機構投資人持股率與盈餘品質關聯性之研究

A Study of the Relationship between Institutional Ownership and Earnings Quality

陳巧綾(CIAO-LING CHEN)

指導教授 ： 王泰昌 ； 劉嘉雯

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2009.10711

摘要

外部股東之監督為外部公司治理機制之一環 (Bushman and Smith 2001)，在外部股東之中，機構投資人由於所擁有之股權較多，且相較於自然人具備充足資源與能力，而具有動機監督管理者。國外許多研究結果亦支持機構投資人具備監督管理者之功能，可提升企業營運績效、抑止管理者盈餘管理行為 (McConnell and Servaes 1990; Chung et al. 2002; Velury and Jenkins 2006)。過去國內與機構投資人相關之公司治理研究少有獨立篇幅針對機構投資人進行探討，而針對機構投資人探討之相關研究，則多著墨於盈餘管理 (楊麗玲與沈明鑑 2005; 林欣美等人 2008; 劉恩強 2005)。因此，本研究試圖站在機構投資人為外部監督者之觀點，探討機構投資人之持股對企業盈餘品質之影響，並以三種方式衡量盈餘品質，包括：裁量性應計數之絕對值、應計品質、盈餘資訊內涵，以有別於以往多以裁量性應計數衡量盈餘管理程度與機構投資人關聯性之研究。
本研究除了測試機構投資人與盈餘品質是否具線性關係外，亦測試兩者是否呈現倒U型關係，是否當機構投資人持股率過高時，反而有盈餘品質下降之現象。於額外分析部分，本研究針對政府機構、金融機構與信託基金、外資法人三類機構投資人分別測試其與盈餘品質之關聯性。並針對裁量性應計數，增額分析當以未取絕對值之裁量性應計數代理盈餘品質時，其實證結果為何；並且依照裁量性應計數之正負向區分為兩組，以測試機構投資人持股率分別對於向上、向下之盈餘管理行為的監督效果。
本研究分別以加入截距項之橫斷面修正式Jones模型及參考Kothari et al. (2005) 與Francis et al. (2003) 之做法調整績效對於裁量性應計數之影響估計出裁量性應計數，並將裁量性應計數取絕對值做為盈餘品質之代理變數。應計品質之衡量則是採用Dechow and Dichev (2002) 之模型，以殘差項之標準差衡量應計品質。盈餘資訊內涵部分，係以當期盈餘與累積異常報酬率迴歸，並以前期市值做為平減因子，評估盈餘資訊內涵。累積異常報酬率則係參考Lyon et al. (1999) 之方式，以權益市值或帳面價值與權益市值比為基礎建立參考群組，計算累積異常報酬率。研究結果如下：
1.假設機構投資人持股率與盈餘品質為線性關係時，僅以應計品質代理盈餘品質時，機構投資人持股率與盈餘品質成顯著之正向關係，支持機構投資人持股率愈高時，愈能有效監督管理者，提升應計品質。
2.在假設機構投資人持股率與盈餘品質為倒U型關係時，機構投資人持股率與應計品質、盈餘資訊內涵代理之盈餘品質成顯著倒U型關係。
3.政府機構、金融機構與信託基金持股率與應計品質代理之盈餘品質成顯著之倒U型關係；政府機構、外資法人持股率與盈餘資訊內涵代理之盈餘品質亦成顯著之倒U型關係。
4.在取絕對值之裁量性應計數、未取絕對值之裁量性應計數、正負向裁量性應計數與機構投資人持股率關聯性之結果中，假設兩者關聯性為線性之實證結果均未達顯著水準。在假設兩者關聯性為非線性時，僅在以績效調整後之修正式Jones模型估計之裁量性應計數做為應變數，且其值大於0之組別中，機構投資人持股率平方之係數達10%顯著水準，但仍無法支持機構投資人持股率與抑止管理者向上盈餘管理行為之倒U型關聯性。

關鍵字

機構投資人 ； 盈餘品質 ； 裁量性應計數 ； 應計品質 ； 盈餘資訊內涵 ； 公司治理

並列摘要

Corporate control mechanisms include both internal mechanisms and external mechanisms. Outside shareholder monitoring is one of the external mechanisms (Bushman and Smith 2001). Among those outside shareholders, institutional investors have the resources and incentives to monitor and influence management decisions. McConnell and Servaes (1990), Chung et al. (2002), Velury and Jenkins (2006) represent research that report institutional investors could constrain the self-serving behavior of corporate managers, and help improve corporate governance. This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings quality in Taiwan, and uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals, the quality of accruals, earnings informativeness as proxies for earnings quality. This study investigates both the linear and nonlinear relation between institutional ownership and earnings quality. In additional analysis, this study partitions institutional investors into three categories: government, financial institutions and trust funds, foreign institutional investors to investigate the relation between different kinds of institutional investors and earnings quality. Also, in additional analysis, this study uses discretionary accruals as dependent variables, and partitions it into two groups: positive value of discretionary accruals, negative value of discretionary accruals to examine its relation with institutional ownership.
This study applies the modified Jones model (including a constant) and performance-matched modified Jones model (including a constant) to estimate discretionary accruals, and uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals as proxies for earnings quality. This study applies the model from Dechow and Dichev (2002) to measure the quality of accruals. As to earnings informativeness, this study refers to the methods used by Lyon et al. (1999) to form reference portfolios based on market value of equity and book-to-market ratios to calculate cumulative abnormal returns, and regresses cumulative abnormal returns on current period earnings, and uses previous year’s market value of equity as scaling factor to measure ERCs. The empirical results are summarized as follows:
1.There is statistically significant linear relationship exists between institutional ownership and the quality of accruals.
2.There is statistically significant nonlinear relationship exists between institutional ownership and the quality of accruals, earnings informativeness.
3.There is statistically significant nonlinear relationship exists between government ownership, financial institutions and trust funds ownership and the quality of accruals. There is also statistically significant nonlinear relationship exists between government ownership, foreign institutional ownership and earnings informativeness.
4.There is no statistically significant linear and nonlinear relationship exists between institutional ownership and discretionary accruals, the absolute value of discretionary accruals.

並列關鍵字

institutional investors ； earnings quality ； discretionary accruals ； quality of accruals ； earnings informativeness ； corporate governance

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