群眾募資：信用風險與市場失靈

Crowdfunding: Default and Market Failure

翁立人(Li-Ren Weng)

指導教授 ： 廖咸興

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.03058

摘要

本文探討群眾募資因個別投資人查核成本高於投資金額導致無人有意願查核案件時，市場能否有機制減少案件執行者因無查核而進行詐欺的動機。結果顯示：缺乏查核時，案件執行者的私人利益與案件募資金額的大小影響其決定是否進行詐欺。若有第三方代為查核將不會有詐欺造成違約，但此時私人利益反而和投資人期望報酬呈反向關係。

關鍵字

群眾募資 ； 信用風險 ； 違約 ； 詐欺

並列摘要

This paper aims to find out the mechanism to prevent fraud of crowdfunding. In a crowdfunding activity, because the cost of state verification is higher than the value of investment, no investor wants to do state verification. A model developed to explain the decision making process of investors and project initiators of a crowdfunding project. Without state verification, the higher the value of private interests of the project initiator, the lower the possibility of fraud. When a third party does state verification for a crowdfunding project, there is no fraud. In this case, the value of private interests is negatively related to investors’ expected return due to decrease of expected default recovery.

並列關鍵字

Crowdfunding ； Credit risk ； Default ； Fraud

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