宗三與勞思光都以儒學為成聖之學,強調了工夫論做為一種哲學問題的獨立性,工夫論是論述我們如何自我修養以達致理想人格的學問,又可細分為實踐指導、聖人境界與直覺體驗等面向。然而,牟、勞兩家在處理工夫實踐的超越根據上則有不同意見。故牟宗三設定了形上學,並區分出縱貫、橫攝兩系統;勞思光設定了價值論(價值根源為何),並區分出天道觀、本性論與心性論三型態。 牟氏提出的「道德的形上學」,強調了逆覺體證,並以本心能夠證成天道、創生萬物。勞氏提出的心性論,則強調了主體自覺,而否定了天道的獨立實存。雙方的最大差異,在於牟氏認定工夫體驗必然有哲學上的論證效力,而勞氏則不如此認為。故牟氏以天道為獨立實存的形上本體,並透過本心所有的工夫體驗來賦予天道以實質內容;但勞氏則把天道理解為主體自覺的投射或延伸,亦即天道可化約為價值自覺。儘管許多人認為工夫體驗並不真能證成形上本體,但從儒學重構的角度看,牟氏是透過工夫體驗來保證工夫論的可理解性、普遍性與必要性。這展現了一種把直覺體驗予以哲學化的積極努力,也解釋了儒家何以如此看重天道流行與化育萬物,此乃儒學重構的應有方向。 根據對牟、勞兩家的反省,筆者對儒學重構之方法提出了幾個建議: 其一,必須考慮工夫實踐的積累過程。牟、勞兩家都注意到了對治私欲、意志純化與直發本心等不同工夫活動,更劃分出了相互衝突的系統與型態,使得工夫活動的差異被放大成互不相容。實則,工夫實踐與體驗的積累,是達致聖境的必要過程。所以,唯有說明不同工夫活動之間如何相輔相成,以及對工夫根據的觀點如何一致,儒家工夫論才會是完整且融會貫通的。 其二,對於工夫實踐之超越根據,應提出恰當的問題設定來處理之。牟氏以工夫論內容來回應形上學,然而,工夫體驗真能有論證形上學命題的效力嗎?許多人不會接受這一點。至於勞氏提出的價值論,則難以說明某些儒學主張,譬如天道的重要性。我們顯然需要考慮新的問題設定,一來可以適當處理儒家的超越性思想,二來足以論證工夫論的可理解性、普遍性與必要性,三來承認工夫體驗的論證效力。 其三,不應強行分判出互不相容的幾種學說。牟、勞兩家為了使他們的判分結果維持一致,犧牲了文本解讀上的恰當性。譬如把朱熹學說解讀為無逆覺體證或無主體自覺可言,並認定其缺乏道德動力,只談後天習慣的養成。事實上,朱熹學說亦有工夫體驗的面向,只是有意無意地被忽略掉而已。儒學是以達致聖境為主要目標,只要對理想人格的認知並不互斥,一切工夫理論及其超越根據就必然是一致的。

關鍵字

儒學 方法 問題設定 工夫論 牟宗三 勞思光 工夫體驗

並列摘要


If we view from the content, traditional Chinese thought is almost identical with Chinese philosophy. However, if we focus on the structural pattern, the main difference between traditional Chinese thoughts and Chinese philosophy is, the former usually express itself through interpretations of classics, the latter expresses itself through problem-settings and understand ancient texts as descriptions, explanations or solutions of these philosophical problems, so the ancient theories could be endowed with systematic form. This is a reconstruction of Confucianism, during this process, the problem-settings decided by researcher build the logical structure of ancient theories, and shape the main content of research result. Therefore, quality of problem-settings determines the evaluation of research results. Mou Zong-San and Lao Sze-Kwang both consider Confucianism as a doctrine of becoming sage, emphasize the independence of discourse of self-cultivation as a philosophical problem. The discourse of self-cultivation is about how we cultivate ourselves into ideal personality, it could subdivide into several parts, such as the practical guideline, realm of sage, and intuitive experiences. However, Mou and Lao have different opinions on dealing with the transcendental basis of cultivated practices. Mou set metaphysics to distinguish two theoretical systems: longitudinal system and horizontal. Lao set metaethics(what is the basis of value) to distinguish three theoretical types: Tien-Dao, Ben-Xing, and Xin-Xing. Mou raises "moral metaphysics", emphasize Ni-Jiue-Ti-Jeng, claim that Xing has the ability to justify Tien-Dao and create all beings. Lao raises the theory of Xin-Xing, emphasize the moral consciousness of subject. The substantial difference is, Mou considers that cultivated experiences must have its effectiveness for philosophical argument, but Lao disagrees with it. So Mou comprehends Tien-Dao as metaphysical substance, and add concrete contents to it through cultivated experiences; But Lao comprehend Tien-Dao as projection or extension of the moral consciousness of subject, which means that Tien-Dao could be reduced to moral consciousness. Although the argument based on cultivated experiences may not really work, from the view of reconstruction of Confucianism, Mou guarantees the understandableness, universality, and necessity of discourse of self-cultivation through cultivated experiences. It shows a positive perspiration of philosophizing intuitive experiences and explains why Confucians attach great importance to Tien-Dao operation and all beings creation. According to the reflection on Mou and Lao, I have several suggestions about the method of reconstruction of Confucianism: First, we must consider the accumulation of cultivated practices. Mou and Lao both notice that there are several kinds of cultivated activities, such as restrain selfish desire, purify will and arouse moral consciousness. In addition, they distinguish several contradictory types or systems, exacerbate the difference of cultivated activities into inconsistent. In fact, the accumulation of cultivated activities and experiences is a necessary condition for becoming sage. Therefore, Confucian's discourse of self-cultivation is whole and coherent only if we point out how different cultivated activities complement each other. Second, we should offer appropriate problem-settings to deal with the transcendental basis of cultivated practices. Mou solves metaphysical problems by the content of discourse of self-cultivation, however, do cultivated experiences really have the effectiveness of philosophical arguments? On the other hand, the value problem offers by Lao is hard to explain some important claims of Confucianism. Apparently, we must consider new problem-settings to deal with the Confucian's transcendental thinking appropriately, and to justify the understandableness, universality, and necessity of discourse of self-cultivation adequately. Third, we must not compulsorily discriminate several theories which contradictory to each other. In other to maintain the consistency of discrimination, Mou and Lao sacrifice the accuracy of text interpretation. For example, they comprehend Chu-Xi's view as no Ni-Jiue-Ti-Jeng, nor the moral consciousness of subject, and claim that his theory lacks any moral motivation, only the development of moral habits. In fact, Chu-Xi's theory has its own concern about cultivated experiences, it just has been ignored intentionally or unconsciously. The main goal of Confucianism is becoming sage, if there is no contradictory in ideal personality, all theories and the transcendental basis of self-cultivation will be consistent certainly.

參考文獻


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